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ABSTRACT 
Experts’ analysis of the report conducted by The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in 
2011 shows that weak governance practices have been among the key causes, or at least 
exacerbate, the recent financial crisis and the severe corporate failures in the US market and 
elsewhere around the world. Therefore, governments and other regulatory bodies have been 
convinced to impose strict regulatory requirements and implement effective plans to ensure sound 
corporate governance practices. 
By reviewing extant literature, I find a clear gap in studying the effect of governance variables on 
firm performance in emerging markets in general and in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 
capital markets in particular, where the existence of majority (controlling) shareholders is 
predominant, and institutional framework is less developed. This research aims to examine the 
effect of country- and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of non-
financial firms listed in Jordan and in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
This study uses the Two-Step Dynamic System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator to examine this relationship over a seven-year period from 2008 to 2014. The empirical 
analyses include three studies. The first study examines the effect of firm-level corporate 
governance variables (e.g., ownership and board of director’s structures) on firm performance 
using the panel dataset of 113 nonfinancial listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 
Jordan. The second study examines the impact of the selected firm-level governance variables on 
firm performance using a panel dataset of 40 non-financial listed firms on the Emirates Securities 
Market (ESM) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Finally, I use the combined panel dataset of 
the nonfinancial firms (153) listed in both markets to examine the impact of a series of country- 
and firm-level governance variables on firm performance. 
This study provides evidence that governance of listed firms in Jordan and in the UAE, is 
characterised by the presence of strong blockholders (including; institutional and family investors). 
Importantly, in line with recent advances in corporate governance research (i.e., Wintoki et al., 
2012; Nguyen et al., 2014, 2015), this research provides evidence that the one-year lagged firm 
performance is significantly positively correlated with current firm performance and governance 
practices. This support the notion presented by recent advances in corporate governance research 
that dynamic framework should be applied when examining the relationship between governance 
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and performance. Moreover, the results in general suggest that the effect of ownership structure 
on firm performance persists in both markets.  
For the Jordanian market, the results indicate that the three ownership structure variables (family 
ownership, institutional ownership, and ownership concentration) appear to have statistically 
positive significant effects on firm performance. On the other hand, board of directors’ variables 
‒board size, duality and independence‒ seem to have no significant implications on firm 
performance using Jordanian dataset. This may imply that strong presence of controlling 
shareholders may substitute the implications of board of directors’ variables. 
For the UAE’s market, the results show that only ownership concentration has a positive effect on 
firm performance. The type of the dominant shareholder has no implications in this context. 
Furthermore, similar to the Jordanian case, board of director variables ‒board size and 
independence‒ have no implications on firm performance in this country. These results remain 
robust even after using alternative firm performance indicators i.e., ROA and ROE. 
The results of the third study, using the combined sample of 153 nonfinancial listed firms in Jordan 
and UAE, indicate that only ownership structure variables ‒family ownership, institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration‒ are significantly positively related to firm performance. 
Board of directors’ variables ‒size, duality and independence‒ still showing no important 
implications on firm performance. These results highlighting the importance of ownership 
structure (concentration) as the most important at firm-level governance mechanisms in such small 
emerging markets. The main findings remain robust even after using alternative governance and 
performance metrics. These results are in line with the efficient monitoring hypothesis of 
blockholders as suggested by agency theory. 
At the country-level governance, the empirical analyses executed in the third study show that 
higher national governance quality levels –such as legal protection of shareholders, the rule of law, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality– are associated with higher firm performance. 
These results are in line with the institutional theory predictions about the ability of external 
(country-level) governance instruments in improving firm performance and reducing its variability 
by encouraging low-risky investments. 
This study is one of the first studies to examine the relationships between a suite of country- 
and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using a dynamic 
modelling approach for the Jordanian and the UAE’s capital markets. The findings of this thesis 
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significantly contribute toward a better understanding of how the country-level governance and 
firm-level governance influence operational and market performance of the firms operating in the 
emerging markets of the MENA region ‒ a context has been ignored in the prior governance 
literature. The practical potential of this research in terms of policy is to inform decisions relating 
to institutional infrastructure and functions as well as pointing to possible effects of financing 
consequences as well as corporate control, ownership and governance decisions connected shaping 
a firm’s market and operational outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is a dynamic process, and it has witnessed major development during 
the past decades throughout the world1. However, corporate failures continue to proliferate. One 
example of such sever corporate failures was shown recently during the (2007-12) financial crisis. 
According to the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report (FCIC, 2011) the crisis was 
avoidable and was subsequently caused by “widespread failures in financial regulation, including 
the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in 
corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much 
risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the 
financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, 
lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in 
accountability and ethics at all levels”2. This has put policy legislators and corporate decision 
makers under pressure to develop and to ensure the effectiveness of corporate governance practices 
to prevent such corporate failures in future. Thus, investigations into the corporate governance 
issues came to the fore following these failures and financial crisis. 
The main purpose of corporate governance is to solve or minimise any potential agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, corporate governance is all about the 
defence of shareholder’s interests. The Main agency problem in corporations refers to the conflict 
of interests between a firm’s shareholders and its managers. Agency theory argues that managers 
may have their own interests which they differ from those of the firm’s shareholders, accordingly, 
they would involve in certain actions i.e., self-opportunistic activities, that may not lead to the 
main goal of corporations which is to maximise the shareholders’ wealth. In consequences, Jensen 
& Meckling (1976, p.310) stated that, “The principal can limit divergences from his interest by 
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to 
                                                 
1 For example, there are many corporate governance reforms and developments noticed around the world, such as; 
Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Higgs (2003), the combined code (2006, 08), Davies report (2011), Stewardship 
code (2012) in the UK and many others around the world. 
2 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission is a research committee contains 11 academic staff from the University of 
Stanford and other government organizations to examine the main causes of the recent financial crisis that started in 
the US market in 2007 and extended elsewhere around the world. 
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limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition, in some situations it will pay the agent to 
expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would 
harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions”. 
Thus, corporate governance practices seem to be a controlling and monitoring mechanisms over 
the managerial behaviour to assure maximum corporate financial performance. 
This type of agency conflict (i.e., P-A conflict) mainly arise as a result of separation of 
ownership and control, and usually happening in capital markets characterised by a wide 
dispersion of ownership i.e., USA and UK capital markets (Berle and Means, 1932). On the other 
hand, in emerging markets, such as Jordan and the UAE, the ownership is highly concentrated in 
the hand of controlling shareholders i.e., families, institutional investors and managerial positions 
held by majority shareholders or their representatives (Alnajjar, 2010). In such cases, a part from 
the traditional agency conflict (P-A conflict), other form of agency conflict may arise i.e., the 
conflict of interests between majority (controlling) shareholders and other minority shareholders 
(Young et al., 2008). Moreover, in such countries, country-level corporate governance instruments 
(i.e., the market for corporate control) may be inactive or even absent, and the legal and 
institutional environment is entirely weak, which may exacerbate this conflict, and leads to 
negative implications on firm performance in general (La Porta et al., 1997; Dharwadkar et al., 
2000; Morck et al., 2005). 
Given these major corporate governance issues, corporate governance research has grown 
rapidly in recent times (Millan, 2016). While the vast majority of this research was mainly 
concerned with the traditional agency conflict (i.e., P-A conflict) which is exclusively related to 
large emerging markets of the developing countries i.e. China, Japan, and India, or the developed 
countries i.e., USA and UK, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
in small emerging markets i.e., the MENA region countries have been uncovered by prior literature 
(Al-Najjar & Clark, 2017). Moreover, prior academic literature has failed to provide consensus 
evidence with regards to this relationship in general. There are several reasons that stood behind 
the inconsistency status of the extant corporate governance research which will be explained in the 
next section.  
Concurrently, recent advances provided by  corporate governance literature have focused on 
how the national governance quality differences may affect and shape firm-level governance 
mechanisms, and consequently, firm performance (Anderson & Gupta, 2009; Klapper & Love, 
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2004; Love, 2010; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015; and Aslan & Kumar, 2014). These arguments 
give support to those presented in this research, that, a corporate governance research must be 
executed at both country- and firm-level issues.  
Indeed, regarding these calls and shortcomings in prior literature, this research will examine 
role of country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on firm performance in the MENA region; 
mainly, Jordan and the UAE. Specifically, this research will take a look at the effect of ownership 
structure ‒the type of majority shareholders and ownership concentration‒ and board of directors’ 
structure ‒board size, duality and independence‒ on firm performance; two important dimensions 
of firm-level governance mechanisms. Moreover, this research will examine the direct effect of 
the national governance quality indicators on firm performance. Accordingly, this research will 
take a look at the issues of corporate governance in small emerging markets and the effectiveness 
of such governance mechanisms in controlling, reducing, or mitigating agency problem between 
majority (controlling) shareholders and other minority shareholders, using a complementary-
multi-theoretical (i.e., agency, stewardship, resource dependency, and institutional) framework. 
The next sections of this chapter present the research’s background, problems, research 
questions and objectives, additionally, it includes the significance of the study, scope of the study, 
research approach and finally the thesis outline. 
1.2 Extant of Knowledge and Research Gaps 
Despite that “corporate governance” as a term is relatively new one both in the public and 
academic debates, the issues it addresses have been around for much longer, at least since Berle 
and Means, (1932), and even earlier, Smith, (1776). This has led to develop several theoretical 
assumptions that concerning with corporate governance issues. For example; Jensen & Meckling, 
(1976) develop a modern corporate governance theory based on the agency problem. According 
to Jensen & Meckling, (1976, p.308) agency relationship is “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. 
Similarly, Freeman in (1984) broadens and develops the agency concepts to include any 
parties that could affect or be affected by the interrelationships inside the corporations, to more 
generalist view called stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory of Freeman’s (1984) identifies 
and models groups of stakeholders and recommends methods by which management can deal to 
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satisfy the interests of these different groups of stakeholders of corporations. It should be noted 
that, this research will not use the stockholders’ approach, but it will focus on shareholders’ 
approach in examining the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
Other theories have evolved in the prior corporate governance literature including; resource 
dependency theory of Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) or even stewardship theory of Donaldson & 
Davis, (1991). 
Concurrently, recent thinking about corporate governance and firm’s financial performance 
relationship has been influenced by institutional theory. This holds that firm-level governance and 
performance may be affected by institutional characteristics and legal system of the hosting 
country (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Nevertheless, corporate governance issues seem to be hard to be 
fully explained using sole-theoretical background. Each theory has advanced the knowledge using 
different angel of research. Thus, this research allows for potential complementary role of these 
theories by examining the impact of country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on firm 
performance. 
With regards to its definition, prior literature has defined corporate governance in different 
ways. One of the influential definitions that has been the basics of the recent research agendas 
provided by Shleifer & Vishny, (1997), define corporate governance mechanism as “economic 
and legal institutions that can be altered through the political process-sometimes for the better” 
(p.738), whereas these mechanisms vary across countries and within firms (Doidge et al., 2007; 
and La Porta et al., 1999). Also, corporate governance mechanisms can be under two main 
classifications; namely, internal and external governance mechanisms. According to Jensen, 
(1993), internal governance mechanism include many variables related to the firms structure such 
as board of directors or ownership structure, while external governance mechanism refers to the 
market for corporate control or legal system of the hosting country (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
A full review and syntheses of extant corporate governance research and the extent to which 
corporate governance mechanisms affect a firm performance is presented CHAPTER 2: of this 
thesis (literature review chapter). In the process of this review, three major avenues that deserve 
further research have been identified at a general view of the relationship between governance and 
performance, and one important aspect at the specific context of this research i.e., MENA region 
corporate governance issues. First, extant related literature was found to be extensively relied on 
one theoretical assumptions; mainly agency theory, to understand how to control managers and to 
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align their interests with the shareholders’ ones. While the potential complementary and supportive 
views of other theories i.e., institutional theory has been ignored. Secondly, extant researches 
ignored the important role of the external governance mechanisms i.e., national governance system 
in mitigating the agency conflicts, and hence, improving firm performance. Thirdly, in terms of 
methodological approach, most of extant related researches ignores the fact that governance 
mechanisms are decisions and activities ‒that certainly depend on how firms perform‒ to influence 
future outcomes. In other words, the relationship between corporate governance structures and 
firm performance is dynamic in its nature (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Thus, large body of prior empirical research plagued with endogeneity issues, which leads to 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, and in some cases, reverse the inference and make it 
unreliable. Finally, the majority of extant corporate governance research was basically developed 
by investigating governance issues in developed and large developing economies such as USA, 
UK, European countries, and China, other small emerging markets i.e., Jordan and UAE as a part 
of the MENA region have been ignored from prior empirical analysis. Each of these points is now 
explained in turn. 
Prior academic literature was found to be over reliant upon a common approach that is about 
to examine the impact of isolated corporate governance mechanisms on a firm’s financial 
performance using single theoretical assumptions. For example; Cui & Mak, (2002) and Hamadi 
& Heinen, (2015) relied on agency theory’s assumption of need for controlling owners to lead the 
business, they conclude that managerial ownership creates countervailing interest alignment and 
entrenchment effects, leading to a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. Farrell & Hersch, (2005), Kim, Pantzalis, & Park, (2013), and Millstein & MacAvoy, 
(1998) neglected to consider the agency theoretical standpoints about control and motivation and 
instead  of using  a sole resource dependence theory conjectures to understand the value added by 
board of directors characteristics and diversity. Similarly, Miller et al., (2014) and Andres, (2008) 
neglected to consider resource dependency role  and evaluate the effect of controlling family 
shareholders upon firm’s financial performance from agency perspectives. 
Although, all the above mentioned researches and publications are well executed and 
thorough, the general results failed to explain the impact that a wider definition of corporate 
governance, e.g., one that simultaneously encompasses all three theories, would have upon firm 
performance. The issue is perhaps best summed up by Nicholson & Kiel, (2007, p. 585) who utilize 
the three main theories in investigating the corporate governance-performance link, concluded that 
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“while each theory can explain a particular case, no single theory explains the general pattern of 
results”. Indeed, this highlights the importance of using multi-theoretical approach in examining 
the corporate governance issues, which is a point covered in this thesis. 
The second shortcoming that was found to exist centred on an apparent research failing to 
consider how the association between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm’s 
financial performance would differ in line with the context of the overall national governance 
quality under which the firms operate in hosting country. Especially, in one such recent academic 
publications of Filatotchev et al., (2013) and Kumar & Zattoni, (2013) who call for investigating 
the impact of combining country-level and firm-level governance variables in studies on corporate 
governance issues. Also, Black et al., (2014) and Aguilera & Jackson, (2010) observed that 
integrating cross-disciplinary paradigms is important to understand corporate governance issues 
in depth and to make generalization more reliable. Subsequent recent evidence provided by 
Nguyen et al., (2015) that  indicates the national governance quality matter for the impact of 
ownership concentration upon firm’s financial performance in emerging markets, moreover, they 
report positive impact of national governance indicators on firm performance. 
On the other hand, recent academic publications (e.g., Wang & Shailer, 2015) stated that 
how and to what extent governance mechanisms affect firm’s financial performance operating in 
emerging markets is still a controversial question. This is not only because of the confliction of 
theoretical predications but also due to the inconsistence of empirical finding. Moreover, Wang & 
Shailer, (2015) call to further examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance by using data from markets that share similar corporate governance characteristics. 
While very recently, Al-Najjar & Clark, (2017, p. 6) highlight the importance of investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the MENA region’s context, 
and observe that the impact of external and internal governance in MENA region has not been 
explored yet. This proposal can be seen limitless, and consequently, there is a need to investigate 
the impact of corporate governance mechanisms upon firm performance in MENA context, and to 
explore whether national governance quality has direct impact on firm performance in this region. 
Moreover, it should be noted that, the most of Arab countries have undertaken privatisation 
plans since the early 90s. These plans tend to transform the majority of state-owned enterprises 
SOEs into private equites. However, governments in some of the Arab markets still holding large 
stakes of portfolios. Jordan’s experience during 1998 – 2008 seems to be different. The 
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Government of Jordan (GOJ) privatised fourteen SOEs –in telecommunications, electricity, air 
transport, mining and other sectors– with technical assistance program financing from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) demonstrates both how privatisation can provide 
a wide range of benefits to society and how to implement a privatization program (Mako, 2012). 
Given these ownership structure transformations, this research provides significant chance to 
examine the ownership concentrations and the type of majority shareholders’ effects on firm 
performance as a key firm-level governance mechanisms. 
The third shortcoming that was identified in prior research is related to the methodological 
approaches that has been used to examine the corporate governance‒performance relationship. 
Prior empirical literature which examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance deals with different aspects of corporate governance mechanisms. Some papers find 
that board size may influence corporate financial performance negatively (Guest, 2009; Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007). Other papers reflect the importance of 
board independence in mitigating agency conflict, and thus enhancing firm’s financial 
performance (Boone et al., 2007; Jameson, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 2014; Li et al., 2015). Also, 
there is another research strand that shows the importance of ownership structure i.e. concentration 
and large-shareholders in imposing efficient mentoring on managerial behaviour to promote 
financial performance (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001; Alipour, 2013; Dalton et al.,  2003; McIntyre et al., 2007; Welch, 2003; Maury 
& Pajuste, 2005; Maury, 2006; Andres, 2008). 
In spite of thorough and methodologically sound, these papers failed to provide consensus 
evidence and conclusive empirical results. Nevertheless, these studies utilised different databases 
in different time frames or even in different countries, they failed to provide consensus evidence 
to explain how corporate financial performance would be affected by a firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms i.e. ownership structure and board structure3. Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 
(2012) justified the inconsistencies in the empirical evidence of corporate governance‒
performance research to the inappropriate endogeneity treatment, and argue that extant governance 
research neglects one source of endogeneity that often rises from the possibility that current values 
of governance variables are a function of past firm performance, this is often referred as a 
“dynamic relationship” between governance and performance. Thus, they proposed a well-
                                                 
3For more details about extant literature associated with the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, please refer to Error! Reference source not found.. 
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developed Dynamic Panel Generalized Method of Moments GMM that alleviate endogeneity 
concerns thoroughly. 
Indeed, considering these research shortcoming, and consequently, this research will 
examine the relationship between corporate governance ‒internal and external‒ mechanisms and 
firm performance in Jordan and in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as representative markets of 
the MENA region using a dynamic modelling approach (System GMM). 
1.3 Research Objectives & Questions  
This research aims: 
First, to examine to what extent that corporate governance mechanisms explain corporate 
financial performance in MENA region represented by Jordan and United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
as a form of emerging markets, using an integrated theoretical framework that encompasses four 
main theoretical assumptions including; agency theory, resource dependency theory, stewardship 
theory, and finally institutional theory. Secondly, to determine whether the national governance 
quality variables have significant effect on firm performance. Thirdly, the author is seeking to 
identify the most relevant country- and firm-level corporate governance mechanism(s) in reducing 
and mitigating agency conflict in these two different countries. And finally, to provide consequent 
recommendations to managerial bodies and policy makers on a wider set of factors to consider 
when constructing corporate governance variables based on aggregate circumstances that most 
accurately reflect the national governance system that the firms operate into enhance firm 
performance levels. 
According to the described research shortcomings in the previous section, and given that 
corporate governance issues that prevails these days, the author states the below questions as the 
main issues in corporate governance research that must be addressed in the two-selected capital 
markets as they share the similar governance and capital market characteristics: 
Main research question: In what way, will the corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms affect the firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in the UAE as a form of small 
emerging markets of the MENA region? 
It is worthy to mention that; this research will investigate the above-mentioned research 
question indifferent manner. For example, unlike most of extant governance research, the focus 
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will not be placed only on the relationship between the internal governance variables (i.e., 
ownership and board structures), but also the direct influence and the possible correlations between 
the national governance quality variables and firm performance. By doing so, a deeper 
understanding of the issues involved may be obtained, and enrich the academic overwhelming 
debate regarding the relationship between governance and performance. 
The above aforementioned research question can now be broken into more specific research 
questions as follow: 
1. In what way (for example, likely or unlikely) will the attributes of the ownership 
concentration (ownership structure) affect firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in the 
UAE? 
It should be noted that, the term “ownership concentration” here refers to both ‘intensity’ 
and ‘identity’ of stock ownership. In other words, this research will have a look at the type of 
majority (controlling) shareholders and the aggregate ownership concentration effects on firm 
performance. 
2. Will the firm’s activities and other governance practices (i.e., board of directors’ 
independence, duality, and size) be beneficial or harmful to the firm’s financial performance 
in Jordan and in the UAE? 
3. What will be the effect of the external country-level governance mechanisms (national 
governance quality) on firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in the UAE? 
Accordingly, by investigating the above questions, the research will further advance 
academic understanding of how a wider set of governance constructs (e.g., those that emerge from 
simultaneous application of agency, resource dependency, stewardship, and institutional 
theoretical standpoints) contribute to firm performance and valuation, and provide managers, 
owners, and policy makers on how to align their governance structure and design to best standards 
under the specific circumstances in which their firms operate (e.g., national governance system 
quality).  
Table 1-1 below provides a summary of some of the prior empirical investigations together 
and theoretical basis that is used to help justify and formulate the above-mentioned research 
questions. Additionally, it provides the reasons that carried the researcher to conduct this study in 
these two specific emerging markets context. Also, it provides a brief explanation about the 
importance of the study and the possible contributions and significance that the study’s results may 
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contribute to the current body of literature in corporate finance and especially in governance field, 
which may help improve governance quality and firm performance levels.
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Table 1-1 Research questions and its justifications 
Main research question  Sub-research questions Theoretical bases of the 
study 
Some of the previous studies 
associated with t research questions 
Why is this study being 
conducted? 
In what way, will the 
corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms 
(internal and external) 
affect firm performance 
in Jordan and UAE as a 
form of emerging 
markets of MENA 
region? 
RQ1: In what way, will the 
attributes of the ownership 
structure (share ownership 
identity and concentration) 
affect firm performance in 
Jordan and UAE? 
Main theoretical lens: 
Agency theory: 
Principal-Agent and 
Principal-Principal 
conflicts (also known as 
agency problem type II) 
(Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Connelly et al, 2012; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Knyazeva et al., 2013; 
Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990; Connelly 
et al.,  2010; Richter & Weiss, 2013; 
Byun et al., 2011; Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 
2010; Demsetatz & Lehn, 1985) 
among others. 
Corporate governance issues 
have been rarely considered in 
the emerging markets of the 
MENA region. Jordan and 
UAE represent an interesting 
platform to examine corporate 
governance effect on firm 
performance, as capital 
markets in these two countries 
are characterised with high 
ownership concentration, and 
weak external (market) forces. 
Moreover, these two countries 
are most representatives in 
terms of governance practices 
among other countries in the 
MENA region. To best of the 
researcher’s knowledge the 
direct impact of national 
governance quality on firm 
performance has never been 
examined in the MENA 
region before. 
RQ2: Will the firm's activities 
and other governance practices 
(i.e., Board size, 
independence, and duality) 
affect firm performance in 
Jordan and UAE? 
Complementary: 
Resource dependence 
theory, Stewardship 
theory, 
(Sur, Lvina, & Magnan, 2013; Sanjai 
Bhagat & Black, 2001; Chen, Barry 
Lin, & Yi, 2008; Elsayed, 2007; Harris 
& Helfat, 1998; Linck, Netter, & 
Yang, 2008; Zona, 2014; Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004; Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & 
Yang, 2015; Chen, 2014) among 
others. 
RQ3: What will be the effect 
of the external (country-level) 
governance mechanisms on 
firm performance in Jordan 
and UAE? 
And Institutional theory 
(Kim & Ozdemir, 2014; Richter & 
Weiss 2013; Ernstberger & Grüning 
2013; Essen et al., 2013; Schiehll et al. 
2014; Donadelli et al., 2014; Beck et 
al., 2003; Klapper & Love 2004; 
Nguyen et al. 2015; Ngobo & Fouda 
2012) among others. 
Note: This table has been formulated based on author’s considerations from extant literature (self-compiled). RQ denote research question. 
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1.4 Research Significance and Contribution 
This study has a significant practical and theoretical importance, as the findings of this 
research should contribute to the academic research and other policy-makers on corporate 
governance issues in several ways. First, it can be considered as one of the first studies to examine 
the joint impact of external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance in the MENA context (see for example; Al-Najjar & Clark, 
2017). While prior corporate governance literature has paid extensive attention to the role of 
internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency conflict, the role of national 
(country-level) governance in this context has been under researched (Schiehll & Martins, 2016). 
Specifically, recent advances in corporate governance literature i.e., Aslan & Kumar, (2014); Van 
Essen et al., (2013); Globerman, Peng, and Shapiro (2011); Aguilera & Jackson, (2010) among 
others, suggest that every corporate governance research must take into account the national 
governance environment that firms are embedded in. Thus, this research responds to these calls 
and provide new evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
using an integrated framework of national (country-level) and internal (firm-level) governance 
factors. 
Second, in terms of methodological applications, this research employs a well-developed 
suitable and rigorous method for testing the relationships between corporate governance variables 
and firm performance. By using the dynamic modelling ‒Dynamic System GMM‒ approach, a 
technique has been introduced and recommended recently by corporate governance advances i.e., 
Wintoki et al., (2012). This research stands in the best modelling choice, which has the ability in 
controlling potential endogeneity issues inherent in corporate governance research (Wintoki et al., 
(2012). Moreover, findings obtained in this research confirm the notions  that have been suggested 
recently by corporate governance scholars that the relationship between corporate governance 
structures and firm performance must be examined in a dynamic framework rather than traditional 
static (Nguyen et al.,2014, 2015; Wintoki et al., 2012). Indeed, this will gain the research much 
importance in terms of the methodological standpoint. 
Third, this research explores the corporate governance‒performance relationship based on 
the application of the new corporate governance codes that has been issued and released lately in 
MENA countries, basically in the year 2007 in UAE and in the year 2008 in Jordan. The limited 
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literature on this topic in these two small emerging markets has been executed in a pre-governance 
codes era. For example; Al-Khouri, (2005) relied on a set of data covering the period between 
1998 and 2001 to examine the corporate governance‒performance relationship in Jordan. Zeitun 
& Tian, (2007) and Zeitun, (2009) examine ownership effect on firm’s performance in Jordan 
based on longitudinal data set covering the period between 1989 and 2002. Similarly, in the UAE 
Hassan & Halbouni, (2013) relied on data published in 2008 only to perform cross-sectional 
analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance on firm’s financial performance. 
Moustafa, (2005) relied on a longitudinal set of data covering the period between 1998 and 2002 
to examine the effect of separation between ownership and control on UAE firms’ performance. 
Consequently, this research will provide comprehensive comments about the effectiveness of these 
corporate governance codes in these two MENA markets. 
Fourth, the majority of prior corporate governance investigations utilizes one underlying 
theoretical assumptions mainly agency theory through an approach that has been criticized recently 
by many scholars because of the limitations that may impose on the research (Moore, 2015). For 
example, agency theory suggests a positive relationship between board independence and firm’s 
financial performance however, it never addresses if board of directors characteristics may 
endogenously be related to firm’s financial performance (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). As noted 
earlier, recent advances in corporate governance research highlight the importance of other 
theoretical standpoints in explaining the governance: performance relationship. For example; 
Filatotchev et al., (2013) argues that national governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule 
of law, or investor protection levels, may influence the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices, and hence firm performance. This implies that institutional theory may provide more 
complete representation of the process of governance, and consequently a greater explanation of 
corporate performance. 
Using a complementary-multi-theoretical perspective to include institutional theory as a 
vehicle through which to understand the effect of context specific variables (e.g., national 
governance quality) will add to the academic practical understanding of the macro-level critical 
effects on corporate performance. Specifically, this research seeks for contributing to 
understanding how the institutional and legal system differ among countries, and how these 
differences affect the corporate financial performance. This will provide academics, shareholders, 
managers, and policy makers in these two specific emerging markets, and other similar markets in 
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the MENA region with guidelines on how best to govern firms in circumstances represented by 
the national governance system quality in which firms operate. 
Finally, this research is tending to provide the best bundle or the optimal options of corporate 
governance i.e., country- and firm-level mechanisms, which could be used to mitigate agency 
conflicts, and consequently, increasing firm financial performance levels in MENA context in 
general, and in the Jordanian and UAE’s capital markets in particular. Most of the prior studies 
have tried to relate to the substitutability and complementarity effects between individual firm-
level governance mechanisms4. However, one important argument presented in this research is 
that, it would be difficult for companies to rely on the internal firm-level governance practices 
only to solve agency conflicts. Thus, this research suggests that country- and firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms must combine to mitigate agency problems and enhance firm 
performance levels. This should alert shareholders, managers, and practitioners alike to the choice 
or the methods of structuring governing business entities in MENA context under the national 
governance system and legal differences. 
1.5 Scope of the Research 
It is worth noting that this study will utilize the shareholding perspectives rather than 
stakeholding in investigating the governance-performance relationship. This is not to undervalue 
the role of the stakeholders in the business life, but just to make the research manageable as 
stakeholders include; employees, lenders, suppliers, and even customers. The important role of 
stakeholders in shaping the relationship between corporate governance and performance may be 
considered in postdoctoral work in future. The next three subsections respectively describe the 
justifications of choosing Jordan and UAE as a platform to execute this study, choosing publicly-
listed firms, and why investigating firm performance in such small emerging market context, 
where ownership is concentrated and external legal environment is weak, is important. 
                                                 
4 For more analysis about the complementary and substitutory evidence of the corporate governance mechanisms, 
please refer to publications provided by (Aguilera et al., 2008; Schepker & Oh, 2012; Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 
2009; Kim & Ozdemir, 2014) among others. 
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1.5.1 Why Jordan and the UAE? 
Recent meta-analysis provided by Wang & Shailer, (2015) shows that there are major 
differences in the relationship between governance variables i.e., ownership concentration, and 
firm performance across countries. These differences are directly driven by the country’s 
institutional farmworker. This accordingly, highlights the need for comparative studies of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Comparative corporate 
governance studies overcome the prior solo-country analysis in terms of generalization. However, 
given the lack of corporate governance data, executing wide comparative analysis on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance seem to be challengeable. In 
fact, corporate governance data collection in multi-country analysis is time-consuming, difficult 
and costly. Recent advances in cross-national corporate governance research have proposed 
potential solution to overcome these difficulties through the utilization of well-constructed 
research sample that highly represents the selected countries.5 
Following these recommendations, the empirical analysis which was executed in this 
research is based on an aggregate sample of nonfinancial listed firms in two typical developing 
countries with high emerging capital markets; Jordan and United Arab Emirates (UAE). These 
two markets are chosen to be the study platform to conduct the required analysis because they are 
the most representative markets in terms of corporate governance practices and development of 
national governance quality in the MENA region.6 
Indeed, compared with other MENA countries, the Jordanian and UAE’s corporate sectors 
represent an intriguing research laboratory that presents an opportunity to expand prior limited 
investigations and to make several contributions to the existing knowledge that we already have. 
At the first place, due to the different ownership form than the prevailing “diffused” ownership 
structure in the most countries around the world, Jordan’s and UAE’s corporate sector is highly 
concentrated which will enable us to understand the influence of concentrated ownership on the 
underlying firm’s financial performance. Additionally, firms listed in these two capital markets 
are mostly held and/or controlled by multiple blockholders, including families and institutional 
investors (mutual funds, pension funds, banks and other large financial institutions). In a situation 
                                                 
5 See for example; Black et al., (2014). 
6 Chapter two of this introductory part provides more details about the institutional settings and other related 
backgrounds on this research about the MENA region in general and about Jordan and the UAE in particular. 
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where there is frequently no difference between management and board of directors as the board 
members usually hold the chairman role, especially in listed firms in Jordan. 
Secondly, most of prior research executed regarding the concentrated ownership effects and 
other underlying firm’s governance activities and practices was mainly done in large emerging 
markets such as china and India. As noted earlier, corporate governance research in small emerging 
markets such as those of the MENA region is still very limited (Al-Najjar & Clark, 2017). 
Therefore, the findings of this research will contribute to other similar-size emerging economies 
in the entire region. 
Thirdly, Jordan offers a unique institutional setting for the corporate governance research. 
This is because Jordanian government has implemented a privatisation plan since the late 1990s 
that covers most of the public large corporations in Jordan. This ownership transformation 
supposed to raise the efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness of the corporations in the public 
sector. Thus, the finding of this research will examine the effectiveness of this privatization plan 
indirectly by investigating the effect of the concentrated ownership and other firm’s activities on 
the financial performance of the nonfinancial listed firms in Jordan. Additionally, Jordanian and 
UAE’s corporate governance experience is relatively new one. In 2008 the Jordanian government 
has proposed the first corporate governance code to encourage listed firms to imply with the 
international governance mechanisms. While in the UAE corporate governance code for listed 
companies was launched in 2007. Due to its importance to the transitional economies, corporate 
governance has witnessed several developments since that time in these two countries. Thus, it’s 
very important to examine these implications on listed firm’s financial performance in these two 
emerging markets. 
Finally, compared with other countries in the MENA region, these two economies are typical 
in terms of national governance quality. While UAE is the most representative economy for the 
relatively high minority protection (60.10) and high rule of law cluster, Jordanian economy 
represents relatively law minority protection (42.00) and low rule of law group (World Bank, 
2016). Given that these two economies are highly representatives for two different groups of 
national governance systems (well-developing vs. under-developing) in the same MENA region, 
the generalization of the research findings is commonly achievable. According to Mallin, Melis, 
& Gaia, (2014) comparing diverse institutional settings should improve the findings’ 
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generalization. This together, provides an opportunity to conduct a rigorous empirical 
investigation using firm-level and country-level governance and financial data. 
1.5.2 Why Publicly-listed Firms? 
As noted earlier, the main purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Accordingly, we rely on nonfinancial listed firms to 
execute the empirical analysis. There are several reasons that clarify the choice of publicly listed 
corporations in this study. First, data availability and reliability. Publicly-traded firms usually have 
more trustworthy sources of data, mainly- annual reports- which are available to the public at any 
point of time through the firm’s website or through capital market portals. Indeed, as the shares of 
listed firms are usually publicly traded, this will give the research the advantage of using market-
based financial performance, specifically Tobin’s Q, and will avoid limiting the performance 
analysis to the accounting-based measures of financial performance if private firms were only 
used.  
Secondly, it is well-documented that corporate governance codes are usually issued to 
regulate the business environment. In particular, governments and other regulatory bodies usually 
show especial interests to those firms that are publicly listed and markedly traded, as these firms 
represent the main economic growth drivers for any country. Thirdly, publicly-listed firms have 
more possibilities of minority shareholders’ wealth expropriation. Unlike SMEs, listed firms may 
have several blockholders rather than main controlling shareholders. This may raise the 
possibilities that controlling shareholders which may execute activities that account for their own 
private benefits on minority shareholder accounts. In terms, this may have several implications on 
firm’s financial health. Under these perspectives, publicly-listed firms provide an excellent 
framework to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
relative to other form of business i.e., SMEs. 
1.5.3 Why Investigating Firm Performance? 
The determinants of firm performance have been a subject of wide interests among 
academics, regulatory and professional bodies. A one important concern is that business financial 
health and firm profitability is a key driver of a country’s economic growth and its financial 
developments. Thus, as noted in literature review section, the relationship between corporate 
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governance mechanisms and firm performance has been one of the most studied areas in corporate 
finance research. In some cases, corporate governance activities may help in protecting minority 
shareholders’ wealth from controlling shareholders’ expropriations activities, which in turns may 
reflects weak financial performance of public firms. 
In most of the emerging markets where capital markets are usually characterised by highly 
concentrated ownership, managerial control is much weaker than in those capital markets with 
widely dispersed ownership. In such market, blockholders are the true owners and the key 
controllers in most cases. As noted earlier, this may lead to the conflict of interests between 
controlling blockholders and other minority shareholders. Usually referred as Principal-Principal 
PP conflict in prior corporate governance literature. 
According to ROSC, (2004) around 70 firms out of 161 were supermajority owned, and 
family ownership is one of the key blockholders in most sectors in the Jordanian capital market. 
Thus, it could be argued that, main corporate decisions can be taken without referral to other minor 
investors. In these perspectives, it would be exceptionally difficult to directly quantify the effects 
of minority investors’ wealth expropriations activities in such economies in real life. However, 
such wealth expropriation activities conducted by controlling blockholders might be manifested 
in reduction in the firm’s financial performance. It is worth noting that this view has been widely-
documented in prior corporate governance literature. See for example (Claessens et al., 1999; Qian 
et al., 2011; and De Cesari, 2012) among others. Indeed, taking in mind other possible factors, 
firms with minority shareholder wealth expropriation effects will underperform other firms (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Meoli et al., 2008). This reflects the importance of examining firm performance 
issues in emerging markets such as the selected countries of this analysis; Jordan and the UAE. 
1.6 Research Approach 
This research examines the role of country-and firm-level governance on firm performance 
using a secondary panel data set for the period from 2008 to 2014. It utilises the dynamic two-step 
System GMM to examine the relationship between governance variables and financial 
performance of the nonfinancial listed firms in Jordan and in the UAE. The Jordan and the UAE 
as MENA region emerging capital markets were defined as the research population, as they seem 
to be most representatives of governance activities among the region’s other countries, and data 
was collected via a combination of secondary databases providers e.g., DataStream, capital 
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markets web-portals, and company’s annual reports. In all, the sample ultimately contains a total 
of 153 nonfinancial listed companies from the two capital markets, 113 of which operate in 
Amman Stock Exchange ASE (Jordan), and 40 in Emirates Security Exchange market ESM (UAE) 
(section 4.3, Chapter 4). 
Having identified, on ground to its ability to analyse path dependent constructs, and to 
alleviate any potential endogeneity issues in corporate governance research, the two-step Dynamic 
System Generalized Method of Moments GMM, proposed by Blundell & Bond, (1998) was 
selected as the most appropriate analytical tool in this thesis.7 This is a well-developed econometric 
technique that employs suitable and rigorous methods for testing the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
In addition to this introductory chapter, the rest of this thesis is structured and organised as 
follows: 
Chapter two – Corporate governance and firm performance: a review of extant literature; 
following the first two introductory chapters, the thesis proceeds with a detailed review of prior 
literature associated with the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
The review starts by discussing the main definitions and models of corporate governance that 
seems dominants in prior literature. It then presents the theoretical and conceptual foundations of 
the corporate governance research. It also provides a wide range of analysis of the previous 
empirical studies carried out in the developed countries and emerging markets that gives a review 
about the relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance. Given that 
the perceived gap in knowledge is identified and is directly relating to the specific variables, the 
final part of the review has been devoted to reviewing literature relating to “national governance 
quality” in the context of corporate governance and debates the extent to which such institutional 
differences represent a set of relevant variables to firm-level governance mechanisms and to its 
financial performance. The focus is on panel-data studies on publicly listed firms. At this point, 
the research hypotheses were eventually built based on the theoretical and empirical analysis. 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that, for specification and comparison purposes, other econometric estimators such as FE and 
traditional OLS were employed. 
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Chapter three – Institutional framework: an overview about Jordan and UAE; this chapter 
introduces the corporate governance status and other institutional setting including national 
governance system differences in the MENA region in general, and in Jordan and UAE in 
particular. Specifically, in this chapter we provide details about the Jordanian and the UAE’s 
capital markets characteristics and governance and regulations reforms in these two emerging 
markets. 
Chapter four – Governance variables and firm performance: methodological issues; after 
reviewing the extant literature, identifying the perceived gap of knowledge, and building the 
research hypotheses, the next step is to provide a clear process and design to perform the research 
methodology. A full description of the research design to test the research hypotheses is given. 
This covers the research philosophy, and the general research approach, selecting the sample and 
data sources, variables metrics and construction, and finally exploring the nature of the selected 
data and the research methodological issues and treatments to identify the best model 
specifications, and the most appropriate analysis techniques. 
Chapter five – Corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from Jordan; this 
chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm performance 
in Jordan. Specifically, this chapter discusses the descriptive analysis of the date, correlation 
matrices, multiple regression analysis, and the robustness analysis of the main findings. 
Chapter six – Corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from UAE; this chapter 
presents the empirical findings of examining the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and firm performance in UAE. Specifically, this chapter discusses the descriptive 
analysis of the main variables of interests, correlation matrices, multiple regression analysis, and 
the robustness analysis of the main findings. 
Chapter seven – Governance variables and firm performance: evidence from the combined 
sample of Jordan and UAE; the main purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between 
a suite of internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) governance variables and firm 
performance using the aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE. Specifically, this chapter discusses 
the descriptive analysis of the used variables, correlation matrices, multiple regression analysis, 
and the robustness analysis of the main results of the effects of governance (country- and firm-
level) mechanism on firm performance using the combined sample of the two countries. 
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Chapter eight – Research conclusions; equipped with the empirical results obtained in 
(Chapter 5, 6 and 7) respectively, the final chapter of this thesis provides a conclusion of the results 
and consideration of the potential implications and the / contributions of the main findings to 
academia and policy makers. Furthermore, it synthesis limitations, and signposts future research 
recommendations. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
At this point of the thesis, the author has outlined the importance of examining corporate 
governance issues these days for business life and policy making disciplines in general and in 
emerging markets of the MENA region in particular, where the national governance standards are 
relatively low and the market control mechanisms are absent. The early concluded comments 
obtained in this section are that prior corporate governance research has found to be plagued by 
different issues that prevent the consistency in research findings. It has failed to consider the extent 
to which firms hosting governance environment might alter and affect the efficiency of its internal 
corporate governance system and, hence, firm performance levels‒leaving a significant gap and 
leading to conclude that researching these areas will make significant contribution in 
understanding the traditional governance: performance relationship‒ it will also provide important 
implications to academia, shareholders, management, and policy makers. In the next chapter 
presented is the discussion about corporate governance and institutional settings in MENA context 
in general, and it explores further the specific governance and regulation reforms and 
characteristics of the Jordanian and the UAE’s capital markets in particular. 
The next chapter of the thesis is the literature review and hypothesis developments; it begins 
by discussing the corporate governance definitions and its prevailing models. Furthermore, it 
provides theoretical justifications of why country- and firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms may affect firm’s financial performance. The chapter then proceeds to synthesise the 
extent empirical evidence that is associated with each identified element of corporate governance 
i.e., firm- and country- level governance mechanisms in affecting firm’s financial performance. 
Finally, chapter summary is concluded. 
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE – A REVIEW OF EXTANT 
LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been a hot topic in the business world for centuries, even though 
the term itself is quite new. It is wide and vast subject, in fact, it is one of the topics that is becoming 
increasingly important in recent times. As noted earlier, the recent financial crisis has promoted 
the importance of corporate governance in preventing such corporate familiars to happen in future. 
Prior corporate governance literature provides a wealth of insights on the relationship between 
governance variables and firm performance under many research disciplinarians. Despite this wide 
variety in corporate governance research, prior literature yielded equivocal findings that seem to 
divert little attention to corporate governance issues in the emerging markets of the MENA region 
in particular, where firm-level corporate governance system is characterised by the prevalence of 
ownership concentration, with weak country-level governance instruments. 
Employing the differences in the institutional context (i.e., a country’s national governance 
quality that the firms operate in) may offer a chance to advance the corporate governance- 
performance relationship arguments in current literature. Drawing on the traditional corporate 
governance theoretical basis, it is too difficult to find or justify corporate governance under general 
theory, definition, mechanisms or a sole-type of corporate governance practices. It is complicated. 
In fact, there are many reasons for this complexity: 
First of all, due to the combined social and economic characteristics of organizations, 
corporate governance practices cannot be explained using one theoretical assumption. This may 
hold that value maximization which is the main target of the business. Thus, agency theory is built 
and based on this idea, which managers must make their efforts to attain this for firm’s 
shareholders. Others may have different view about the goal of the business entities. As stated 
before, stakeholders’ theory is built to extend the agency theory view to include other parties in 
the firm’s nexus of contract, and each part may have different target to be achieved. Moreover, the 
new economic thinking of corporations today is how these public entities may contribute with the 
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social welfare in general. In these perspectives, institutional theory may provide good explanations 
for corporate governance practices. 
Second, corporate governance practices vary across countries based on economic, political, 
and legal backgrounds. Also, it varies across firms within a country based on the capital and the 
way of accessing capital in these firms. According to Denis & McConnell, (2003, p.30) firms in 
Anglo-Saxon countries e.g., USA and UK depend on strong legal protection for shareholders. In 
contrast, other countries characterised by a weak legal protection e.g., developing countries of 
emerging markets like Jordan and UAE, public firms may depend on ownership concentration as 
a substitute for the lack of legal environment for shareholders’ property protection. 
Finally, fuelled by the recent corporate scandals, most countries around the world are now 
trying to issue and develop robust corporate governance codes. These codes are expected to 
contribute to improve corporate governance in the business life of these countries. All of these 
points have added to the complex nature of corporate governance making it one of the most 
important topics in corporate finance research. 
The extant literature review presented within this chapter defines the concepts and the 
distinguished models of corporate governance, and explores the potentials of the context specific 
variables (i.e., ownership structure and board of directors) importance in determining the 
relationship with firm performance in general. The review then proceeds to consider the theoretical 
debate that formulates the bases for why an association between governance and firm performance 
may exist. In particular, the review explores the potential implications of four complementary 
governance theories; Agency, Stewardship, Resource, and finally Institutional theory. 
Finally, it should be noted that this chapter considers the empirical literature associated with 
the role of both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms, which will be used together with 
theoretical assumptions to build the formal research hypotheses eventually. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Definitions 
Before proceeding to the extent corporate governance literature and empirical findings, it is 
important to explain corporate governance definitions and main models presented in literature. 
According to prior literature, there is no agreed way to define corporate governance. Aguilera & 
Jackson (2010, p.487) argue that “scholars have approached the subject of corporate governance 
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from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including economics, management, law, political 
science, culture, and sociology. Likewise, corporate governance has emerged as a key term in 
public policy debates around the world, refracting academic concepts through the lens of diverse 
institutions and cultures of discourse”. Given that there are several definitions of corporate 
governance, the author divides them according to the paradigm which the definitions serve, mainly 
the macro and micro-level aspects of corporate governance system. 
Denis & McConnell, (2003, p.2) defined corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms - 
both institutional and market-based - that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those 
that make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize 
the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital)”. This definition is very much tied 
to the idea of how macro level (constitutional) and micro level (firm practices) aspects of corporate 
governance will help shareholders to minimise the cost of conflict of interests. Shleifer & Vishny, 
(1997, p.738) define corporate governance mechanisms as “economic and legal institutions that 
can be altered through the political process-sometimes for the better”. In the same vein, Blair, 
(1995, p3) defines corporate governance as “the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional 
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how 
control is exercised, and how the risk and returns from the activities they undertake is allocated”. 
According to the last definition, corporate governance practices must go beyond firm-level 
contractual agreements to include other constitutional factors of the hosting country. 
Other corporate governance definitions are directly linked to the firm-level practices. Gillan 
& Starks, (1998, p.14) define corporate governance “as the system of laws, rules, and factors that 
control operations at a company”. Also, Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, (1997) identify corporate 
governance as internal firm-level mechanisms and practices that determine the capital structure 
decisions  of firms. Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, (2005, p.370) argue that corporate governance 
“is defined as a response to the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and 
control in a corporation”. Many more definitions of corporate governance abound in prior related 
literature. 
According to these two groups of definitions of corporate governance, it’s clear that scholars 
define corporate governance based on the paradigms which they support or interesting in. 
However, all of these definitions talking about the mechanisms either internal or external that help 
organizations to maintain lower level of agency problem as a result of the conflict of interest 
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between shareholders and managers. At the micro-level, internal corporate governance includes 
ownership concentration and board of directors, while at the macro-level it includes formal 
institutions and regimes designed to enforce the legislative frameworks at the national environment 
level. The following section presents and discusses the main models of corporate governance that 
often cited in prior related literature, and showing each model’s implications. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Models 
Corporate governance systems vary around the world. This is because in some cases, 
corporate governance focus on the link between the company and the shareholders, other models 
of corporate governance focus on role of the board of directors and board practices, while in some 
cases the focus would be on the social responsibilities of the company. There are two main models 
that are often cited in prior literature related to the concept of corporate governance, namely 
outsider and insider governance models. These basic models usually identified as Anglo-Saxon 
and Continental European models in prior governance literature (Ahmad & Omar, 2016). Each 
model reflects the environment in which companies operate and the system of corporate 
governance that is in place. 
Under the Outsider model hypothesis of corporate governance, the market represents the 
most efficient monitoring mechanism of corporations due to the separation of ownership from 
control in large publicly traded firms. This form of governance system is predominating in 
countries characterised with large listed corporations, wide-dispersed ownership, independent 
board of directors, active takeover activities, transparent disclosures, liquid capital markets, and 
well-developed legal system and financial structures such as UK and USA (Cernat, 2004; Ahmad 
& Omar, 2016). Figure 3-1 below show the power and authority flow from shareholders toward 
management through the board of directors under the Anglo-Saxon “outsider model” of corporate 
governance. 
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Figure 2-1 Outsider corporate governance model 
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Note: This figure is adopted from (Cernat, 2004, P. 153) 
 
On the other hand, the insider model of corporate governance relies more on managerial 
control. The insider model of corporate governance is based on broader perspectives i.e., 
stakeholder theory, which suggest that managers are the most important tools in safeguarding not 
only shareholders’ interests but, other internal and external stakeholder (Freeman, 2010). 
Countries following this pattern of governance have relatively small listed companies, higher 
levels of financial leverage, vigilant boards, concentrated ownership, illiquid capital markets, and 
limited disclosures (Hasan, 2009). However, it should be noted that, some of the prior related 
literature shows that some concentration of ownership even exists in countries following the 
outsider pattern of corporate governance including USA and UK8. The insider model of 
governance is predominant in most of European countries and some of the Asian countries like 
Japan. Unlike outsider pattern of corporate governance that mostly depends on equity finance, 
insiders are more likely to depend on family and bank financings (Cernat, 2004). Figure 2-2 below 
show the interrelations between the participants of the insider model of corporate governance “the 
Continental European Model”. The next section is in turn moves to discuss theoretical debate on 
corporate governance issues presented by prior literature. 
 
 
                                                 
8 See for example; Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political 
Economy 94:461–88. And, Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market 
valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293–315. 
 27 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Insider corporate governance model 
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Note: This figure is adopted from (Cernat, 2004, P. 154) 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance Theoretical Debate 
As noted before, corporate governance is a system of practices and rules used to control and 
direct an organization as a defence of shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, it essentially to 
maintain balance between the different stakeholders of an organization, including shareholder, 
managers, creditors, suppliers, customers, government and the whole community (Cadbury, 1992). 
Today, corporate governance has become a fertile area of interests and research among scholars 
and practitioners from different disciplines. The empirical work associated with corporate 
governance issues has been developed mainly based on four corporate governance theories; (i) 
Agency theory (ii) Stakeholders theory (iii) Stewardship theory and (iiii) Recourse dependence 
theory. 
These theories have evolved from different perspectives. For example, while agency theory 
was developed from finance and economic views, resource dependence theory was evolved from 
organizational context. However, prior academic literature has go further to demonstrate the use 
of other form of theories in investigating the impact of corporate governance on firm’s financial 
performance to include life-cycle theory (Filatotchev et al., 2006) and institutional theory 
(Filatotchev et al., 2013) or even transaction cost economic theory (Williamson, 1988). Thus, this 
research will depend on these four theoretical assumptions that justify the relationship between 
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corporate governance and firm performance if it exists. Below subsections describe each theory in 
details and its viewpoint on the aforementioned relationship, these are as follows; 
2.4.1 The Theory of Agency 
It is obvious that the below quoted statement proposed by Adam Smith (1776) in his well-
known book titled "The wealth of nations" was the most influential in developing agency theory: 
"The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not 
for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from 
having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or 
less, in the management of the affairs of such a company." 
— Adam Smith, (1776) 
Accordingly, agency theory was developed by Jensen & Meckling, (1976) in their influential 
study titled "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," 
where they addressed the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p. 318). In the legal sense, 
Milgram and Roberts, (1992, p. 170) defined agency relationship as “a situation in which one 
individual (the agent) acts on be-half of another (the principal) and is supposed to advance the 
principal’s goals”. Rungtusanatham et al., (2007, p. 118) assert that “an agency relationship exists 
whenever two parties cooperate and engage in an association wherein one party (i.e., the principal) 
delegates work to be performed by another party (i.e., the agent)”. 
Thus, these scholars among others argue that decision-making delegation from principal to 
agent can be problematic. According to Fama & Jensen, (1983) several crucial assumptions 
underline this problem, including divergence of interests between principals and agents in terms 
of value maximization, conflicting goals and self-opportunistic behaviour, risk aversion 
preferences, and information asymmetry. These assumptions form what so called the agency 
problem. Rungtusanatham et al., (2007, p. 118) stated that “The agency problem arises because 
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the principal is unable to efficiently verify (a) what the agent did in performing the work delegated 
by the principal (i.e., moral hazard) and/or (b) what expertise the agent claims to have in order to 
perform the delegated work (i.e., adverse selection)”. Also, Huang & Chang, (2010, p. 597) argue 
that “prior literature has consistently supported the position that the presence of an agency problem 
invariably leads to discontinuing a possibly failing project”. 
In consequence, agency theory deals with problem that can arise from the agency 
relationship between different parties in corporations. As mentioned before, agency problem can 
arise from: first, the wide divergence of interests from the firm interests to self or own interests; 
and second, the existence of information asymmetry between agents and principals (Huang & 
Chang, 2010). According to Klein et al. (2002, p. 318) asymmetric information in corporate 
finance refers to the “notion that firm insiders, typically the managers, have better information 
than do market participants on the value of their firm's assets and investment opportunities". As 
noted earlier under the agency framework, we may expect a divergence of the economic interest 
of the agent (manager of the firm) from those of the principal (investor in the firm) in whose 
interest the agent is supposed to act; and this leads to the existence of information asymmetry 
between the agent and the principle. So, asymmetric information is a main cause of the agency 
problem, which in turn requires mechanisms of corporate governance to solve this information 
differential problem. 
There are two main contracting issues that asymmetric information can cause in 
corporations, which are; adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when there 
is a lack of symmetric information prior to a transaction between a buyer and a seller, whereas 
moral hazard occurs when there is asymmetric information between two parties and change in 
behaviour of one party after the transaction (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the context of the 
agency problem, since the agent’s interests are not completely aligned with the shareholder’s 
interests, we conclude that, the issue of adverse selection and moral hazard may happen, and 
extremely affect the firm’s performance eventually. 
Also, it is important to highlight the potential costs that these informational divergence 
problems may impose on firm’s shareholders. According to Jensen & Meckling, (1976), 
controlling an agent's behaviour to make them less likely to behave in ways that are not aligned 
with the principal’s interest will not be at zero cost, this is what frequently called the agency cost. 
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Jensen & Meckling, (1976) define the agency cost as the sum of:  monitoring costs (when 
agents’ actions are restricted or monitored by principals), bonding costs (when agents enter into 
contracts that limit their mobility), and residual loss (when costs remain even after the execution 
of the monitoring and bonding elements). McColgan, (2001, p. 5) define monitoring cost as 
“expenditures paid by the principal to measure, observe and control an agent’s behaviour”. In this 
case monitoring agents’ behaviour can be by establishing suitable compensation scheme, and this 
may include the audit costs, writing executives compensation contracts, and the ultimate cost of 
firing managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Bonding costs “are costs borne by the agent, they are likely to set up structures that will see 
them act in shareholder's best interests, or compensate them accordingly if they don't” (McColgan, 
2001, p. 6). In some situations, an agent may commit to contractual obligations that limit or restrict 
the agent’s activity. For example, a manager may agree to stay with a company even if the 
company is acquired. The manager must forego other potential employment opportunities. That 
implicit cost would be considered an agency bonding cost. Bonding costs are not always financial; 
they may include costs of disclosing additional information to investors. Also, agents will usually 
hinder incurring bonding costs when marginal increase in bonding equals to marginal decrease in 
monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Residual loss are the losses incurred because the conflict of interests between shareholders 
and management despite monitoring and bonding activities (McColgan, 2001, p. 7). Also, Jensen 
& Meckling, (1976, p. 308) define the residual loss as: “The dollar equivalent of the reduction in 
welfare experienced by the principal as a result to divergence of interests”. The main reasons that 
incur residual losses in corporations are to be the ownership dilution and the managerial discretion 
levels. Williamson, (1988, p. 572) stated that “Residual loss is the reduction in the value of the 
firm that obtains when the entrepreneur dilutes his ownership”. 
Accordingly, agency theory is associated with agency problem and agency costs that form 
the agency relationship between principal and agent in corporation based on different interests and 
benefits. Agency theorists have called this relationship to be the Principal-Agent model. Briefly, 
principal-agent problem refers to the value appropriation from shareholders by agents or 
managerial behaviour, often by the conflict of interests and risk-sharing activities. This problem 
can be sever in developed capital markets where the diffused ownership structure and separation 
between ownership and control is a prominent feature (La Porta et al., 1999). According to survey 
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conducted by Lewellen, only 15% of non-financial institutions in the US owned only by their 
managers in 1969. Thus, managers are the ones who would be blamed first for poor corporate 
performance, but over time, as managers became increasingly involved as a separate class of 
agents, they came to recognize that compensation schemes could work to their benefit (Dobbin & 
Jung, 2010). 
However, the case in emerging markets is different. A small number of owners still own the 
majority of many companies’ stock shares (concentrated ownership) and exert extensive control 
over firm’s investing activities. Thus, a second form of agency model was developed. In particular, 
there has been research strand pointing that the Principal-Principal (PP) problem seems to be 
manifest in emerging markets (Su et al., 2008). Principal-principal conflict refers to the value 
expropriation from minority shareholders by majority shareholders, usually by major assets sales 
and purchase. Thus, in order to alleviate the conflict of interests and minimize agency costs, agency 
theorists prescribed different governance mechanisms and practices to control agents actions and 
protect shareholders wealth from any kind of expropriation (Berle & Means, 1932; Mitnick, 1975; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1994). 
According to Shleifer & Vishny, (1997) these governance and control mechanisms vary 
around the world. For example, in continental Europe and Japan, there is less reliance on legal 
protection and more reliance on blockholders, while in the UK & USA, firms rely on legal 
protections to alleviate the agency conflict. Due to these governance differences across countries, 
we can expect to see that different organizations display different relationships between ownership 
and firm values. Recent studies of corporate governance suggest that geographical position, the 
tax system, industrial development, and cultural characteristics, along with other factors, affect 
ownership structure. In turn, localized differences in ownership structures impact corporate 
performance (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). 
Accordingly, in line with prior related literature, we conclude that the agency theory is the 
most influential theory in understanding the complex relations inside corporations based on 
different interests, risk sharing, and private benefits circumstances. At the same time the main goal 
of the theory of agency is to find the most effective governance mechanism to solve or mitigate 
existing or potential agency problems including principal-agent and/or principal-principal 
conflicts. 
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2.4.2 The Theory of Stewardship 
“Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by 
separation of incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory 
argues shareholder interests are maximized by shared incumbency of these 
roles.” (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, p. 49) 
According to the above-mentioned statement, stewardship theory is an alternative to agency 
theory, it has its pedigree in organizational psychology and sociology rather than finance and 
economic perspectives. It has been widely accepted by many professional associations including 
governments and large organizations. Unlike agency theory, the theory of stewardship argue that 
managers should be left on their own, indeed they will act as responsible stewards of the assets 
they control (Davis et al., 1997). Donaldson & Davis, (1991, p. 51) argue that “organizational role-
holders are conceived as being motivated by a need to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility and authority, and 
thereby to gain recognition from peers and bosses”. This indicate that beside financial motives, 
managers have non-financial motivators to maximize shareholders’ wealth. In particular, to gain 
intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise 
responsibility and authority, and thereby to gain recognition from peers and superiors to improve 
their market reputation (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Agency theoretical assumptions based on economic and finance perspectives, and 
highlighting only self-interested behaviour and ignoring other human nature behaviours that may 
exist (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Accordingly, the theory of stewardship was initially introduced 
to define organizational context relations based on other human behaviour premises (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). Muth & Donaldson, (1998, p. 6) argue that “stewardship theory recognizes a range 
of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour. These include: the need for achievement and 
recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and the work 
ethics”. In other words, under stewardship theoretical perspectives managers are viewed as 
interested in achieving higher level of performance and to act at the best of interests of firm’s 
shareholders (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Stewardship theory predict that a firm success and shareholders’ wealth maximization can 
be only achieved when organization structure facilitates effective control by management. Thus, 
insider board members are favoured more than outsiders due to their technical expertise, depth of 
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knowledge, and access to firm’s operating information (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Also, 
stewardship theory argues that combining CEO with board chairman under one-person authority 
(board-duality) would be favoured in terms of investment decision-making and organizational 
strategy. Thus, firm’s financial performance and shareholders wealth can be adhesively maximized 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Accordingly, we conclude that stewardship theory is an attempt to compromise between 
agency theory on the one hand with the board of directors is responsible for governance and 
management theory, and on the other hand where management is what stewardship theory argues 
that board and management are single collective stewardship team at the top of the corporations, 
and the board roles are not to direct and control the corporation but to support and assist the CEOs 
and management in accomplishing their tasks. The weaknesses of the stewardship theory are that 
because there is no bright line between the boards and management responsibilities when things 
go wrong, people just start finger-pointing, and it is very difficult to hold the CEOs accountable 
for the results. Thus, a key feature of the theory of stewardship can summarized in the following 
points: (i) no inherent conflict, (ii) the key is the coordination rather than control, and (iii) 
managerial autonomy rather than hegemony. 
2.4.3 The Theory of Resource Dependencies 
Resource dependence theory is primary focus on the relations with the external environment 
rather than ones within the firm. The theory of resource dependencies highlights the role of 
external resources in shaping organizational behaviour. Wernerfelt, (1984, p. 172) stated that “a 
resource is meant anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm”. 
Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) argue that firm’s resources provision is a function directly related to 
the board of directors. Also, Muth & Donaldson, (1998) boards are important boundary 
mechanisms that they form links with the external environments. 
The theoretical underpinnings of these assumptions refer directly to the work titled “The 
External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” for Pfeffer & Salancik, 
(1978). Pfeffer and Salancik note that “when an organization appoints an individual to a board, it 
expects the individual will come to support the organization, will concern himself with its 
problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it” (1978: 163). Consequently, this 
assistance is viewed to enhance firm’s financial performance and increase shareholders returns 
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(Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In this context, resource dependence theory suggests that the board of 
directors is not only the most important governance mechanism but also a source of different 
resources for the firm. Thus, the experience, qualification, gender, and other characteristics of 
members of the board become increasingly important (Peters & Bagshaw, 2014). 
Additionally, resource dependence theory suggests that establishing a connection between a 
firm and its external environmental has consequences that may reduce the transaction cost 
associated with environmental interdependencies. This improves a firm's survival and enhances its 
financial performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In terms of the interdependencies between 
governance mechanisms, Daily et al., (2002) have stated that utilizing resource-dependence theory 
in explaining the governance effects on firm performance facilitates the understanding of the 
relationships between these governance mechanisms. 
Although agency theory has been extensively relied on as a basis for examining corporate 
governance issues, it has been argued recently that resource-dependence theory could be in a better 
position to operate as a base for governance knowledge systems. Agency theory concentrates on 
the controlling and monitoring role of the board of the directors, while as  resource dependence 
theory concentrates on the counselling and advisory role of the board of directors (Peters & 
Bagshaw, 2014). According to resource dependence theory, board of directors can be best 
mechanisms to provide help and assistance to firm’s management. 
Accordingly, we conclude that resource dependence theory is associated with resources 
involved and how they establish dependencies in corporation, and who control these resources. 
Resources coming from verity forms and their value depending on their importance and their 
availability. There are various types of resources that firms depend on, such as a physical materials 
or technical resources like information and knowledge as well. Also, firms in general may depend 
on social resources like prestige and reputation that enable them to survive. Resources have 
different values, the value of each resource can be determined by different factors such as demand 
and supply, or even the availability of the resources. Discretion over a resource also defines 
relation of the resource dependence. The theory of the resource dependencies arguing that board 
of directors is the most effective mechanisms in controlling firm’s resources and find new links to 
get resources from external environment. Therefore, it is highlighting the role of boards in 
determining the firm’s value in general. 
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2.4.4 The Theory of Institutions 
“Institutional Theory is Policy-making that emphasizes the formal and legal aspects of 
government structures.” (Kraft's Public Policy, 2007, p. 2). Thus, institutional theory of corporate 
governance suggest that corporate governance arrangements always reflect social and political 
process. Also, Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, (2008, p. 766) assert that “Institutional theory emphasizes 
that organizations, organizational fields, and nations are more than a means to produce goods and 
services-they are also social and cultural systems”. Accordingly, institutional theory extend the 
traditional agency framework further by suggesting that the effectiveness of the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms is shaped by a set of complex institutional factors that tend to differ across 
countries (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Interestingly, recent advances in corporate governance 
literature shows empirically that institutional theory complement agency theory in terms of the 
governance mechanisms offered by each theory i.e., country- and firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms (see e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015). 
Moreover, recent cross-national comparative research has highlighted the effect of 
institutional difference between countries in modifying the basic principal-agent conflict 
(Filatotchev et al., 2013). La Porta et al., (2000) have argue that legal systems offer different 
investor protection level among countries, which in terms affect the level of agency conflict faced 
by shareholders. According to Aguilera & Jackson, (2010) institutional theories have moved 
beyond the focus on how the law shapes agency conflicts, and looks now at how wider cultural, 
social, and political factors shape the cross-national diversity of actors and settings in corporate 
governance. Warren, (2003) argue that these political and social forces can become more 
influential than economic forces in shaping corporate destiny. 
Filatotchev et al., (2012, p. 970) stated that “This new approach is aimed at a better 
understanding of the interdependence between governance mechanisms and the organizational and 
institutional environments in which these practices are conducted. This view implies that corporate 
governance practices do not have a direct and linear effect on performance. Rather, performance 
effects are contingent on a number of firm-level and macro institutional factors that are not 
accounted for in the vast majority of studies”. Also, Misangyi & Acharya, (2014, P. 1703) have 
suggested that “…to truly understand governance effectiveness, we must stop thinking about the 
mechanisms in isolation, giving up a search for the end all mechanism(s), and instead direct 
attention to how the various governance mechanisms effectively combine with each other for the 
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particular outcomes desired”. This could be a good indication to support the argument proposed 
in this thesis, institutional theory and country-level governance framework may have the ability to 
complement the agency theory and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms in reducing 
agency conflict and increasing firm’s performance. Below table provides main characteristics 
agency-based and institutional-based corporate governance approaches. 
Table 2-1 Main characteristics of the agency-based approach and institutional-based approach of 
corporate governance 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Note: This table has been sourced from Filatotchev et al., (2013, p. 969) 
 
After this short analysis of the four main theories of corporate governance, we conclude that 
regardless of the theory which the corporations hold, every theory must try to find cost effective 
solutions, or ways or mechanisms to solve conflicts which occur between management and 
stockholders or stakeholders. These varieties in corporate governance theories and mechanisms 
complement each other, which in turn suggest that corporate governance variables at both country- 
and firm-levels could be used as collaborative tools in reducing agency and information 
asymmetry issues. Below section reviews empirical literature associated with the relationship 
between firm- and country-level corporate governance and firm performance which allows to 
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formulate the research hypotheses jointly with the theoretical reviews presented in previous 
sections in this chapter. 
2.5 Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Development 
In the previous section (2.2), details have been provided regarding the major corporate 
governance definitions that has been discussed in prior literature. These definitions describe the 
corporate governance functions, which in terms highlight its importance to business succession in 
general. However, it has been argued that the most challengeable issue in corporate governance 
researches since its inception is the definition of "good corporate governors" (Schnyder, 2012). 
Shleifer & Vishny, (1997, p. 738) argue that “Corporate governance mechanisms are economic 
and legal institutions that can be altered through the political process-sometimes for the better”. 
Denis & McConnell, (2003) argue that the most important internal corporate governance 
mechanisms are the firm’s board of directors and the ownership concentration patterns. According 
to Jensen, (1993) there are two main form of corporate governance mechanisms, internal and 
external. While internal governance mechanisms can be in form of boards and ownership 
concentration, external corporate governance mechanisms are the market for corporate control 
(takeover market). However, it is worth noting that prior related literature has failed to demonstrate 
a common way to define the best governance mechanisms that may lead to better financial 
efficiency, social legitimacy, or even for more general goals attainment (Judge, 2012; Aguilera et 
al., 2008). 
As noted earlier, this research will focus on the role of internal (firm-level) and external 
(country-level) governance mechanisms on firm performance. Therefore, we classify the extant 
related empirical literature into three main sections. First, it will provide reviews related to firm-
level governance mechanisms i.e., the role of ownership structure on firm performance. Second, 
this section provides more revision on firm-level governance mechanisms by presenting prior 
empirical evidence on the role of board of directors related variables on firm performance. Finally, 
this section present theoretical and empirical reviews about the role of national (country-level) 
governance mechanisms on firm performance. These empirical analyses presented by prior 
corporate governance literature, subsequently, will allow to formulate the research hypotheses. 
 38 
 
2.5.1 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
Prior corporate governance research recognizes the essential role performed by shareholders 
in monitoring management. For example, Douma, George, & Kabir, (2006, p. 637)  argue that “A 
firm’s ownership structure influences its performance for several reasons. Firstly, differences in 
identity, concentration and resource endowments among owners determine their relative power, 
incentives and ability to monitor managers’ shareholdings by corporations, individuals, banks, 
mutual funds, and governments are well-known examples of this phenomenon. Secondly, as 
owners have divergent goals, they have different influences on firm performance”. Similarly, Li, 
(1994) argue that corporate ownership structure seems to be the most influential part in the 
dynamics of corporate governance mechanisms in different countries around the world.  
According to  Fraile & Fradejas, (2014) there are two main classifications of ownership 
structure; the first type of share ownership is dispersed ownership. Under this ownership structure, 
firms usually owned by large number of investors with small shares and cross-holdings are rare 
and infrequent. This type of ownership is often noticed mostly in the UK and USA capital markets. 
The second type is the concentrated ownership, where a small number of investors i.e., individuals, 
banks, pension funds, families, and other large blockholders own the majority of a firm’s shares 
and hold the most control rights with other minority investors. Such type of ownership is prevailing 
in the Continental Europe and Asia, and especially in emerging markets (Parigi & Pelizzon, 2008). 
In these perspectives, the problem of corporate governance that a company may face in each 
of these contexts is different. For example, Jensen & Meckling, (1976) stated that in countries 
where the predominant structure of ownership is the dispersed ownership such as UK, the agency 
problem that a firm face in this case is the traditional conflict of interests between shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). This type of agency problem called in literature Agency 
Problem Type I. On the other hand, in contexts such as Jordan and UAE, where equity ownership 
is highly concentrated, the main corporate governance problem that a firm could face, aside of the 
traditional principal-agent conflict, is the possible conflict of interests between large shareholders 
themselves and/or other small shareholders, this usually referred in literature as Agency Problem 
Type II (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Consequently, firms in emerging markets  still maintain their traditional governance 
mechanisms such as large-controlling shareholders, government or family connections in the 
management of the business (Yoo & Jung, 2015). Therefore, corporate governance scholars trying 
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to investigate the effectiveness of these traditional governance mechanisms in enhancing the firm’s 
value and its financial performance, conducting investigations in different economic backgrounds, 
see for example;(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Nguyen et al., 2015; 
Fraile & Fradejas, 2014) among others. It is worth noting that, most of this prior empirical work 
on ownership structure has been aimed at answering questions related to share ownership identity, 
and share ownership intensity (concentration). Therefore, this research classifies the literature 
review related to ownership structure into the type of the controlling shareholders and the 
aggregate ownership concentration. Below subsections provide more details on the relationship 
between the type of the shareholders and firm performance, by bringing the most up-to-date 
international evidence. 
2.5.1.1 Share Ownership Identity and Corporate Performance 
As noted earlier, the impact of the type of the controlling shareholder on firm performance 
is an often-studied topic in corporate finance literature. Past studies have focused on different 
dimensions of this relationship. For example; Pagano & Röell, (1998) highlighted the importance 
of the existence of other blockholders in reducing the potential wealth expropriation that may run-
through controlling shareholders. Ng, (2015) explored the role of identity of a firm’s ownership 
structure in determining corporate financial performance. Furthermore, the importance of the 
shareholding identity in determining corporate strategy and, hence, its performance has been 
highlighted by (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Moreover, Ferreira & Matos, (2008, p. 500) posit 
that professional investors as a large shareholder groups in corporations credited worldwide with 
more active actions and incentives to offer vigilant monitoring mechanisms over managerial 
investment decisions towards maximising shareholders value. 
Many of the previous studies examine the influence of such dominant shareholders’ type i.e., 
executive, institutional, family and other venture capitalists on firm performance. Kim & Patel, 
(2017, p. 248) argue that “Different types of ownerships elicit variegated organizational strategies 
and behaviours, that in turn, influence firm performance”. Consequently, we follow this verity in 
prior literature and aim to examine the impact of two major types of the dominant shareholders in 
the selected capital markets i.e., ASE and ESM. Specifically, the aim is to examine the impact of 
the family and institutional ownership on firm performance in these capital markets. Next 
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subsection is therefore, provides discussions about the relationship between family investors as a 
dominant shareholders and firm performance. 
2.5.1.1.1 Family Investors Ownership Effects 
Family ownership is increasingly prevalent in emerging markets around the world (La Porta 
et al., 1999). The existence of such big percentage of share-ownership and rights on hand of such 
majority shareholders may lead to the exacerbate and extend the traditional conflict between 
principals and agents to more complicated and severe conflict between majority (controlling) and 
minority shareholders (Silva & Majluf, 2008). In particular, the ability of expropriating minority 
shareholders’ wealth depends on the national governance quality that those firms are embedded in 
i.e., the strength of minority investors indices and the rule of law enforcement levels. It is worthy 
to note that, emerging markets are generally characterised by weak legal protection and absent of 
external governance forces i.e., market for corporate control. This in turns make the situation much 
worse than in developed countries. 
In fact, prior literature suggests that family control has two-main controversial effects on 
firm performance in general i.e., negative and/or positive. However, most of prior related literature 
states that family control can have several important beneficial advantages and implications on 
firm performance supporting the agency theoretical arguments on ownership concentration-
performance relationship. For example, Aguilera & Jackson, (2003) argue that, families as a 
controlling shareholders in corporations will have the highest incentives to increase their firm 
performance as they will gain much benefits from doing so. Beside financial benefits, families will 
gain other intangible important benefits such as reputation, and other competitive sustainable 
advantages. 
Huang et al., (2015, p. 108) stated that “family control affects firm value through capital 
investment, debt financing, M&A activities, and governance structure”. Accordingly, most of the 
empirical literature regarding family firm’s performance document superior family firm’s financial 
performance compared to other counterparts. For example; Anderson & Reeb, (2003) examine the 
influence of family ownership on corporate financial performance using US firms data. Their 
results indicate that family business outperform the non-family business in the US capital market. 
However, they highlighted the potential cost of family ownership in corporations, which centred 
about the potential profit exchange with private benefits. Also, Miralles-Marcelo et al., (2013) 
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examined the stock performance of the Portuguese family firms. The results indicate that family 
business outperform non-family business. 
Martínez et al., (2007) argue that family business is better in aligning business objectives 
between owner and manager –as usually being the same person or have kin relationship− that non-
family business which may justifies the performance “superiority” of family business. However, 
they argue that such kind of business may suffer from weak governance system or have lower level 
of professionalism. Similarly, Erbetta et al., (2013) examined family ownership effect on firm’s 
financial performance measured by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Interestingly, they report 
that family business outperforms the non-family counterpart in Italia. Furthermore, they argue that 
family business has lower systematic efficiency in overuse labour and capital in investments which 
in terms impose benefits and justifies higher levels of financial performance and efficiency. 
Shyu, (2011) utilize a Taiwanese panel data of five years to examine the influence of family 
ownership on corporate financial performance measured by both accounting and market value 
measures. The results indicate positive significant relationship. Also, they argue that firm 
performance increases as family ownership increase to max of 30% only, then it falls suggesting 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. Moreover, Walker et al., (2013) report a superior financial 
performance to family firms compared to other non-family firms in the Canadian capital market. 
Additionally, they argue that the existence of family ownership may help in reducing and solving 
the traditional agency conflict between managers and owners by presenting a unique leadership 
style. However, they showed that corporate financial performance decreases when a family 
descendant acting as CEO rather than the founder himself. 
Other scholars such as Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, (2003) have argue that sometimes and 
in some cases, family extensive control over corporations has perceived as undesirable. Family 
founder and their heir managers can spoil other shareholders’ wealth by taking private benefits 
investment decisions. Additionally, Fama & Jensen, (1983) noted that combining ownership and 
control will allow shareholders to extract private benefits. This view has been supported by 
different scholars9. Furthermore, there is much debate in corporate finance literature that families 
as a controlling shareholders usually tie executive managerial positions to same family members, 
                                                 
9Demsetz (1983) argue that in some cases the controlling blockholders may choose nonfinancial consumptions, and 
thus, draw scarce resources away from profitable investment projects. In a similar vein, Byun et al. (2011) stated that 
the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights provides controlling blockholders (families) with 
opportunistically advantages to retain control in managerial decisions, especially in emerging markets where the 
external market for corporate control and the rule of law is weak.   
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which in terms may question the capabilities of those candidates compared to highly skilled talents 
in other non-family business, this may reduce the competitive advantage of these firms in the 
market (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Given the above-presented empirical and theoretical discussion, family ownership as a 
majority shareholders (blockholders) variable could be an endogenous variable from 
econometrics’ point view, as family member-owner may have more internal information than any 
other minority shareholder (Shyu, 2011). In other words, the presence of family control may signal 
positive prospects for the firm and enable easier decision-making regarding company holdings. 
Thus, the willingness of a family to exercise control over a firm may be affected by firm 
performance itself. Accordingly, most of the prior empirical studies which fail to address the 
endogeneity issues that inherent in the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance may plague with statistical bias. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that in most of the MENA emerging markets i.e., Jordan and 
UAE, most of the publicly listed firms are controlled by their founders, or the founder’s family 
and heirs. Even the financial institutions including (banks) are dominated by families and/or 
individual investors. Thus, it could be argued that due to the lack of regulatory environment and 
weak investors' protection shield, families as a majority (controlling) shareholders keep control 
the firm's resources and may use it for their private benefits in these capital markets, which implies 
that expropriating minority shareholder’s wealth may exist in these capital markets, and hence, 
firm performance of such listed firms may be harmfully affected (la Porta et al., 2002). This 
research is the first to examine the relationship between family ownership and firm performance 
in the Jordanian and the UAE’s nonfinancial listed firms, while simultaneously controlling the 
issue of endogeneity by applying the dynamic system GMM. According to the aforementioned 
theoretical and empirical discussion, the below hypothesis is formulated pretending that: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟏: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance. 
2.5.1.1.2 Institutional Investors Ownership Effects 
As noted earlier, both past and recent corporate governance literature increasingly establish 
the importance of controlling shareholders in monitoring managerial self-opportunistic behaviour, 
or even in enhancing the managerial efficiency. Generally, the presence of professional, 
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experienced and strong “financially” capable investors may have several advantages and positive 
implications to the business life. Burkart, (1995) argue that the presence of large shareholders in a 
firm can challenge increase the takeover premium by challenging the outsider riders. In other 
words, theoretically, “Large investors have the potential to perform an important monitoring 
function in corporate governance systems that serves as protection for smaller investors for whom 
monitoring costs are prohibitive” (Pergola & Verreault, 2009, p. 551). These investors can 
influence management’s behaviour directly through their power as large owners, as board 
members, or indirectly through threat of liquidation. Moreover, such type of large shareholders 
has more incentives than others i.e., minority investors to monitor their sizeable investments 
(Pergola & Verreault, 2009). 
One of the most other influential large investors in capital markets in these days is the 
institutional investors (Fich et al., 2015). Boubakri & Cosset, (2011, p. 4) defined institutional 
investors as “large entities with considerable amounts of money to invest, and are thus more likely 
to buy sizeable blocks of a target firm’s common stock”. According to Ferreira & Matos, (2008, 
p. 501) institutional investors can be “divided into two groups: independent institutions (mutual 
fund managers and investment advisers) and grey institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, 
and other institutions)”.  
Accordingly, corporate governance literature has documented that institutional investors’ 
ownership has several implications on firm performance in general. For example, Hutchinson, 
Seamer, & Chapple, (2015) show that institutional investor is an important driver of financial 
health, and found that firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and firm’s financial 
performance are positively associated with institutional investors’ ownership. Also, they argue that 
the significance of this relationship depends on the institutional investors’ ability on exert vigilant 
monitoring on managerial activities. This implies that institutional investors are not equally-
incentivised to monitor. Moreover, they argue that, institutional investors tend to promote short-
term performance activities or exit in financial crisis times rather than supporting long-term 
investment activities. 
Consistent with monitoring hypotheses, Hutchinson et al., (2015) note positive influence of 
institutional investors’ equity ownership on firm risk, performance, and corporate governance 
policies. Nagel et al., (2015) agree about the vigilant monitoring activities of institutional 
investors, and report positive relation between institutional investors and firm’s operating 
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performance and pay-out ratios. Similarly, Cornett et al., (2007) report that higher institutional 
ownership associated with higher firm’s performance. Fung & Tsai, (2012) assert that institutional 
investors are a key determinant of firm performance in the US capital market. Additionally, they 
argue that different types of institutional investors have different performance implications. 
Similarly, Cornett et al., (2007) examined the relationship between institutional investors 
involvement and firm’s operating performance. They find that the percentage of institutional stock 
ownership and the number of institutional stockholders are significantly related to firm’s operating 
performance measurements. Additionally, they argue that, this relationship is dependent on the 
institutional investors’ business relationship with the firms they invest their money in. Elyasiani 
& Jia, (2010) show that firm performance is positively associated with institutional ownership 
stability over time. These results account for the importance of institutional investors working as 
a vigilant monitoring mechanisms on firm’s management. These studies suggest that simply by 
having an institutional investor type as a controlling shareholder, this may affect the firm 
performance positively, due to incentives and monitoring efficiency that such type of investors 
may characterised with. 
In contrast to the above arguments and consistent with the negative effect hypotheses, 
recently, some scholars have argued that institutional investors has played negative role 
(behaviour) and exacerbate the recent financial crisis by putting more pressures on the financial 
services providers to focus on short-term profit investments and increase the risk-taking activities 
(Callen & Fang, 2013). In fact, prior corporate finance literature has made distinguish between 
two controversial behaviours of institutional investors in financial markets; ‘monitoring’ and 
‘short-termism’. Indeed, monitoring behaviour leads to positive implications on firm performance 
in general, while short-termism may lead to negative implications. For example; Cheng et al., 
(2015, p. 840) assert that “There is anecdotal evidence, which we confirm in our analysis below, 
that savvy institutional investors such as Bill Miller of Legg Mason, one of the largest mutual fund 
companies in the United States, over-weighted and supported the most risky companies like Bear 
Stearns in their portfolios”. 
Empirical studies examining the implications of institutional investors −despite their 
presence− on firm performance in MENA countries are limited and marginally exist. Institutional 
investors in Jordan (for example) has become beneficial in strengthening corporate governance 
practices and hence make decisions towards achieving long-term value maximization target. 
According to Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC, 2004), 70 public firms 
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out of 161 in Jordan were considered to be supermajority owned by institutional investors. 
Additionally Al-Najjar, (2010) stated that average institutional share ownership was about 68.18 
and other firms were totally owned by institutional investors in 86 nonfinancial listed firm in ASE 
market. Moreover, Al-Najjar, (2010) argue that a key driver of these structural ownership 
transformation was the privatisation plan that the Jordanian government adopted in the late 90s. 
Al-Khouri, (2005) examined the internal (firm-level) corporate governance mechanisms 
effects on firm’s financial performance in Jordan, and report that institutional investors ownership 
is significantly positively associated with firm performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
there is no study examining the effect of blockholders including institutional investors on firm 
performance in the UAE. Generally, the direct influence of institutional investors on corporate 
financial performance has been under-investigated (Cornett et al., 2007). There are limited number 
of studies associated with this relationship in corporate finance literature, additionally the research 
results are mixed and lacks consistency in evidence. Thus, this research contributes to the 
understanding of how institutional investors may affect firm performance in the MENA emerging 
markets context. 
Indeed, the discussion presented above shows that the vast majority of prior empirical 
literature reports a positive effect of such investors on firm performance. For example ;prior 
literature indicates that institutional investor monitoring can influence firm performance (Han & 
Suk, (1998), increase management turnover in poorly performing firms (Kang and Shivadasani, 
1995), and enhance firm R&D investments among other effects (Hansen and Hill, 1991; see also 
Kane and Veluri. 2004; Veluri and Jenkins, 2006). According to Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 
(2002) ownership concentration is crucial in curtailing managers' opportunistic behaviour. 
However, some investors may have stronger incentives to monitor than others. Given the 
aforementioned arguments, below hypothesis pretending that: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟐: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. 
2.5.1.2 Share Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance 
First of all, it should be noted that, the above two-subsections were associated with the type 
of majority (controlling) shareholders effect on firm performance. In this section, we present 
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reviews of prior literature associated with the block-ownership concentration without any special 
link to its identity. In order to avoid any overlapping with the previous subsections, we will present 
most important arguments and summarise those that directly related to the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. 
As noted earlier, ownership concentration can play an important monitoring role as a form 
of traditional governance mechanism in emerging markets. For many years, research has tried to 
examine the implications of such internal governance mechanism on firm performance. The focus 
of such research has been on minimizing the agency conflicts, and hence, improving firm 
performance. The dominance of the effectiveness of ‘ownership concentration’ in monitoring 
managerial behaviour and enhancing firm’s profitability is a subject of much debate in recent 
times, especially in transitional economies context. Empirical literature on emerging markets 
seems to demonstrate negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
One theoretical explanation for this negative effect, especially in emerging markets, is that 
when ownership concentration is coexisting with weak corporate governance mechanisms, 
underdeveloped capital markets and non-existing market instruments, the traditional agency 
conflict between principals and managers is replaced by another type agency conflict between 
majority shareholders and minority investors (Young et al., 2008). Moreover, Kalezić, (2015) note 
that, the negative impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in emerging markets 
may considerably presents due to the insufficient incentives for the largest owners to attempt 
timely efficient firm restructuring to maximise the firm’s long-run valuation. Dharwadkar et al., 
(2000) argue that principal-principal agency problem is a concern in institutional environments 
which lack minority shareholder protection and enforcement mechanisms. 
Consequently, empirical literature associated with the ownership concentration-performance 
relationship in emerging markets does not face the problem of interconnecting theoretical 
arguments with its empirical findings. A comprehensive meta-analysis by Wang & Shailer, (2015) 
based on the experience of 18 emerging markets, suggests that ownership concentration has 
negative implications on firm performance across these countries. Moreover, Jiang et al., (2011) 
provide evidence that ownership concentration is positively associated with the level of 
information asymmetry. This may support the detriments effect of ownership concentration on 
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firm performance. Similarly, Bednarek & Moszoro, (2014) argue that greater ownership dispersion 
is positively associated with firm performance. 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned critical determinants, ownership concentration has 
some positive consequences. For example, Shleifer & Vishny, (1986) stated that majority 
shareholders may have more incentives to monitor and discipline managers by their threatening 
power of voting rights. Lemmon & Lins, (2003, p. 1445) argue that “ownership structure is a 
primary determinant of the extent of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside 
investors, which has important implications for the valuation of the firm”. Also, Li, (1994) argue 
that large shareholders can have ultimate power and effective level of monitoring by the ability of 
facilitating a third-party takeover by splitting their own shares gains with external bidder. These 
arguments confirmed by international evidence in Finland by Maury & Pajuste, (2005) show that 
ownership concentration has positive effects on firm performance. Additionally, they argue that 
the results indicate that the identity of shareholder matters significantly when it comes to the 
concertation. Similarly, in Germany, Lehmann & Weigand, (2000) report that large shareholders 
enhance corporate performance. 
In Korea,  Joh, (2003) report that firms with smaller level of ownership concentration tends 
to have lower profitability which implies that ownership concentration may have positive 
implications on firm performance. In China, Isaac & Ke, (2007) show that ownership 
concentration is positively associated with corporate performance. In addition, the relationship 
between ownership concentrations is affected by the identity of owners. For example, they argue 
that government ownership contributes positively to firm’s financial performance. Connelly et al., 
(2012) examined the relationship between ownership structure and other corporate governance 
practices on firm’s value using Thai firm’s data. They show that there is a direct positive effect 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Similarly, Isakov & Weisskopf, (2014) 
report positive relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Taking in mind this variety in the international evidence associated with the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, recent advances in corporate governance 
literature suggest that, the relationship between governance and performance may depend on 
several factors. For example, Fan et al., (2011) argued that it is conceptually difficult to attribute 
the persistence of certain ownership structures solely to expropriation i.e., negative impact, other 
factors may influence this relationship. Gedajlovic & Shapiro, (1998, p. 533) posit that the 
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relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance differs across countries and 
may depends on the national system of corporate governance. Most recently, Nguyen et al., (2015) 
provide evidence that a country’s national governance system moderate the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. This implies that, the institutional environment is 
a key determinant of this relationship, and as a result, the prior international empirical findings are 
inconsistent. 
It is worth noting that, the institutional environment for economic activities is under-
developed in the MENA region in general. Thus, ownership concertation in the context of this 
thesis may possibly lead to the second type (principal - principal) agency conflict. As agency 
problem increases, majority (controlling) shareholders make strategic decisions which are in the 
best of their interests rather than the firm interests, and hence, firm performance decreases and 
minority shareholders’ wealth expropriated. Moreover, in emerging market case, investors may 
suffer from sever information asymmetry problem, due to the weak institutional and legal 
framework (La porta et al., 2000). In fact, prior empirical literature suggests that the effect of 
ownership concentration may be viewed in two directions; positive and negative. Positive impact 
is hypothesised based on interests’ alignment effect, substitution of weak legal and institutional 
environments, and substantial shareholdings commitment to bailout and to avoid firm’s resources 
expropriation. On the other hand, corporate governance theorists hypothesised negative impact 
based on cost of capital, principal-principal agency problem, and negative potential impact on 
other corporate governance mechanisms (Wang & Shailer, 2015). 
By juxtaposing the aforementioned arguments, and drawing on empirical evidence in 
emerging markets, where ownership is highly concentrated, and national governance quality is 
weak, the below hypotheses can be drawn regarding the ownership concentration-performance 
relationship in this context: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟑: Firm performance is negatively dependent on share-ownership concentration. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to ownership concentration effects on firm’s 
financial performance –which is summarized in Table 2-2– the main following results can be 
concluded: 
First, in general, ownership concentration is an important determinant of both firm’s 
financial performance and value. Second, ownership concentration is negatively related to firm 
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performance and value, especially, in emerging markets, where the legal and constitutional 
environment less effective that in developed countries. Third, these differences in research findings 
suggest that reforms in corporate governance principles should go beyond adopting the best 
practices from developed markets and take into account the macro institutional differences and 
firm-specific characteristics in each separate market. 
Table 2-2 Prior related studies’ findings summary 
Study  Sample  Methodology  Results  
Houmes & Chira, 
(2015) 
S&P 500, the S&P 
Midcap 400, and the 
S&P Small cap 600 
Index, 1995–2012 
Univariate tests and 
linear regression 
Ownership 
concentration 
perpetuate financial 
performance.  
Hu & Zhou, (2008) 
World Bank survey, 
1500 Chinese firms, 
1998-2000 
Base regression  
Nonlinear relationship 
between managerial 
ownership and financial 
performance.  
Perrini, Rossi, & 
Rovetta, (2008) 
297 Italian firms, 2000-
2003 
Pooled OLS, 2SLS 
Ownership 
concentration is 
beneficial.  
Bhaumik & Selarka, 
(2012) 
228 Indian firms, 1995-
2004 
Regression  
Ownership 
concentration may 
reduce traditional 
agency cost; however, 
it may increase 
principal-principal 
conflict.  
Mikkelson, Partch, & 
Shah, (1997) 
US 283 IPOs, 1980-
1983 
Univariate comparison, 
regression  
Financial performance 
is not related to insider 
ownership. 
Villalonga & Amit, 
(2006) 
US Fortune-500 firms, 
1994–2000 
Regression, sensitive 
analysis  
Family ownership 
creates value only when 
it’s combined with 
CEO family 
membership.  
Omran, (2009) 
52 privatized Egyptian 
firms, 1995-2005 
Regression 
Ownership 
concentration and 
identity have positive 
impact on financial 
performance.  
Nguyen, Locke, & 
Reddy, (2015) 
Listed firms from SGX 
Mainboard (for 
Singapore), or the 
HOSE and the HNX 
(for Vietnam) 
Regression, dynamic 
modelling  
Ownership 
concentration has 
positive impact on 
financial performance.  
Chung & Pruitt, (1996) 1000 US firms in 1987 
Regression OLS, and 
3SLS 
Both ownership 
structure and financial 
performance are jointly 
determined.  
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2.5.2 Board of Directors and Firm Performance 
Board of directors as an internal governance instrument has received a wide attention in the 
mainstream of academic literature. With a particular focus on the board of directors’ relationship 
to firm performance, board composition and characteristics have become a hot topic, especially, 
in recent days and attracted substantial interests (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014; Iwasaki, 2008). The 
importance of the board of directors referred to the arguments proposed by Jensen, (1993) who 
posit that, in modern form of corporate system, where managers are not shareholders or own few 
shares, board of directors can supervise and advice management on behalf of the shareholders. 
Similarly, Jensen & Meckling, (1976) stated that in the real world there are many factors would 
force managers to perform opportunistically in order to maximize their best interest at the expense 
of the business owners. One of these factors called information asymmetry. Asymmetric 
information is the power imbalance in the transactions. In these perspectives, managers may have 
better information and may take decisions at the expense of the shareholders. Thus, board of 
directors playing an important role in aligning managers’ interests to those of the shareholders. 
Board of directors is an important instrument in solving the traditional agency problem. Prior 
literature i.e., Kim et al., (2010) has, therefore, identified four-main duties of the board of directors; 
(1) Fiduciary duty where they have to control shareholder’s money and ensure firm’s profitability, 
(2) Loyalty and fair dealing duty where they have to support faithfully the shareholders’ interests, 
(3) duty of care and interests where they have to be vigilantly informed about the activities around 
them in the business, and (4) Supervisory duty where the directors must be responsible to create 
ethics and rules and to implicitly ensure the discloser of these rules. 
Nevertheless, prior research basically examines the effect of governance mechanisms on 
firm performance through specific characteristics of the board of directors. For example, the 
composition of the board of directors is one aspect of the relevance of this topic in corporate 
finance literature (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). It has been 
generally argued that board’s member’s ability and willingness to perform efficient monitoring 
role depending on ‘board independence’ and ‘board size’ (Coles et al., 2008). Several studies show 
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how outside directors may affect different aspects of board tasks, including CEO’s enforced 
tenure, anti-takeover defence, and takeover premiums negotiation.10 
On the other hand, theoretical assumptions and empirical investigations associated with the 
board of directors’ attributes have been recognized in real world. In fact, recent surveys show that 
board of directors has undergone major changes around the world. For example, Faleye, (2015, 
P.1) and stated that “According to the 2012 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 86% of the boards of 
Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 companies in the US market had 12 or fewer directors in 2012, 
compared with 68% in 2002. Similarly, the percentage of independent directors increased from 
79% in 2002 to 84% in 2012, while the proportion of chief executive officers (CEOs) who also 
chaired their boards declined from 75% to 57% during the same period. Perhaps the most 
significant of these trends is the exclusion of all employees but the CEO from serving on the board 
of directors. In 1998, only 36% of S&P 1500 firms had no other employee directors besides the 
CEO. The proportion of such firms has increased steadily each year since then, reaching 70% in 
2011.” 
These statistics may show how important the board of directors’ composition and leadership 
structure to corporations’ financial health. However, the recent financial crisis and corporate 
failures around the world have raised a serious doubt about the effectiveness of this board on 
safeguarding the shareholders wealth and holding the interests of other stakeholders (Erkens et al., 
2012; Pathan & Faff, 2013). Therefore, corporate finance recent literature highlighted the 
importance of different levels of rules and regulations inside the firms and outside at the country-
level in enhancing board of directors monitoring ability (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). This also, 
implies that the effectiveness of structuring boards toward shareholders’ wealth maximization may 
depend on the institutional environment where the business embedded in (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014). 
Taking the importance of the board of directors in mind, in this thesis, we aim to examine 
three important governance variables related to the board of directors. These board governance 
variables are size, duality and independence, which are most frequently pointed in international 
corporate governance literature, but less examined the MENA context. Below subsections show 
                                                 
10Borokhovich et al. (1996) provides more analysis and details about how independent directors influence hiring and 
firing the CEOs in the US corporations. Cotter et al. (1997) highlighted the importance of the independent directors 
in negotiating takeover premiums. 
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reviews of prior corporate finance literature associated with the relationship between board of 
directors −size, duality and independence−and firm performance.11 
2.5.2.1 Board Size and Firm Performance 
As noted earlier, many of the prior empirical research has highlighted the importance of the 
internal corporate governance instruments, especially after the recent financial crisis. Many 
research studies have been interested in examining board composition implications on firm 
performance. Consequently, an enormous mainstream of academic literature has been conducted 
on the relationship between the size of the board and firm performance. However, academic 
literature has not yet reached to answer the question regarding should the board of directors be 
smaller or larger. Theoretical research seems to have contradictory viewpoints. 
For example; Lipton and Lorsch, (1992) argue that large number of directors in the board 
room would make the board dysfunctional in monitoring management as large number would 
rarely review firms important polices. Additionally, Jensen, (1993) criticize large number of board 
members and stated that in order to get more effectiveness and less cost the optimal board members 
should be around eight. Agency theory argue that large number of board members may become 
symbolic governance mechanism and eventually a part of the management. Thus, since large board 
members in board room may question its effectiveness in performing the monitoring role, board 
characterised with large number may negatively affect corporate financial performance (El-
Faitouri, 2014). 
On the other hand, there is another school of thought which support the view that large 
boards may have the ability to put pressure on the firm’s management to pursue lower cost of debt 
and hence, improves corporate financial performance (Anderson et al., 2004). Furthermore, Klein, 
(2002) argue that in order to maintain effective monitoring, firms may have to increase their board 
size. However, Coles et al., (2008) stated that the relationship between board size and corporate 
financial performance is U-shape relationship implying that the optimal board size is either very 
small or very large. In consequences, much of the empirical research dedicated to examine this 
issue, see for example; (Jameson et al., 2014; Elsayed, 2010; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Francis et 
al., 2013; Hillman, 2014; Sun & Shin, 2014; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014) among others. However, 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that board –duality and CEO–duality is used interchangeably in this research. Both terms refer to 
the situation where the board chairman is holding a CEO position of the company at the same time. 
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prior empirical results associated with the relationship between board size and corporate financial 
performance were inconclusive and limited to developing economies (Ehikioya, 2009). 
It’s a worthy of note that, the vast majority of these studies that have examined the effect of 
board size on corporate financial performance report negative association. For example; Yermack, 
(1996) was among the first who provide empirical evidence consistent with the assumption that 
smaller board of director is more effective monitoring device. In the same vein, Eisenberg et al., 
(1998) report significant negative correlation. Cheng, (2008) assert that corporate board size is 
negatively associated with corporate financial performance. This implies that board of directors 
may have weak monitoring role and it perform advisory role instead (Guest, 2009). Similarly, 
Kumar, (2013) report negative association. However, other scholars have found positive 
relationship. In terms of risk taking and performance variability, Nakano & Nguyen, (2012) 
indicate that firms with large board members in the board room have lower performance volatility 
and lower bankruptcy risk. Recently, Johl et al., (2015) provide evidence that board size is 
positively associated with corporate financial performance in Malaysia. In the MENA context, 
governance research is limited and scarce. Thus, this research will add to the current debate on the 
relationship between board size and firm performance using MENA context −Jordan and UAE− 
data as a form of small emerging markets. 
However, the effect of board size on firm performance seems to be contingent on external 
governance mechanisms i.e., market for corporate control. There are two competing hypotheses 
on this matter; the Complement and the Substitute Hypotheses. According to the Complement 
Hypothesis, board size will have negative relationship on firm performance under an active market 
for corporate control framework (John & Senbet, 1998). On the other hand, the Substitute 
Hypothesis predict that the importance of the board will be substitutory depending on the existence 
of the external governance mechanisms, and hence, expecting positive impact of board size on 
firm performance in such environments (Williamson, 1983). Cheng, (2008) provide evidence that 
board size matter for firm performance before the passage of antitakeover laws in the US in the 
mid-to-late 1980s. In contrast to developed countries and some other large emerging markets i.e., 
China, the MENA region’s emerging markets has poor and weak external governance 
mechanisms. The market for corporate control instruments are absent, capital markets are mostly 
illiquid and equity ownership is concentrated. In this context, the importance of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms i.e., board size is more valuable. Thus, positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance might be observed. 
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However, empirical evidence seems to be inconclusive and incontinent when it comes to the 
relationship between board size and firm performance in general. Moreover, the effect of board 
size on firm performance seems to be contingent on external governance mechanisms i.e., market 
for corporate control. There are two competing hypotheses on this matter; the Complement and 
the Substitute Hypotheses. According to the Complement Hypothesis, board size will have 
negative relationship on firm performance under an active market for corporate control framework 
(John & Senbet, 1998). On the other hand, the Substitute Hypothesis predicts that the importance 
of the board will be substitutory depending on the active existence of the external governance 
mechanisms, and hence, expecting positive impact of board size on firm performance in such 
environments (Williamson, 1983). Cheng, (2008) provide evidence that board size matter for firm 
performance before the passage of antitakeover laws in the US in the mid-to-late 1980s. 
In contrast to developed countries and some other large emerging markets i.e., China, the 
MENA region’s emerging markets have poor and weak external governance mechanisms. The 
market for corporate control instruments is absent, capital markets are mostly illiquid and equity 
ownership which is concentrated. In this context, the importance of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms i.e., board size is more valuable. Thus, positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance might be observed. Drawing on this debate in prior theoretical and empirical 
literature, the below hypothesis can be formulated regarding the effect of board size on firm 
performance in this research context: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟒: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
2.5.2.2 Board-Duality and Firm Performance 
Similar to other board composition variables i.e., size and independence, CEO-duality and 
its impact on firm performance has attracted intensive attention of the mainstream academic 
literature in the previous years. The term Board-duality refers to the situation where the board’s 
chairman is performing as the CEO at the same time in firms. 
In fact, board-duality seems to be a wide phenomenon in business life in the old days. For 
example, during the 1980s and beyond, the global economy appears to have caught up in what is 
described as “board-duality”. Brickley et al., (1997) report that in 1988 the percentage of firms in 
Forbes executives’ compensation survey that had one person filling both posits was 80.9%. 
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Moreover, Dahya et al., (2009) assert that board-duality was the dominant leadership structure 
theme in firms around the world until the 1990s. 74.4% of American firms were having the same 
person holding both positions, where in the Continental Europe the percentage was nearly 60% of 
firms having board-duality. However, recent surveys showing that the CEO/Chairman 
convergence has been dropped significantly. For example Favaro et al., (2010) stated that in 2009 
the percentage of firms holding the term board-duality fallen to 16.5% in north America, and to 
7.1% in Europe as stated in (Byrd et al., 2012). 
It is arguably that these significant changes were driven by the corporate governance 
recommendations posits by the Cadbury report in 1992in the UK, and/or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, and other seminal empirical findings on its negative effect on performance (Duru et al., 
2016). The Cadbury report recommend that the positions of the CEO and chairman must be held 
by two different individuals. An underlying theoretical justifications of this recommendations is 
that, board with different candidates holding both posits separately will help in improving the 
quality of monitoring and hence, enhance corporate financial performance (Dahya et al., 2009). 
Other scholars have has come to a conclusion that having board-duality is similar to the function 
of “CEO grading his own homework” (Brickley et al., 1997: 190). 
Theoretically, there are two-main dominant perspectives on duality’s performance effect. 
The effect of board-duality on firm performance is expected to be negative under the agency 
theory. When the CEO has extensive power i.e., dominate the firm board by having chairman 
positon, this will reduce the board effectiveness and ability in controlling managerial self-
opportunistic behaviours, which in terms may reduce firm performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1979; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jenson, 1993). On the other hand, stewardship and resource dependence 
theory argue that duality promotes more focused and flexible leadership which facilitates 
organizational effectiveness in a potentially dynamic business environment, which in terms may 
increase firm performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The empirical literature examining the effect of board-duality on firm performance yields 
mixed results and inconsistent findings (Byrd et al., 2012; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Dahya et al., 
2009). One reason could refer to the mixed evidence in corporate financial literature is that board 
of directors’ structure may be endogenously related to corporate financial performance (Brickley 
et al., 1997). Wintoki et al., (2012) provide evidence that board-duality variable is a subject to the 
past firm performance, and hence it not affecting firm performance. Yang & Zhao, (2014, p.536) 
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stated that “it is not theoretically obvious whether dual or separate leadership is more beneficial to 
firm performance. Therefore, the efficacy of CEO duality is an empirical question”. However, 
empirical evidence on the relationship between board-duality and firm performance seemed to be 
mixed also. 
Byrd et al., (2012) utilize the thrift crisis of the late 1980s to examine the influence of CEO-
duality on corporate financial performance using US financial-companies’ data. They found that, 
during thrift crisis firms that combine the role of the chairman and CEO were significantly more 
likely to survive and resist the crisis than firms that separate those roles into independent CEO and 
independent chairman. According to their study, one underlying assumption to these results was 
the restricted lending policies that those financial firms adopt during the thrift crisis in the US 
market at that time. Lam & Lee, (2008) argue that neither agency theory nor stewardship theory 
alone can explain the board-duality influence on corporate financial performance. Accordingly, 
they assert that relationship between board–duality and corporate financial performance is 
contingent on the presence of the family-control factor. Thus, their results revealed that board-
duality improves corporate financial performance in non-family firms while it decreases financial 
performance for family-controlled firms. One explanatory factor is that in family-controlled firms 
the ownership structure is quite different than those of non-family firms. Concentrated ownership 
structure may have different implications on the board of directors’ composition and firm’s 
leadership structure. 
In Egypt as a country of the MENA region, Elsayed, (2007) report that board-duality has no 
effects on corporate financial performance. Similarly, Dahya et al., (2009) fail to find any 
performance differences between firms splitting the combined Board/CEO roles with other firms 
adopting board-duality leadership structure. However, Elsayed, (2007) highlighted the importance 
of the industry classification as it seems to have significant implications on the relationship 
between board-duality and corporate financial performance. After controlling for industry 
classifications, the results were to support the agency and stewardship theoretical assumptions 
concluding that board-duality negatively affects corporate financial performance in Egypt. Carty 
& Weiss, (2012) show that no correlation between board-duality and banks’ failure was found. 
Meta-analysis on 31 articles by Dalton et al., (1998) find that CEO duality does not affect firm 
performance. In fact, the empirical evidence associated with this issue seems to be inconclusive 
and exclusively related to developed markets experience such as USA (Elsayed, 2007; Wahba, 
2015).  
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In fact, the empirical evidence associated with this issue seems to be inconclusive and 
exclusively related to developed markets experience such as USA (Elsayed, 2007; Wahba, 2015). 
Thus, literature associated with board-duality issue is in general limited and in emerging markets 
is dearth. This research adds to the literature by analysing the impact of CEO-duality on firm 
performance using a new framework –Dynamic System GMM− that mitigates the endogeneity 
problem in such relationship. Given that family ownership is prevailing in the MENA context, it 
is expected that CEO-duality has negative implications on firm performance under the 
entrenchment assumptions. Accordingly, the below hypothesis can be formulated as the following: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟓: There is a negative link between board duality and firm performance. 
 
 
2.5.2.3 Board Independence and Firm Performance 
Does board independence affect firm performance? This question has motivated 
considerable empirical research over the past years. Prior literature shows that; a board is likely to 
have high level of independence if the board includes more outside directors.12 
Two main competing theories dominate the discussion on the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. Prior corporate governance literature under the agency theory 
logic suggest that, more independent board members allow for more effective monitoring 
mechanism and hence, improves firm performance (Coles et al., 2008; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; 
Wu, 2004). Fama & Jensen, (1983) argue that outside directors are more capable to perform 
vigilant monitoring activities as they are free of any firm’s management influences. Agency theory 
also suggest that because of the notion that outside director’s ‘monitoring performance’ is probably 
the only way to evaluate them, and hence, it determines their value as human capital, they must 
have more incentives to develop their reputation in order to get advantage while competing in the 
labour’s market. On the other hand, stewardship theorists argue against having outside directors 
in a firm board. Stewardship theory mainly suggest that outside directors have less knowledge of 
the firm’s strengths and weaknesses which may prevent them in providing any useful services to 
the management and shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, Armstrong et al., (2014, p.383) 
argue that “When the corporate information environment is opaque, and there are significant costs 
                                                 
12An outside director in this context is any member of a company's board of directors who is not an employee 
or stakeholder in the company. 
 58 
 
to acquire and process detailed information about their firm's operating, financing, and investing 
activities, independent directors are less effective”. These last views highlight a weakness points 
of independent directors. 
In consequence, this issue has attracted extensive body of corporate governance literature. 
See for example; Muniandy & Hillier, (2014); Brickley et al., (1997); Bhagat & Black,(2001); 
Hermalin & Weisbach, (2008); Andreou et al., (2014); Jermias & Gani, (2014); Lefort & Urzúa 
(2008); Duchin et al., (2010); Wang, (2014) among others. However, this extensive empirical 
literature has inconclusive, and has not provide consensus regarding the precise of the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Erickson et al., 2005; 
Wahba, 2015; Cavaco et al., 2016). Moreover, the vast majority of these empirical studies were 
exclusively related to developed countries i.e., USA and UK and other European countries, while 
less attention has been paid to explore the board of directors monitoring role in emerging markets, 
especially those related to the MENA region, where the prevalence of concentrated ownership 
exist (Muniandy & Hillier, 2014). 
Despite the maintained assumption that we should expect a positive relationship between 
board independence and firm performance, the results, however, turns to be mixed. For example, 
Nguyen & Lu, (2017) show that board independence has negative effect on firm performance in 
Vietnam. Cavaco et al., (2016) show that there is a significant negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance in the French context. Bhagat & Bolton, (2009) report that 
board independence affecting corporate financial performance negatively significant in the US 
context. Moreover, Wahba, (2015) examined the effects of board composition on firm's financial 
performance in Egypt as one of the emerging markets and found that board independence is 
negatively associated with firm performance. Similarly, Agrawal & Knoeber, (1996) investigate 
the effect of independent directors on firm performance, and report that the proportion of outside 
directors has negative effect on firm performance. Similarly, Faleye, (2015) examines the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance in the US context, and report that 
there is negative relationship. These findings are consistent with many prior studies that report 
negative association between board independence and firm performance i.e., Bhagat & Bolton, 
(2013), Baysinger & Butler, (1985) among others. 
Contrary to the debates presented above, Liu et al., (2015) examined the board independence 
impact on the firm performance using emerging markets data from China. They found that 
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independent directors have an overall positive impact on firm performance. Moreover, Dahya & 
Mcconnell, (2007) investigate the implication of the calls for more outside directors released after 
the Cadbury committee report during the period 1989-1996. They report that firms that increased 
their outsiders in the board witnessed better operating corporate performance and higher stock 
prices at that time in the UK. Similarly, Nguyen & Nielsen, (2010) report a positive relationship 
between board independence and firm performance. 
Relying on different empirical strategies, recent advances in corporate governance research 
suggest that board independence has no effects on firm performance, since board of directors’ 
characteristics are endogenously determined. For example, Wintoki et al., (2012) relied on 
Dynamic System GMM to examine the relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance in the US context. They report that there is no causal relationship between board 
independence and another characteristics i.e., size and duality, and firm performance. Bhagat & 
Black, (2001) provide evidence about the reverse causality (endogeneity) between board 
independence and corporate financial performance. They argue that firms with low profit rates 
tends to increase their outside directors in an attempt to impose more vigilant monitoring in the 
top management decisions. Prevost et al., (2002) report that outside directors’ proportion in the 
board is not associated with better firm’s performance.  
However, recent advances in corporate governance research suggest that board 
independence has no effects on firm performance, since board of directors’ characteristics Are 
endogenously determined. For example, Wintoki et al., (2012) relied on Dynamic System GMM 
to examine the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the US context. 
They report that there is no causal relationship between board independence and another 
characteristics i.e., size and duality, and firm performance. Bhagat & Black, (2001) provide 
evidence about the reverse causality (endogeneity) between board independence and corporate 
financial performance. They argue that firms with low profit rates tend to increase their outside 
directors in an attempt to impose more vigilant monitoring in the top management decisions. 
Prevost et al., (2002) report that outside directors’ proportion in the board is not associated with 
better firm’s performance. Most recently, Nguyen et al., (2015) shows that board variables 
including independence have no significant effect on firm performance using emerging markets 
context –Singapore and Vietnam− using Dynamic System GMM. Accordingly, based on recent 
advances in econometrics research i.e., applying dynamic System GMM when modelling the 
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governance-performance relationship, and based on recent empirical findings, below hypothesis 
pretend that: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟔: There is no relationship between the level of board independence and firm 
performance. 
Table 2-3 below showing more details about the prior empirical findings associated with the 
board composition, leadership structure, and other board characteristics influence on corporate 
financial performance as predicted by different theoretical assumptions.  
Table 2-3 Overview of prior literature findings regarding the relationship between internal corporate 
governance and firm performance 
Authors and countries 
Relationship of firm’s performance with ownership and/or 
governance variables 
Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell, 
(2008) 22 countries 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Board independence: + 
Hu & Izumida, (2008) Japan DV: Tobin’s Q, ROA 
 Ownership concentration with Tobin’s Q: +++ 
 Ownership concentration with ROA: + 
Li et al., (2015) China DV: Tobin’s Q, ROA 
 Board independence with ROA: +++ 
 Board independence with Tobin’s Q: ++ 
Hamadi & Heinen, (2015) Belgium DV: MBV, ROA 
 Ownership concentration with MBV: + 
 Ownership concentration with ROA: + 
McConnell & Servaes, (1990) USA DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Insiders ownership concentration: ++ 
Demsetz & Lehn, (1985) USA DV: Stock Market return  
 Ownership concentration: NC 
Agrawal & Knoeber, (1996) USA DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Independent director - 
Dalton et al., (1998) Meta-analysis DV: Tobin’s Q, ROA 
 Board composition: NC 
Bhagat & Black, (2001) USA 
DV: Tobin’s Q, ROA, Ratio of sales to assets, and market 
adjusted stock price returns 
 Board independence: NC 
Bhagat & Bolton, (2008) USA DV: ROA, Stock Return, and Tobin’s Q 
 Board duality with ROA: - 
 Board independence with ROA: - 
 Corporate governance with SR and Q: NC  
Yermack, (1996) USA DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Board size: -- 
Baysinger and Butler, (1985) USA DV: Relative financial performance RFP 
 Board independence: + 
Hermalin & Weisbach, (1991) USA DV: Average Tobin’s Q 
 Board independence: NC  
Palmon & Wald, (2002) USA DV: Abnormal Returns, Accounting Profitability Ratios 
 Board duality in small firms: ++ 
 61 
 
 Board duality in large firms: -- 
El-Faitouri, (2014) UK DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Board characteristics: NC  
Mura, (2007) UK DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Non-executive directors proportion: ++ 
 Block holding ownership: - 
Morck et al., (1988) USA 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Ownership concentration (managerial)+ 
Weir, Laing, & McKnight, (2002) UK 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Board independence: ++ 
Note: + (−), ++ (−−), and +++ (−−−) indicate positive (negative) inference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. DV= dependent variable(s), NC=no correlation. 
2.5.3 National (Country-Level) Governance Effects 
As noted in the earlier sections and subsections, the prior corporate governance literature 
shows that the effect of internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms on firm performance seems 
to be existent. Concurrently, recent advances in governance research suggest that the institutional 
context that a firm operates in may have better explanations, and may add to better understand the 
relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance. It is worthy to note 
that, in this thesis we will examine the direct effect of the national (country-level) governance 
indicators on firm performance in the selected capital markets i.e., ASE and ESM, rather than 
examining the moderation effects of such indicators on the relationship between internal 
governance and firm performance. 
One explanation is that; firm shareholders may rely on two broad categories of corporate 
governance in mitigating firm’s agency cost; mainly internal and external governance 
mechanisms. While internal governance mechanisms such as ownership structure (concentration) 
and board of directors’ variables and other firm-level governance activities are discussed in details 
in the above subsections (i.e., 2.5.1 and 2.5.2), below we will discuss the national (country-level) 
governance mechanisms effect on firm performance. 
According to extant literature, external governance mechanisms can be directly linked to the 
rule of laws, legal system, investors protection strength and other takeover market instruments, 
and should be extremely treated as exogenous variables i.e., these variables are out of control of a 
firm’s activities. These variables are formulated and classified under country-level governance 
activities (Gillan, 2006). On the other hand, prior corporate governance literature widely suggests 
that internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms are endogenous or predetermined variables 
which are directly related to the firm’s environment such as ownership concentration i.e., 
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controlling shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and board of directors (Jensen, 1993). Thus, 
agency theory predicts that causal relationship should run from corporate governance mechanisms 
to the corporate financial performance (Lemmon & Lins, 2003). 
However, as stated earlier, scholars such as Demsetz, (1983) and Demsetz & Lehn, (1985) 
have questioned this relationship and argue that corporate ownership structure is determined 
endogenously in equilibrium by corporate financial performance and other unobserved firm 
characteristics. Similarly, Demsetz & Villalonga, (2001) stated that when a an investors decide to 
buy shares they usually tend to buy shares that belong to companies characterised with higher rate 
of return. In these perspectives, a firms’ ownership structure and corporate performance are 
simultaneously determined. Thus, corporate ownership structure and corporate financial 
performance should not be systematically correlated. This argument has been literary supported in 
corporate governance research recently (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Moreover, recent advances in corporate governance research considerably argue that 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance are dynamically related (Wintoki et al., 
2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Roberts & Whited, 2012; Chen et al., 2008). This implies that current 
corporate governance structure could be affected by past firm financial performance. Wintoki et 
al., (2012) argue that reverse causality can run from past corporate financial performance to 
governance structure, which can be acknowledged as another source of endogeneity, and, hence, 
implying that the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance seems to be difficult to be observed. 
Consequently, recent advances in corporate governance research i.e., Nguyen et al., 2015, 
Filatotchev et al., 2013, and Ngobo & Fouda, 2012 among others highlighted the importance of 
the national governance indicators in mitigating firm agency cost, and hence, in improving the 
financial health of corporations that embeded in such national governance quality environment. 
The role of the national governance quality on improving firm performance can be simply justified 
by its ability in reducing transactions and production costs, risk mitigation, and hence, increase 
firm profitability (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). 
A number of papers have modelled the direct impact of national governance quality on firm-
level governance activities (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015) most recently and among others, indicating 
important implicationsthat the national governance quality has upon firm-level governance 
mechanisms. Ngobo & Fouda, (2012) and Saona et al., (2016) report direct positive relationship 
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between national governance quality and firm performance. Moreover, other scholars argue that 
the naional governance quality may moderate the realtionship between internal governance 
mechsnisms and firm perfromance as reported by Nguyen et al., (2015). Kumar & Zattoni, (2013) 
highlighted the importance of the interaction between country-level and firm-level governance 
mechanisms in developing global theory of corporate governance. On the other hand, Rose, (2016) 
argue that the degree of a firm compliance with national corporate governance codes depend on 
the institutional environment. Richter & Weiss, (2013) state that the institutional context in which 
companies operate has a relatively large effect on ownership concentration. Sobel, (2003) argue 
that superior national governance is associated with better lending and access to capital. Hail & 
Leuz, (2006) provides evidence that national governance intensiveness and extensive regulatory 
environment has significant negative relationship with cost of capital. Furthermore, La Porta et al., 
(2002) argue that firms are more likely to enjoy higher valuation when they belong to stronger 
domestic investor protection levels and higher national governance and legal enforcement 
countries.  
A number of papers have modelled the direct impact of country- and firm-level governance 
mechsnisms on firm perfromance (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015) most recently and among others, 
indicating the important implications that the national governance quality has upon firm-level 
governance mechanisms and its perfromance. Similalry, Ngobo & Fouda, (2012) and Saona et al., 
(2016) report direct a positive relationship between national governance quality and firm 
performance.as noted eariler, The role of the national governance quality on improving firm 
performance that can be simply justified by its ability in reducing transactions and production 
costs, risk mitigation, and hence, increase firm profitability (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). Based on this 
literature, national governance quality has several implications on firms activities and, hence, on 
its performance. Thus, this research will respond to these recent calls for further investigating the 
direct effect of the national (country-level) governance indicators on firm performance using two 
different national governance frameworks i.e., well-developing (UAE) and under-developing 
(Jordan). 
Given the important theoretical propositions regarding the impact of country-level 
governance mechanisms on firm performance, and the prevalence of either benefits or costs of 
national governance quality, the relationship between country-level institutional governance 
framework and firm performance in emerging markets remain an important open question   
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(Nguyen et al., 2015). Based on these theoretical propositions and empirical results, the last 
hypothesis can be formulated stating that: 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟕: Firm performance is associated with higher national governance index. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
From the above synthases reviews of prior literature associated with the relationship between 
corporate governance (internal and external) and firm performance we conclude the following 
points: 
First, corporate governance and firm performance has received a great and vast attention 
among researchers from several disciplines, especially, in recent years after the 2007/08 financial 
crisis. 
Second, despite the huge number of these published articles concerning about the 
relationship between governance and performance in different places around the world, they fail 
to provide consensus evidence to explain how would corporate financial performance would have 
affected by a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms i.e. ownership structure and board 
structure. 
Third, there has been many reasons that contribute and stood behind this consensus status of 
the research in the field of corporate governance. One of the most important reasons, is that 
endogeneity issues has been improperly addressed in prior work of governance-performance in 
most cases. Furthermore, researchers tend to use econometric techniques that would produce 
biased results when endogeneity is exist. 
Fourth, there are many theories that are related to the concept of corporate governance, but 
if we are talking about the “conflict of interests” that is usually arises between shareholders and 
managers in corporations as a fundamental element and reason for corporate governance practices, 
then the agency theory will be the main theory in explaining corporate governance issues. 
However, other theories in this research such as stewards, resource dependence theory, or even the 
institutional theory have been seen and employed as a complementary to agency theoretical views. 
Fifth, prior governance research has ignored the important role of national governance quality 
(country-level) in determining firm performance. More specifically, the impact of national 
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(country-level) governance on firm performance in Jordan and UAE as a form of the MENA region 
emerging markets has never been examined before. 
Table 2-4 below present then predicted signs of the estimates coefficients on the explanatory 
variables that presented in form of research hypotheses. 
Table 2-4 Predicted signs of the estimates coefficients on explanatory variables with the dependent 
variable (Tobin’s Q) 
Explanatory variables Relevant hypothesis Predicted relationship  
Ownership structure variables    
Family ownership  𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟏 - 
Institutional ownership  𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟐 + 
Ownership concentration  𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟑 - 
Board of directors’ variables    
Board size 𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟒 + 
Board-duality  𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟓 - 
Board independence  𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟔 Ø 
National Governance Variables    
Aggregate national governance NGI 𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟕 + 
Alternative national governance index NGI(a)         𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟕 + 
Investor protection index IPI 𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟕 + 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and (Ø) represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively 
Variables definitions are presented in Table 4-4 in the next chapter.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the corporate governance and 
institutional settings in the MENA region in general, specifically, in Jordan and in the UAE. The 
chapter proceeds to explore specific governance and capital markets characteristics of the two 
countries; Jordan and the United Arab Emirates UAE. Additionally, the chapter provides an 
overview about the importance of the corporate governance system in MENA region and context. 
Finally, it ended up with chapter summary. 
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK - AN 
OVERVIEW ABOUT JORDAN AND UAE 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted earlier in the previous chapter, one of the key causes of the latest financial crisis 
was –a systematic failure of the corporate governance and risk management practices of the big 
financial institutions in the US market– a statement concluded by the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission report (FCIC, 2011). Thus, a one can conclude a message about the importance of 
the firm-level governance mechanisms in preventing firm distress and default. It is also 
emphasising a new priority enhancing disclosures transparency, stabilizing global financial 
markets, and strengthening regulations based on each individual countries’ structural dimensions 
(Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015). It is a worthy of note that the subject of “governance” can be used 
in different levels (i.e., macro and micro), capital markets as a whole (country-level) and at each 
firm individually (firm-level), and in different subjects of sciences disciplines i.e., law, business, 
management and finance. 
This chapter will discuss firstly, the macro-level political, governance activities and qualities 
of the MENA region as a whole, and then proceeds to those of which specifically related to Jordan 
and UAE; second, the main characteristics of the individual selected country’s capital markets, 
regulations developments and the issued governance codes, ownership structure, and legal 
preferences. 
3.2 The MENA Region Background &Governance Practices 
At the first place, the term MENA is an acronym referring to the Middle East and North 
Africa region. The MENA region is a vast geographical area comprises several countries to include 
all Middle Eastern Mashreq and Maghreb countries13. It consists of 20 countries most of them are 
Islamic Arab countries. The MENA region population is considered at its least extent to be around 
381 million people, which represents about 6% of the total world population. Countries in this 
                                                 
13 The term Mashreq referred to the region of the Arab world to the east of Egypt, while the term Maghreb is referring 
to the region of the Northwest Africa including the Atlas Mountains, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.  
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region are classified under three main regime traditional classifications, Democratic Systems, 
Republics, and Monarchies. However, recent publications from international organizations such 
as Freedom House and other freedom indices put most of the MENA countries under “Not Free” 
or “Partly Free” classified indices.14 
It should also be noted that the MENA region contains such of the wealthiest countries 
around the world. In 1981, these countries formulate what so called the Gulf Cooperation Council 
GCC. Countries belong to this council are: Saudi Arabic, United Arab Emirates UAE, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. The rest of the countries in the MENA region are generally classified 
as (higher or lower) middle income countries (World Bank, 2015). 
With respect to corporate governance, the area has witnessed a wide change during the past 
decade, especially, after the recent financial crisis that het what supposed to be the most powerful 
and well governed financial institutions in the US market and then spread all over the world. 
Consequently, the MENA region as a form of emerging markets has seen important changes in 
corporate governance field lately. These changes and developments including issuing corporate 
governance codes or/and developing an existing one. Highlighting these developments the 
International Finance Corporation in its report IFC, (2008, P.10) stated that “Today, hundreds of 
conferences on corporate governance have been held across the region, a number of MENA 
countries have adopted new or amended existing corporate governance codes and regulations, 
institutes of corporate governance or directors have been established, and banks and companies 
themselves are starting to undertake corporate governance improvement plans”. It should also be 
noted that, in some of MENA countries the requirements for corporate governance practices was 
initially supported by the regulatory framework, which was issued before these developments and 
governance codes.15 
Furthermore, the report add “A number of events have spurred the emergence of corporate 
governance as a leading reform initiative, including: (i) a number of domestic reform initiatives in 
the region, in particular the launch of Hawkamah; (ii) the rise of international, regional, and 
domestic investment to the region, coupled with stock market booms (and corrections), and the 
emergence of investor activism; (iii) corporate governance programs and projects implemented by 
international development institutions; and (iv) updates to the international corporate governance 
                                                 
14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_in_the_Middle_East. 
15 For example; in Jordan company laws and security exchange laws were the initial regulatory framework to enforce 
and recommend for best practices of corporate governance since the mid-1990s.  
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framework” (IFC, 2008, p. 13). These important events were initially developed to support 
business life and to enhance business environment in the MENA context. 
However, in real life the case is more complicated and much more difficult. Most of MENA 
countries are currently suffering from economic, political, and social turmoil issues that certainly 
affecting the macroeconomic fundamentals of the entire region. All Arab transitional countries are 
currently facing same major issues related to maintain public economy growth rates, creating jobs, 
and recruiting foreign investments16. Subsequently, most private sector development indicators 
rank Arab countries behind the other regions of comparable income (Harabi, 2007). Furthermore, 
intensive oil prices drop, rising political conflicts, and security issues have considerably weekend 
the MENA region recently. According to very recent report issued by IMF in  (April, 2016, p. 21), 
“Growth in the region overall is projected at 3.1 percent in 2016 and 3.5 percent in 2017, 0.8 
percentage point and 0.7 percentage point weaker, respectively, than projected in the October 
2015”. This showing the extensive challenge that face business environments in this region in 
particular. 
While the investment climate constraints to business development in the MENA region are 
well documented in the several Business Climate Surveys of the World Bank and other national 
and international organizations, much less is known on other impediments to private sector 
development, such as the legal and regulatory frameworks and corporate governance nature and 
its enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the purpose of the next section is to provide a synthesized 
review of the quality of the constitutional and national-level governance environment in MENA 
countries, which may help in predicting and understanding the governance – performance 
relationship of firms operating in this region. The discussion starts by approaching the region as a 
whole and then put emphasise on the two countries that were selected as a platform to conduct this 
study; Jordan and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, the focus will be on the quality of 
national governance system, capital market developments, and corporate governance 
developments. 
                                                 
16 MENA region countries can be classified under three major classifications: countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) are as follows: Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and United Arab Emirates. While, Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen are classified as Arab Countries in Transition, Algeria, Iraq, Djibouti, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, and the Palestinian Authority classified as other MENA countries. 
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3.2.1 National (Country-Level) Governance Quality 
The debate on the relationship between the quality of public governance and investment has 
become livelier in recent years. For example, recent advances in corporate governance literature 
i.e., Aguilera & Jackson, (2010); Claessens & Fan, (2002); Klapper & Love, (2003) suggest that 
country-level governance such as the legal institutions and the rule of law may influence the 
internal (firm-level) governance system, and eventually its performance. The traditional 
interpretations is that national governance quality fosters investors’ confidence through protecting 
their claims and property rights, including financial assets, against any kind of expropriation (La 
Porta et al., 2002). The strength of recent researches on this issue is the observation that, national 
governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule of law, or investor protection, may influence 
the effectiveness of corporate governance strategies (Filatotchev et al., 2013), it also has direct 
impact on firm financial performance (Nguyen et al., 2015; Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). Implying its 
importance when examining firm-level governance effect on firm performance (Nguyen et al., 
2015). 
As noted before, the MENA countries have faced serious challenges and tremendous 
different form of issues. These issues are perhaps summed up recently by Farazmand, (2015, p. 8) 
when he state that “Governance in the Middle East today is experiencing a cocktail of authoritarian 
to marginal democratic systems”. The author justified this state by arguing that “Decades of 
manipulating governmental apparatus in order to siphon public resources for the benefits of the 
ruling oligarchies and justifying prolonged family and tribal grip on power through various facades 
of demagogy had created a system of dysfunction that exhibits corruption, infectiveness, nepotism, 
lack of transparency, lack of accountability, censorship, and oppressive police state”. These 
challenges may deteriorate the development of such legal institutions in the MENA region 
countries. 
Furthermore, recent publications and reports by international organizations, such as World 
Bank and Transparency International, show that most MENA countries are lagging behind in 
international rankings that classify countries according to various dimensions of public 
governance, suggesting a great need for substantial actions to boost public governance in the region 
(Awartani et al., 2015). Table 3-1 below shows MENA countries worldwide rankings according 
to Corruption Perception Index for the last three years. 
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Table 3-1 MENA countries corruption perception index ranking 
Country (2015)Rank (2014)Rank (2013)Rank 
Qatar 22 26 28 
United Arab Emirates 23 25 26 
Israel 32 37 36 
Jordan 45 55 66 
Saudi Arabia 48 55 63 
Bahrain 50 55 57 
Kuwait 55 67 69 
Oman 60 64 61 
Tunisia 76 79 77 
Algeria 88 100 94 
Egypt 88 94 114 
Morocco 88 80 91 
Djibouti 99 107 94 
Mauritania 112 124 119 
Lebanon 123 136 127 
Yemen 154 161 167 
Syria 154 159 168 
Iraq 161 170 171 
Libya 161 166 172 
Sudan 165 173 174 
Note: This table has been adopted from several annual reports published by Transparency International 
Organization (self-compiled). 
 
Despite that, the majority of the MENA countries are appear to be well-positioned with 
corruption, it is worth noting that some other countries like Qatar, United Arab Emirates UAE, 
and Jordan are performing better that others in combating corruption. Farazmand, (2015, p. 9) 
argue that “marginal reforms, either in response to popular demands or uprisings or due to the 
foresight of some extra-ordinary leaders, are also emerging in various parts of the region. Although 
the reform remains to be slow, anaemic, and minimal, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction 
that may contain the pregnanting seeds for larger and more robust reforms that may yield the legal 
framework for true progress toward sound governance”. Starting from the fact that an organization 
can be affected and affects the institutional environment, institutional theory may sufficiently 
address the dynamics which links the firm’s activities to its identified institutional environment. 
In terms of the ease of doing business in the MENA region, the World Bank indicators have 
showed that MENA countries vary dramatically (presented in Table 3-2). For example, UAE is 
positioned 26th in the world (out of 190) whereas Libya lags at late position 188. The regional 
average of doing business in the MENA region is 124, indicating that UAE and Jordan are 
performing well-under the regional average in total. 
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Table 3-2 MENA region doing business rankings 2017 
Country Rank 
UAE 26 
Bahrain 63 
Oman 66 
Morocco 68 
Tunisia 77 
Qatar 83 
Saudi Arabia 94 
Kuwait 102 
Jordan 118 
Egypt 122 
Lebanon 126 
West Bank and Gaza 140 
Comoros 153 
Algeria 156 
Mauritania 160 
Iraq 165 
Sudan 168 
Djibouti 171 
Syria 173 
Yemen 179 
Libya 188 
MENA region average 124 
Note: This table has been sourced from Doing Business report 2017 issued by the World Bank. 
 
According to Al-Akra et al., (2009), rules and regulations in MENA region are not supported 
by a code of ethics that would help in instituting moral commitment among business partners. 
Furthermore, MENA capital markets are characterised with lack of efficiency, insufficient 
development of the judiciary bodies to support strict enforcement of capital market laws and 
regulations, and an issuer’s culture, as issuers are not yet accustomed to transparency and corporate 
governance sound principles. This argument implicitly highlights the importance of appreciating 
that internal corporate governance good practice is not only influenced by formal laws, accounting 
standards, and regulations, but also by their actual enforcement and most importantly, by societal 
values. Consequently, national governance quality operates as a significant antecedent that cannot 
be ignored when evaluating corporate governance practices. 
As noted earlier, national governance quality may influence the efficiency of the internal 
(firm-level) governance system, and its performance (Nguyen et al., 2015). This implies that 
national governance differences between countries may contribute to the inconsistencies in prior 
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empirical findings of the relationship between internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms and 
firm performance. According to Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011), a country’s national 
governance quality can be measured by six main indicators; Voice and Accountability; Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; 
and Control of Corruption. These indicators used in prior literature individually or as summed 
index. However, it should be noted that these factors showing high correlations, and thus, having 
them summed in a one index may be better in terms of econometric efficacy (Schiehll & Martins, 
2016). Table 3-3 below shows the national governance indicators for Jordan, UAE, MENA 
region’s average, and OECD country’s average in 2015 respectively. It is observed that UAE 
maintain higher national governance indicators making it comparable to those obtained for higher-
income OECD countries. Moreover, Jordan’s national governance rankings is lower than UAE, 
however, still higher than the MENA region’s average in general. 
Below section provides more details about MENA capital markets characteristics, and then 
turns to describe Jordan’s and UAE’s capital markets and corporate governance practices. 
Table 3-3 National governance indicators 2015 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Governance indicator 2015 Jordan UAE 
MENA  
average 
OECD 
average 
voice and accountability 26.6 19.70 25.00 87.00 
political stability  26.67 71.43 27.00 74.00 
government effectiveness  59.13 91.83 45.00 88.00 
regulatory quality 55.29 82.69 44.00 87.00 
Rule of law 68.27 75.00 44.00 88.00 
control of corruption 64.42 82.69 43.00 85.00 
Note: This table has been sourced from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
The higher the values the higher the national governance indicators. 
 
3.2.2 MENA Region’s Capital Markets 
Recently, the demand for investment opportunities in the MENA region has been challenged 
by the lower oil prices. Subsequently, regional exchanges of the trading volumes have declined, 
and volatility increased. However, there are still some opportunities that may have big impact in 
shaping regional markets. MENA countries are economically diverse while sharing a common 
culture, heritage, language, and religion. The region accounts for about 400 (million) total 
population which represent about 5% of the total world’s population. It also had an aggregate GDP 
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close to $3.1 (trillion), or around 3% of the global total GDP (World Bank 2015). The MENA 
region has one of the most source of power and economic tool in the world; it’s the Oil. On ground 
of its economic status, MENA countries can be classified into three main categories; the first 
category to include the six oil-exporting countries which form the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC. 
These countries are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. 
Massive quantities of crude oil reserves and the continuous rise in oil prices for decades has 
facilitated macroeconomic stability in these countries as their governments have undergone major 
development programs to improve infrastructure and other public sectors. International 
organizations classified these countries in top of the world’s highest income levels and as net 
capital exporters. 
The second category includes countries that are oil-importer countries to include Jordan, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Sudan. These countries are net 
capital importers that have been engaged in several economic reform projects funded by the IMF 
and World Bank since decades. The third category consists of eight countries that are either 
economically vulnerable due to political instability, or in the very early stages of economic 
development, or both. This includes Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Libya and Yemen, 
as well as the West Bank and Gaza (Piesse et al., 2012). 
In general, The MENA countries have witnessed significant economic and financial 
development in the last decade. Alkulaib, Najand, & Mashayekh, (2009, p. 43) stated that “The 
relaxation of security laws and regulations in emerging markets in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) provides abundant opportunities for foreign investors. These markets exhibit high-
expected returns and substantial volatility”. However, Despite their praise of efforts made by 
MENA countries to develop their financial sectors, reports issued by most international 
organizations – IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc. – tend to agree that, on average, this region's 
financial systems remain among the least developed in the world (Awartani et al., 2015). 
In terms of capital markets, the region comprises some of the ancient stock markets in the 
world that were active since the 19th century, such as the one of Egypt created in 1890 and 
Morocco in 1929. Similarly, Amman Stock Exchange market was among the firsts to be 
established in the region. It was officially launched in 1976, and since that time has seen major 
developments and reforms. The next section will turn to provide more specific details about the 
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two MENA countries which have been selected to be the research platform; namely Jordan and 
UAE. 
3.3 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Profile 
Jordan is a relatively new and small country, with limited resources and majority of desert 
landscape17. After the Arab revolt against Ottoman Empire in 1916, Jordan has been officially 
emerged under the British mandate as Transjordan in 192118. Jordan’s strategic geographical 
location has gained the country its significance in different disciplines including political and 
economic patterns. The country is located in the crossroads of what Christians, Jews and Muslims 
call the Holy Land19. Knowles, (2005, p.1) stated that “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) 
has proved to be one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to external political, economic and 
security events”. However, the regional longitudinal instability since the occupation of the coastal 
parts of Palestine in 1940, and the occupation of Iraq in 2003, and even the recent Arab spring in 
2011 and what is going now days in Syria, has put the country under huge pressure. Accordingly, 
the country’s population has been subject to political issues and crisis in the region. Jordan’s 
population has been nearly doubled since 2000 to be 9.53m in the year 2015 (World Bank, 2016). 
Despite the challenges that emigration and refugees pose to the counters of the country’s 
economy, straining public services and labour market conditions in Jordan, the Jordanian economy 
has been successfully maintaining steady conditions of economic growth. According to World 
Bank, (2015) economic monitoring report, the Jordanian real GDP growth rate is 3.5 percent, and 
it’s expected to reach 3.9 percent in the year 2016. Since, the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the 
Jordanian governance has received more than 707 million of Jordanian dinners from different 
organizations and countries including United Nations20, in assistance to refugees and vulnerable 
community in Jordan. Figure 3-1 below provides details about annual growth rates of GDP 
alongside population growth rates over the period 1972 to 2015in Jordan. 
 
 
                                                 
17 89,341 sq. KM 
18 The British mandatory period on Jordan last from 1921 to 1946.  
19 BBC country profile/ Jordan. 
20 Jordanian dinar equals 1.41 of US dollar. 
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Figure 3-1 GDP and population annual growth rates during the period 1972-2015. 
 
 
 
            
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
Note: This figure has been adopted from world development indicators provided by the World Bank.  
 
Despite the current events in the neighbouring countries and the fact that Jordan is limited 
resources country, its services and goods exports records contribute more than 40 percent of the 
country’s GDP in 2014. Additionally, external transfers of the workers’ remittances and gulf 
subsidiaries and development grants reflect 19 percent of the GDP. Making Jordanian economy 
one of the highest in these ratios around the world21. Below figure showing the country’s economic 
activities contribution of the GDP. 
As noted in Table 3-2 previously, MENA region doing business ranking varies dramatically. 
Table 3-4 below show comparative analysis between Jordan and other world’s indicators of doing 
business rankings as provided by the World Bank Doing Business 2016 report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The Central Bank of Jordan. 
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Table 3-4 Doing Business Main Indicators international comparative data for Jordan in 2016. 
Indicator (rank) Jordan MENA lowest MENA best 
Regional 
average  
Global best 
Starting a Business  106 173 (Kuwait) 32 (Oman)  119.05 1 (New Zealand) 
Dealing with 
construction permits  
109 
157 (West Bank 
and Gaza) 
4 (UAE) 91.48 1 (New Zealand) 
Getting Electricity  48 172 (Djibouti) 4 (UAE) 97.19 1 (Korea, Rep.) 
Registering Property  96 168 (Djibouti)  11(UAE) 91.71 1 (New Zealand) 
Getting Credit  185 185 (Jordan)  
82 (Saudi 
Arabia)  
138.14 1 (New Zealand) 
Protecting Minority 
investors  
165 187 (Sudan) 9 (UAE) 127.62 1 (New Zealand*) 
Paying Taxes  79 
186 
(Mauritania)  
1 (UAE) 83.48 1 (UAE) 
Trading across borders  50 184 (Sudan) 50 (Jordan) 128.67 
1 (10 
Economies*) 
Enforcing Contracts  124 184 (Djibouti) 25 (UAE) 115.76 1 (Korea, Rep.) 
Resolving Insolvency  142 161 (Syria) 58 (Tunisia)  129.43 1 (Finland) 
Note: This table has been sourced from Doing Business 2017 report (self-compiled). * Two or more 
economies share the top ranking on this indicator. 
3.3.1 The Jordanian Capital Market 
Amman Financial Market AFM was established in 1976 officially22. In 1994 the Jordanian 
government restructure the market in order to increase its size and liquidity and in order to enhance 
information reliability and disclosers transparency. Accordingly, AFM was replaced by three main 
entities namely; the Amman stock exchange ASE, the Jordan security commission JSC, and the 
securities depository centre SDC. For almost a decade, the Amman Stock Exchange market (ASE) 
was one of the world's examples of a well-developed and credible regulated market. Having a 
market capitalization close to US$ 5 billion, ASE is one of the largest Arab stock markets in the 
MENA region that is open to foreign investors23. Today ASE, ranks among the leaders of emerging 
markets of developing countries (CBJ, 2015). 
Following these major development, the number of listed companies in ASE market has 
increased from 152 listed firm in 1999 to 228 in 2015, while there were only 66 companies in 
1978. Also, market capitalization experience growth in the same period for example, it has 
increased from 286 million Jordanian dinars (JOD) to 17.984 billion in 2015, while it accounts for 
                                                 
22 Amman is the capital city of Jordan, and the ASE is Jordan’s only stock market. 
23For example; Morocco's stock market has a market capitalization of US$ 4.5 billion, Tunisia US$ 1.5 billion and 
Oman US$ 1.5 billion. 
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4.1 billion in 1999. Similarly, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP has grown from 37 percent 
in 1978 to 326.6 in 2005, however, it has been dramatically decreased to 70.7 in 2015. 
Nevertheless, the 70.7% ratio of market capitalization to GDP is considered one of the higher 
ratios among other emerging markets, indicating both a well-established stock market and a 
relatively high level of securities trading24. On average basis during the period of 1990-2012, 
Jordan’s market capitalization percentage of the GDP showing higher level among Middle-East & 
North-Africa (MENA) countries. For example; the average market capitalization of listed 
companies as a percentage of GDP during 1990-2012 for similar regional countries was as follow; 
in Egypt was 34.34, Israel was 60.85, morocco was 38.82, Oman was 26.87, and United Arab 
Emeritus UAE was 25.64, while in Jordan the percentage was to 109 (Bayraktar, 2014). 
One of the most important factors for economic growth and developments both in developed 
and emerging markets are the existence of effective financial markets (Bayraktar, 2014). The 
Jordanian capital market has contributed positively to the national economy. The banking and 
finance sector leads the market with a capitalization of 50% of total market capitalization. The 
industrial sector ranks second with a 41% capitalization. The service and insurance sectors 
represent 8% and 2% respectively. By end of 1995, the average price/earnings ratio of all 97 listed 
companies reached 21.3, high enough to convince potential investors that large capital gains are 
available in Jordan. ASE's trading system is based on open-outcry on the trading floor. 
The visibility of the ASE market is superior to many other markets in the MENA region. In 
Jordan, the market capitalization has undergone accelerated growth, increasing by 158% over the 
last five years. Jordan is the only Middle Eastern market to be represented on the board of 
International Accounting Standards (IASC). ASE statistics indicate that about 30% of the market 
value is owned by non-Jordanians. In addition, the government of Jordan through the Jordan 
Investment Corporation (JIC), owns approximately 18% of the total market capitalization. 
Foreign investors can own up to 50% of any listed public shareholding company, with a 
minimum investment capital of US$ 1,428. Annual dividends and capital gains are tax-exempt for 
both Jordanians and foreigners investing in Jordan. This has contributed significantly to ASE's 
competitive edge at an international level. Table 3-5 below showing historical financial data about 
ASE market. 
 
                                                 
24 Various annual reports/ the central bank of Jordan. 
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Table 3-5 ASE market performance from 2005-2015 
Year No. of listed 
Co. 
Market Cap. 
(JD Million) 
Market Cap. as 
a% of the GDP 
General 
Weighted 
Price Index 
(point) 
Value Traded 
(JD million) 
2005 201 26,667.10 326.6 8191.5 16,871.00 
2006 227 21,078.20 233.9 5518.1 14,209.90 
2007 245 29,214.20 289 7519.3 12,348.10 
2008 262 25,406.30 216.7 6243.1 20,318.00 
2009 272 22,526.90 149.6 5520.1 9,665.30 
2010 277 21,858.20 122.7 5318 6,690.00 
2011 247 19,272.70 102.7 4648.4 2,850.20 
2012 243 19,141.50 93.5 4593.6 1,978.80 
2013 240 18,233.49 83 4336.7 3,027.30 
2014 236 18,082.62 75.8 4237.6 2,263.40 
2015 228 17,984.67 70.7 4229.9 3,417.10 
Note: This table has been adopted from Amman Stock Exchange ASE market several annual reports 
(self-compiled). 1 JD = 1.41 USD. 
3.3.2 Overview of the Jordanian Corporate Governance 
Jordan is representative of the mixed system developed from codes instituted by the Ottoman 
Empire (based on French law), British common law, and Islamic law25. With respect to corporate 
governance, Jordan corporate governance experience is developed based on ‘insider-oriented’ 
corporate governance system. With the absence of market for corporate control, the Jordanian 
government keep revising and developing the country’s legal and organizational structures. 
Among the key economic legislations that the Jordanian government has introduced was the 
issuance of The Company Law, (1997) and The New Securities Law, (2002)26. Accordingly, 
corporate governance roles and concepts are embedded in these laws and legislations to improve 
the country’s investment climate. 
Within the last decade, tremendous changes took place around the world to increase 
liberalization and globalization. Consequently, Jordan as a form of emerging markets was one of 
the few countries that realize the importance of coping up with the new trends of changes in the 
MENA region27. According to the Heritage Foundation report of Economic Freedom, Jordan has 
                                                 
25 The world factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html. 
26 The New Securities Law 2002 is superseding the initial Securities Law no. 23 issued in 1993. 
27 The MENA region covers Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syria, Tunisia, the United 
Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
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a steady state of improvements and it its economic freedom index was 69.3 percent. Interestingly, 
this is considered above the world’s average making the country’s economy 38thamong the freest 
around the world. Additionally, Jordan’s economy has been ranked the 5th in the Middle East 
region in 2015 by Heritage Foundation recent report. 
There are many entities in the Jordanian business community that contribute to these 
economic reforms and developments. For example; Corporate Compliance Authority plays an 
important role by enforcing many basic corporate governance provisions of the Company Law. 
Another key player is the Central Bank of Jordan. Further to issuing the bank Director’s Handbook 
of Corporate Governance in 2004, the Central Bank of Jordan is continuing its efforts to enhance 
corporate governance in the Jordanian banking system by preparing the Corporate Governance 
Code, which is intended to promote international best practice in the corporate governance of 
Jordanian banks (Al-Amarneh, 2014). 
The important aspects of these reforms of corporate governance are directly related to 
shareholders’ rights. In Jordan, shareholders enjoy a considerable right in terms of access to secure 
methods of registering a property, the strength of legal rights and legislation enforcement, getting 
credit from local banks and financial institutions, sell or transfer shares, obtaining relevant 
information or actions on a timely basis, and other firm activities like voting and board elections 
(World Bank, 2014). McGee, (2009) provide assessment of the Jordanian corporate governance 
experience based on the World Bank’s ROSC Report measuring the extent of compliance with the 
OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004). Accordingly, the weighted average 
score of compliance in Jordan was 3.91. This score is a composition of different subcategories 
relevant scores, for example; Jordan highest score was in the role category, while its lowest score 
was in the rights category (3.5). Table 3-6 below showing scores of each subcategory including; 
rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, disclosure and transparency, and the board responsibility. 
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Table 3-6 Jordan’s corporate governance compliance with OECD’s governance principals 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Note: This figure has been sourced from (McGee 2009, P. 276-277). Rights is composed based on 
different categories that measure the shareholders’ rights in the Jordanian corporate sector. Treatment 
refer to various indicators that measure the level of equitable treatment among shareholders in Jordan. 
Role is a composite score that combine different factors that measure the stakeholders’ role and 
intervention in a firm corporate governance system. D&T refer to different factors that measure the level 
of disclosure and transparency. And finally, Board in this figure refer to various factors that capture the 
responsibilities of the board of directors.  
 
Similarly, Shanikat & Abbadi, (2011) assessed Jordanian corporate governance based on 
compliance with OECD principles, and comes to an overall conclusion that can be summarized to 
the following points: 
 Shareholder have active rights in decision-making, except in major cases including major asset 
sales. 
 In practice, shareholders were not treated equitably, though controllers sometimes took action 
and prohibited insider trading. 
 Stakeholders have active roles and rights in corporate governance, they are practically 
protected by the Jordan’s company laws and regulations. 
 Disclosure and transparency were observed to a large extent, although limited to quantity rather 
than quality, because Jordan has fully adopted IFRS and ISA, and. 
 Boards largely fulfilled their responsibilities, as these are extensively defined by law and 
regulation. 
In general, Jordan has high level of financial development compared to other countries in 
MENA region, see below table. Creane et al., (2007, p.505) stated that Jordan has very low 
government restrictiveness on property rights, and well-developed, profitable, and efficient 
banking sector compared to majority of other countries in the region. Jordanian government has 
strengthened the banking sector regulations and supervisions during the past years. Additionally, 
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the first corporate governance code was initially issued for banking sector in Jordan in 2007. As a 
part of the continuous efforts to enhance transparency and efficiency, the Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ) has supersede the old banks governance code recently to the new corporate governance code 
for banks in Jordan in 2014.28 
Despite these financial development, however, corporate governance code or best practices 
has been implemented recently in the Jordanian market. Corporate governance code of 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange ASE was issued in 2008. The main 
objectives of this code were to help increase Jordan’s economic attraction and to ensure the rights 
and benefits of the business sector. The code provides recommendations for listed shareholding 
companies with regards to board size and composition and leadership structure to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Jordanian listed firm’s board of directors. In a step to cover most of the market 
participants, the Jordanian government represented by the ministry of industry and trade through 
the department of companies control issue new code nominated as the Jordanian Corporate 
Governance Code in 201229. It specifies the distributions of rights and responsibilities among the 
different parties in companies including stakeholders, shareholders, board of directors, and firm’s 
management, and lays down rules and procedures of decision-making process in organizations. 
Table 3-7 below describes the ownership and board of director’s structure and framework of the 
nonfinancial listed firms in Jordan during the research sampling time 2008-2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Deloitte & Touché/Jordan/MENA region head quarter various annual reports. 
29 B. Tricker, 2015. Corporate governance; Principles, Policies, and Practices. Third edition, Oxford University press, 
UK. 
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Table 3-7 Ownership and board of directors’ structures alongside the sampling period (2008-2014) in 
Jordanian listed nonfinancial firms 
 Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Government ownership 790 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.60 
Family ownership 790 0.24 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.99 
Foreign ownership  790 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.99 
Institutional ownership  790 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.00 0.99 
Concentration (Total) 790 0.61 0.64 0.23 0.06 0.99 
Board size 790 8.22 8.00 2.38 3.00 14.00 
Board independence  790 0.56 0.57 0.16 0.14 0.91 
CEO-duality  790 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Note: This table reports the identity of the largest shareholders (who own at least 5% of the firm’s shares), 
and board characteristics of the nonfinancial listed firm in Jordan during the sampling period (2008-
2014). Institutional ownership in this context includes banks, Insurance, Pension fund, Financial and 
Brokerage Firms. For more details about the measurement of governance variables see    
 
3.3.3 Overview of the Ownership Transitions in Jordan 
It would be useful to examine in details ownership characteristics for listed Jordanian firms. 
Especially, after the Jordanian privatization experience 1998-2008, when the government of 
Jordan privatize fourteen large state-owned companies in electricity, telecommunications, hotels 
& tourism, transportations, mining, tobacco & cigarettes, and other sectors. Consequently, direct 
state ownership is relatively small in the public firms in Jordan except in the mining sector 
(phosphates and potash) and other few companies in other sectors30. It could be arguable that 
privatization is a key factor of structural reforms in both developing and developed countries to 
achieve market efficiency and to enhance the general economy (Estrin et al., 2009). 
For Jordanian economy, privatization has strengthened the Jordan’s fiscal position. 
According to Mako, (2012, p.1) the Jordanian privatization experience has helped the country’s 
economy in different aspects; for example it helped Jordan to reduce its public debt from 100 
percent of the GDP in 2000 to 60 percent of GDP in 2008 by generating $2.3 billion in sales 
proceeds. Additionally, it also enhances the productivity of these firms which can be reflected by 
the large amount of sales that these firms generate. Accordingly, privatization contributes to 
macroeconomic stability in Jordan by providing the treasury of annual cash inflows i.e. taxes from 
these privatized firms. Interestingly, Jordan’s privatization experience can be shown as an 
excellent model for other MENA countries in terms of efficiencies and commitment in completing 
                                                 
30 Amman stock exchange various annual reports. 
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privatization program (Mako, 2012). However, OECD, (2013) report stated that “The government 
of Jordan also retains minority stakes in strategic assets like Arab Potash, Jordan Phosphate Mines, 
Jordan Cement Factories and Jordan Petroleum Refinery”. Table 3-8 below provide information 
about state ownership status in the Jordanian market during period of study 2008-2014. 
Table 3-8 Average percentage of ordinary shares held by state in Jordan. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total  Max Min 
State 
ownership 
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.0115 0.24 0 
No. of Obs  791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 
Note: This table has been adopted from several annual reports of firms listed in Amman Stock exchange 
ASE market (self-compiled). 
 
According to Table 3-8 above, the Jordanian government has transformed the ownership 
structure of the market by minimizing its holdings and keep it in decreasing patters. Accordingly, 
other forms of ownership evolved in the Jordanian market. For example; one of the important 
features of the Jordanian listed firms is that considerable share of the market is held by families, 
and showing increasing patters from 21.1 percent in 2008 to 25.1 percent in 2014. Another key 
player in the Jordanian market is the institutional investors. Institutional investors including 
pension funds, banks and other financial firms, and large holding companies. Table 3-9 below 
showing average percentage of ordinary shares held by different investors in listed firm in Jordan. 
Table 3-9 Average ownership structure alongside the sampling period of Jordan 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  Min Max 
Family ownership 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25  0.00 0.99 
Institutional 
ownership 
0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16  0.00 0.99 
Insider ownership 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10  0.00 0.71 
Foreign ownership 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.00 0.98 
No. of observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 791  791 791 
Note: This table has been adopted from several annual reports of firms listed in Amman Stock exchange 
ASE market (self-compiled). Insider ownership refer to the sum of all shares held by board of directors 
including executive and non-executive except those classified as large owners with at least 5% 
shareholdings. 
 
3.4 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Profile 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a new country, it has been formally formed as a 
confederation of seven independent emirates in December 1971. It occupies a strategic 
geographical location long boarders of the Arabian Gulf, with huge natural resources of crude Oil, 
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Gas, and Cement. However, Grant et al., (2007, p.507) argue that “The United Arab Emirates is 
quickly making its presence known on the world stage; the country is shifting away from its 
dependence on oil and diversifying into new business sectors such as real estate, tourism, world-
class sporting events, finance, and construction”. Since formulation, the UAE has lead other 
countries in the same MENA region in terms of maintaining legal environment, developed 
infrastructure, regulate and improve investor and consumers protection, provide the society with 
the best service, and develop the country’s economy and business environment to emerge as a part 
of the developed international community (Zoubir, 1999). 
Consequently, the UAE has emerged as a leader in global business and financial trade across 
the MENA region. These developments have created large opportunities for the expansion of work 
and the trade environment which is something incomparable with other countries in the same 
region. Beside economic contributions, these rapid developments have contributed to the country’s 
demographical distribution. Large job opportunities have been created for migrant workers to 
settle and work in the UAE. According to recent publications, the country has a total population 
of (5,927,482), with majority percentage of migrants account for nearly 85% of the UAE’s 
population31. It is a worthy of note that most of these migrants are from South East Asian countries 
i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Siri Lankan32. 
The official language of the country is Arabic and the predominant religious belief is Islam. 
Nearly (96%) of the UAE’s population are Muslims with a Sunni majority. The UAE is governed 
basically through a federation of hereditary absolute monarchies, which is a federal council made 
up of the seven Emirs of the united emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ras 
Al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Qaiwain)33. With respect to the legal system, the UAE constitution has 
been basically developed based on the French, Roman and Egyptian law. It should be noted also, 
that the laws in the UAE has been naturally influenced by the Shariah law jurisdiction34. 
Table 3-10 below show comparative analysis of doing business main indicators between 
UAE and the rest of the world rankings. It is worth noting that UAE economy is ranked in the 26th 
position out of 190 countries around the world. 
                                                 
31According to UN data (2016). 
32https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Emirates. Accessed on 03/03/2017. 
33 See Rabi, U. (2006), Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966), British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp 37-50.   
34 See Tarbuck, A. and Lester, C. (2009), Dubai Legal System ‘creating a legal and regulatory framework for a modern 
society’, Motivate Publishing, pp 7-8. 
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Table 3-10 Doing Business Main Indicators international comparative data for UAE in 2016. 
Indicator (rank) UAE MENA lowest MENA best 
Regional 
average  
Global best 
Starting a Business  53 173 (Kuwait) 32 (Oman)  119.05 1 (New Zealand) 
Dealing with 
construction permits  
4 
157 (West Bank 
and Gaza) 
4 (UAE) 91.48 1 (New Zealand) 
Getting Electricity  4 172 (Djibouti) 4 (UAE) 97.19 1 (Korea, Rep.) 
Registering Property  11 168 (Djibouti)  11(UAE) 91.71 1 (New Zealand) 
Getting Credit  101 185 (Jordan)  
82 (Saudi 
Arabia)  
138.14 1 (New Zealand) 
Protecting Minority 
investors  
9 187 (Sudan) 9 (UAE) 127.62 1 (New Zealand*) 
Paying Taxes  1 186 (Mauritania)  1 (UAE) 83.48 1 (UAE) 
Trading across borders  85 184 (Sudan) 50 (Jordan) 128.67 
1 (10 
Economies*) 
Enforcing Contracts  25 184 (Djibouti) 25 (UAE) 115.76 1 (Korea, Rep.) 
Resolving Insolvency  104 161 (Syria) 58 (Tunisia)  129.43 1 (Finland) 
Note: This table has been sourced from Doing Business 2017 report (self-compiled). * Two or more 
economies share the top ranking on this indicator. 
3.4.1 The UAE Capital Markets 
Following the approval of the stock exchange law in 1999, two financial markets were 
created in the UAE: Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market (DFM). 
Both markets were established in the year 2000. The ADX market is the larger of the two in the 
UAE, which begins its operations in November 2000. As of 2005, there were 50 companies listed 
in the ADX, the number of firms has been increased to 66 in 2015. Concurrently, the DFM has 
begun its operations in March 2000 with the intention of becoming a world-class regional market 
place. Furthermore, it tended to operate as a secondary market for trading securities issued by the 
public joint-stock companies, bonds issued by local and federal governments and other local or 
foreign financial instruments (Squalli, 2005). As of 2005, there were only 28 firms listed in the 
DFM, where the number of listed companies increased to 66 by the end of 2015. 
Both the ADX and the DFM have been electronically linked by The Emirates Securities 
Market ESM which was established by the Securities and Commodities Authority. It has its own 
index which covers the trading on stocks for all listed companies in both markets. The index is 
called The Emirates Securities Market Index. The number of listed companies in the ESM has 
grown steadily over the past ten years, going from 89 in 2005 to 125 in 2014. This substantial 
increase in market listings has resulted in a significant increase in market capitalization, it should 
be noted that, these trends had been affected and limited by the 2007 financial crisis (see Table 
3-11 below). 
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Table 3-11 ESM performance from 2005-2014 
Year No. of listed 
Co. 
ESM Index Market Cap. 
(AED 
Million) 
Traded 
volume 
(shares 
millions) 
Traded 
value (AED 
millions) 
No. of trades 
2005 89 6,839.97 839,683.1 33,811.9 509,868.0 2,300,452 
2006 106 4,031.01 514,697.5 50,939.9 418,149.3 3,138,749 
2007 120 6,016.21 824,629.2 157,318.1 554,333.6 3,354,617 
2008 130 2,552.23 363,872.0 126,439.3 537,134.4 3,257,450 
2009 133 2,771.56 404,702.5 148,297.4 243,489.9 2,728,964 
2010 129 2,655.32 385,429.9 56,003.4 103,804.9 1,158,505 
2011 128 2,341.42 346,135.8 40,995.9 56,819.2 728,097 
2012 123 2,561.21 379,062.0 56,858.4 70,705.5 880,087 
2013 120 4,313.56 646,270.8 178,682.4 244,504.7 1,894,030 
2014 125 4,580.13 728,367.0 217,895.2 525,955.3 3,272,329 
Note:  This table has been adopted from the UAE Securities and Commodities Authority ESCA. 1 AED 
= 0.227 USD.   
3.4.2 Corporate Governance and Ownership Trends in the UAE 
As noted before, recent high-profile corporate failures in the US market and in other 
countries has highlighted the importance of corporate governance for business survival. Indeed, 
investors have become more convinced about how to impose efficient controlling mechanisms on 
their business entities. Also, enhancing firm corporate governance and compliance levels may have 
important potentials to attract investors, which in turn provide access to equity capital. 
Accordingly, corporate governance has received substantial support from the UAE government 
since the recent financial crisis (2007/08). In the year 2007, the Securities and Commodities 
Authority (SCA) introduced the UAE Code of Corporate Governance for the first time35. The 
published corporate governance code aims to enhance corporate governance rules and discipline 
standards for UAE’s listed companies on Abu Dhabi Security Exchange (ADX), and Dubai 
Financial Market (DFM). 
In fact, this corporate governance code has been established based on common international 
norms and practices, mainly; the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. It is a stringent code 
and listed companies have been given a three-year period to comply with this rule (Pierce, 2008). 
The consequential effect of implementing corporate governance code is driven by particular 
emphasize on main areas of governance, to include board of directors’ major characteristics and 
                                                 
35 The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) is a market regulatory entity that regulate both Abu Dhabi 
Security exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial market (DFM).  
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composition such as; size, duality, independence; committees; remuneration; internal control; 
audit committee; external auditor; management authorization; shareholder right; professional 
conduct rules; governance report; penalties; and implementation (SCA, 2009). The elements of the 
corporate governance code should be comprehensively consistent with the UAE Corporation Act 
of Transparency and Disclosure. These governance points should be reflected as an integral part 
of the companies’ annual reports (Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012). 
In a further step of the development of corporate governance in the country, the UAE’s 
government has issued a new corporate governance code in 2009. Shehata , (2015, p. 320) stated 
that “The new code, entitled “Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards”, covers new 
issues of board structure and directors’ duties and responsibilities, and it stipulates that the 
chairman and CEO role must be separated; board committees must appoint nomination and 
remuneration committees; internal controls must be implemented; external auditors must follow 
restrictions; and companies must provide governance reporting to shareholders and to the Emirates 
SCA”. 
According to the 2009 UAE corporate governance code, “a corporate governance report 
must be disclosed by companies, and cover all information and details in the code, in particular: 
(i) the requirements and principles of completion of the corporate governance system; (ii) 
violations committed during the financial year, including their causes and the methods of remedy 
and avoidance of future occurrences; and (iii) method of formation of the board of directors in 
terms of member classes, terms of membership, means of remuneration fixation and remuneration 
of the general manager, executive director or chief executive” (Shehata , 2015, p. 320).  
The UAE’s institutional setting is relatively strong, which increases the need for companies 
there to improve corporate governance and compliance levels. As noted earlier, the UAE’s 
corporate governance code covers many aspects of the compliance. However, it has been observed 
recently that companies listed on Emirates Security Market ESM fails to show enough stringent 
compliance to the standards of corporate governance recommendations. According to a survey 
conducted by The Red Flag group in 201336 “UAE companies have adopted compliance to some 
degree, appointing compliance officers, but there is a lack of clarity on their roles, and they are not 
                                                 
36 The Red Flag Group is an international compliance consultancy interested in international business and economic 
development (https://www.redflaggroup.com/). 
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very senior,” says Scott Lane, chief executive of Red Flag Group. “Compliance is still about 
ticking the boxes.” Quoted in an article published by the Financial Times.37 
In fact, compliance can be seen as a competitive advantage for corporations seeking 
reputation and global capital access. Also, corporate governance comply and compliance has been 
seen as an important determinant of firm valuation and performance (Rose, 2016). Thus, this study 
illustrates that compliance in the form of “best practice” character of the corporate governance 
recommendations among listed firms in the UAE, by examining the relationship between a set of 
the internal (firm-level) corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
As noted earlier, corporate governance in the MENA region in general has received support 
from international organisations such as Hawkamah, The Institute for Corporate Governance, 
which was established in 2005 to help the MENA region overcome the corporate governance 
issues, by developing and implementing well-integrated corporate governance frameworks in 
MENA’s countries. The main objective of Hawkamah is to “shape corporate governance practices 
and framework throughout the region by promoting the core values of transparency, 
accountability, fairness, disclosure and responsibility”.38 
Table 3-12 below shows ownership and board of director’s structures of the UAE’s 
nonfinancial listed firms during the research sampling timeframe 2008-2014. 
Table 3-12 Ownership and board of directors’ structures alongside the sampling period (2008-2014) in 
UAE nonfinancial listed firms 
 Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Government ownership 279 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.55 
Family ownership 279 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.70 
Foreign ownership  279 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.50 
Institutional ownership  279 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.85 
Concentration (Total) 279 0.53 0.58 0.20 0.06 0.88 
Board size 279 8.12 8.00 2.06 5.00 16.00 
Board independence  279 0.70 0.73 0.19 0.22 100.00 
CEO-duality  279 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: This table reports the identity of the largest shareholders (who own at least 5% of the firm’s shares), 
and board characteristics of the nonfinancial listed firm in UAE during the sampling period (2008-2014). 
Institutional ownership in this context includes banks, Insurance, Pension fund, Financial and Brokerage 
Firms. Board (CEO) duality does not exist in the UAE’s capital market. For more details about the 
measurement of governance variables see    
                                                 
37https://www.ft.com/content/53b79214-a5ab-11e2-9b77-00144feabdc0 accessed on 03/3/2017. 
38 Hawkamah (2011), “Hawkamah vision, mission and objectives”, available at: www.hawkamah.org/ 
about_hawkamah/vision_mission_values/index.html (accessed 24 July 2017). 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides institutional background on corporate governance characteristics in 
MENA region in general and in the selected countries of analysis ‒Jordan and UAE. Specifically, 
it shows corporate governance practices at the firm level, and regulatory (country-level) 
framework of each capital market. After reviewing this chapter, the following main points can be 
concluded: 
First, in terms of country-level variation in governance, it is observed that while Jordan is 
characterised by a less-developed national governance system, UAE has a well-developed 
governance system and shows better enforcement of the rule of law, and higher national 
governance scores, see Table 3-3. Both Jordan and the UAE are a part of the MENA region, which 
is one of the most growing regions around the world. The pervasiveness of corporate governance 
best practices in capital markets and its impact on economic growth and firm’s outcomes has 
received a great deal of attention in recent years in MENA region in general and in Jordan and 
UAE in particular. Thus, investigating the issue of corporate governance and firm performance in 
this specific region would make several contributions to country-level and firm-level policy-
makers. 
Second, there are many codes or doctrines that formulate the best practices of corporate 
governance around the world, but the content of these codes is in general quite similar across 
countries, holding in mind the common characteristics of countries and markets related to the same 
region or culture. For example; USA and UK have common market characteristics that made the 
best practices of corporate governance nearly the same or quite similar, while continental Europe 
and Japan have shared similar corporate governance codes. Similarly, emerging countries of the 
MENA region, where financial markets are highly concentrated, they tend to have similar best 
practices of corporate governance in general. For example, board of directors mainly share the 
common characteristics regarding, size, independence, duality and committees in both corporate 
governance codes issued in these two countries. However, it should be noted that the only apparent 
difference is in term of the enforcement of such governance practices. It is observed that while in 
Jordan the compliance with the stated recommendations of the corporate governance code is 
voluntary to the choice of the firm, in the UAE’s capital market firms must comply with the 
recommendations of the best practises of governance mechanisms. 
 90 
 
Given the differences in national (country-level) governance and the similarities in internal 
(firm-level) governance in Jordan and in the UAE, it would be interesting to test that impact of 
such corporate governance (internal and external) mechanisms on firm performance. This may 
imply potentials to offer insights and to advance empirical literature associated with corporate 
governance and firm performance relationship within the context of small emerging markets of 
the MENA region. 
The next chapter of this thesis is the research design and methodology. It first describes the 
research philosophical stands, then it moves to the research sampling process. The chapter then 
proceeds to variables construction, measurement. Also, it explains the research methods of 
analysis, issues and treatments of panel data analysis, model specification, and estimation 
techniques, ended by chapter summary. 
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CHAPTER 4: GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE - METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter three, it presented the review of the literature which was associated with 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (internal and external) 
and firm performance. The results showed that despite these tremendous years of study, there is a 
clear gap in the literature in studying the effect of corporate governance on firm’s financial 
performance, especially in the non-US markets like MENA region capital markets that has newer 
experience with implementing corporate governance codes. How does the quality of the different 
governance mechanisms –which is applied in these small emerging capital markets– control, 
reduce, or mitigate agency problems? Wither internal corporate governance (i.e., ownership 
structure and board of directors) align interests and, hence increase firm performance is an 
important question in finance literature. According to the literature review presented in the 
previous chapter, these questions must be addressed within framework that best controls for 
endogeneity sources in such field of research. 
Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to build a methodological foundation to derive and 
test the governance-performance empirical model. The basics of the methodological foundations 
will be inspired from readings of different research methodological publications, and mainly from 
Rayan et al, (2002) and Saunders et al., (2009). These publications have been very helpful in 
providing useful analysis of the methods and methodologies for business and finance studies. 
Thus, they had been very helpful in shaping and constructing the empirical model used in this 
research to test the research hypotheses and examine the effects of the different governance 
monitoring mechanisms on corporate financial performance in the framework of analysis– the 
selected two capital markets of Jordan and the UAE. 
This chapter started with a brief discussion about the ethical approval issues (if any) involved 
in this research followed by explanations on its philosophical stance. The process of sampling and 
data collection methods and brief discussion about the panel data advantages and disadvantages 
and why it has been chosen as a data analysis method in this research. In the next section, 
construction explanation of the variables of interests in this thesis including; dependent variables 
 92 
 
i.e., corporate performance measures, independent variables i.e., corporate governance variables 
and other country-level governance mechanisms (World Bank), followed by control variables 
provided. This is followed by research methods of analysis and discussion of the model 
specification. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Consistent with prior literature, in terms of philosophical stand, this research adopts the 
“positivist approach” to examine the relationship between governance and performance. Certainly, 
the research hypotheses are developed and built based on the notion that the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance exist, and can be justified theoretically and examined 
empirically. According to Burrell & Morgan, (1979, p. 5) positivists “seek to explain and predict 
what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between its 
constituent elements”. Thus, we apply the deductive approach where the pre-existing theoretical 
basis is identified and relied upon in developing the research hypotheses. 
In consequence, the empirical findings will then confirm whether the hypotheses developed 
based on the theoretical and extant empirical arguments are supported or not. To achieve this 
objective, we run a set of regressions as the main tools of analysis in this research in which the 
researcher pursues the positivists’ understanding of the conduct of methodological process which 
is “unaffected by individual perceptual differences” (Bettner et al., 1994, p. 3). 
4.3 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
In any empirical research work, sample selection and data collection are a vital process to 
reflect the research reliability and validity. According to Ryan et al, (2002) it is very essential to 
clearly define the research population, and to ensure that the selected sample is really represent 
that population. In these perspectives, the target population in this research is defined as the non-
financial firms listed in Jordan and UAE. We relied on a non-probability sampling technique to 
build the research sample. Consequently, we choose only firms with the required information of 
our interests. 
More specifically, we choose nonfinancial firms that are locally incorporated and listed on 
Amman Stock exchange market ASE Mainboard (for Jordan), and the Abu Dhabi Securities 
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Exchange market ADX and Dubai Financial Market DFM (both for UAE) for the period from 2008 
to 2014.In line with previous studies, we exclude financial companies and banks from the 
sample39. The year 2008 is selected because it is one year after the new corporate governance 
guidelines and regulations which have been promulgated in 2007/08 in both countries. Indeed, 
2008 is an appropriate point of time to examine corporate governance impact on firm’s financial 
performance as the new guidelines of governance proposed on 2007 would have their effects on 
company’s annual report in the next financial year. The sample ends in 2014 since it is the most 
recent year for which data was available at the time this study was conducted. 
In November 2015, Jordanian capital market had (228) listed firms in Amman Stock 
Exchange, and there were (133) listed firms in Emirates Security Market, making a total of (361) 
listed firms in both capital markets. According to their main business activities, the selected capital 
markets classify all listed companies under specific ‘sectors’. These sector classifications allow us 
to consider the effect of the industry on the regression analysis later. Table 4-1 below describes 
the firms’ classification details under each sector in Amman Stock Exchange and in Emirates 
Securities markets in Jordan as showed in Nov, 2015. 
Table 4-1 Firms classifications as in ASE & ESM capital markets of Jordan and UAE respectively. 
Sector  Number of listed firms 
 Jordan UAE 
 Financial  
Banks 15 25 
Insurance 24 30 
Diversified financial services  36 12 
Real estates  34 12 
 Services  
Health care services 4 1 
Educational services 6 0 
Hotels and tourism   11 2 
Transportations 12 5 
Technology and communication 2 3 
Media 2 0 
Utilities and energy 4 2 
Commercial services 13 9 
 Industrial 
Pharmaceutical and medical industries  6 2 
Chemical industries  9 3 
Paper and cardboard industries  3 0 
                                                 
39 Excluding financial firms from the sample selection in this research is consistent with the extant related literature, 
see for example; (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Perrini et al., 2008; Pergola & Joseph, 2011; Nguyen et al., 
2015; Black et al., 2014) among others. Moreover, the governments and the regulatory bodies usually issue a separate 
form of governance code to regulate the financial sector differently.  
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Printing and packaging 1 0 
Food and beverages  11 4 
Tobacco and cigarettes 2 0 
Mining and extraction industries 16 4 
Engineering and construction 6 6 
Electrical industries 4 2 
Textiles, leathers and clothing 6 0 
Glass and ceramic industries  1 1 
Total 228 133 
Note:Data in this table are extracted from the selected capital markets annual reports. 
 
As shown in Table 4-1 above, financial firms listed in these two capital markets are classified 
under four main sectors, namely; banks, insurance, diversified financial services, and real estates. 
The total number of these firms is (109) in ASE and (79) in ESM. By extracting these firms from 
the main sample on board, the remaining (173) firms were from two main sectors namely industry 
and services in both markets. Additionally, there were (20) firms excluded from the sample due to 
missing data and/or their shares not been traded actively in ASE& ESM markets during the study 
period which is 2008-2014. Thus, this determines the sample final number as a total of (153) non-
financial listed firms in the both markets of Amman Stock Exchange & Emirates Security Market. 
Table 4-2 below summarises the research sample selection process: 
Table 4-2 Sampling process 
 ASE ADX DFM 
Total number of listed firms in capital market as in November 
2015  
228 66 67 
Less financial firms                                                                                                                           109 39 40
    
Remaining firms in the sample  119  27 27  
    
Less firms with missing data to cover the study period 2008-
2014 
6 8 6 
    
Final sample  113 19 21 
Note: Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) market located in Jordan, while both Abu Dhabi Security exchange 
(ADX) market and Dubai Financial Market (DFM) are located in United Arab Emirates and the jointly 
comprise the Emirates Securities Market (ESM). 
 
It should be noted that such type of data analysis is common in prior international and local 
governance literature. For example, Al-Shiab & Abu-tapanjeh, (2005) employ data from 1996-
2002 for (46) industrial firms out of (180) firms listed in ASE at 2002 to examine the effect of 
ownership structure on corporate performance. Zeitun & Tian, (2007) use data for 59 firms out of 
(180) listed in ASE from 1989-2002 to investigate the effect of ownership structure on corporate 
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performance and default risk. Similarly, Al-Khouri, (2005) utilizes data from 1998-2001 for (89) 
industrial firms out of (185) listed in ASE market to examine the relationship between ownership 
identity and concentration on firm’s value. 
There are three main sources for the data used in this research. First of all, national 
governance quality data such as (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law), 
and (Investor Protection Index) are sourced from the World Governance Indicators WGIs 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011), and Doing Business reports (the World Bank) consecutively. Secondly, 
we use DataStream and Osiris database to extract firm-level financial information such as (market 
capitalization, book value of firm’s ordinary shares, total sales, total assets, total shareholders’ 
equity, total liabilities, net income, earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT), current liabilities, 
current assets, cash dividends, and firm age). Finally, Internal (firm-level) governance data was 
extracted manually from firm’s annual reports, where they report ownership and board of 
directors’ detailed information. It is worth noting that, a cross-checking to ensure the accuracy of 
the data provided by the electronic data base sources performed randomly with company annual 
reports to ensure the data accuracy and reliability. 
Firm’s annual reports must disclose ownership structure and board of directors’ composition. 
Since the data of this study was collected during the period (Nov, 2015 – Feb, 2016) the company 
annual reports for the year (2015) were unavailable at that time, as annual reports disclosed by the 
end of first quarter of the fiscal year. Thus, using data from annual reports of 2008 till 2014 reflect 
the latest data available at the data collection time. Table 4-3 below shows the statistical 
breakdown of the selected listed-firms in each sector and their weights from the overall population. 
Table 4-3 Comparisons based on each sector of the aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE  
Sector  
Number of firms in each 
sector 
Share of population 
Number of firms in 
sample  
 Jordan UAE Jordan 
UA
E 
Jordan UAE 
Financial  
Banks 15 25 0.066 
0.18
7 
0 0 
Insurance 24 30 0.105 
0.22
5 
0 0 
Diversified financial 
services  
36 12 0.158 
0.09
0 
0 0 
Real estates  34 12 0.149 
0.09
0 
0 0 
Services  
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Health care services 4 1 0.018 
0.00
7 
4 1 
Educational services 6 0 0.026 
0.00
0 
6 0 
Hotels and tourism   11 2 0.048 
0.01
5 
9 2 
Transportations 12 5 0.053 
0.03
7 
10 4 
Technology and 
communication 
2 3 0.009 
0.02
2 
2 2 
Media 2 0 0.009 
0.00
0 
1 0 
Utilities and energy 4 2 0.018 
0.01
5 
3 2 
Commercial services 13 9 0.057 
0.06
7 
13 9 
Industrial  
Pharmaceutical and medical 
industries  
6 2 0.026 
0.01
5 
6 2 
Chemical industries  9 3 0.039 
0.02
2 
9 2 
Paper and cardboard 
industries  
3 0 0.013 
0.00
0 
3 0 
Printing and packaging 1 0 0.004 
0.00
0 
1 0 
Food and beverages  11 4 0.048 
0.03
0 
11 3 
Tobacco and cigarettes 2 0 0.009 
0.00
0 
2 0 
Mining and extraction 
industries 
16 4 0.07 
0.03
0 
16 4 
Engineering and 
construction 
6 6 0.026 
0.04
5 
6 6 
Electrical industries 4 2 0.018 
0.01
5 
4 2 
Textiles, leathers and 
clothing 
6 0 0.026 
0.00
0 
6 0 
Glass and ceramic 
industries  
1 1 0.004 
0.00
7 
1 1 
Total 228 133 
100
% 
 100% 113 40 
Note: Data in this table is self-compiled from ASE and ESM web-portals. 
 
Table 4-3 above shows that the final sample 153 listed companies in both capital markets. 
Most of this sample is concentrated in industrial sectors (55.6%), while service providers’ firms 
are jointly representing (44.4%) of our sample. We will account for all of the industrial and service 
sub-classifications in the regression analysis to examine the effect of each industry on firm 
performance. Next section proceeds to provide brief discussion about the panel data analysis as a 
methodology choice to execute this research. 
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4.3.1 Introduction to Panel Data Analysis 
As stated above, panel data is frequently used in prior corporate finance literature. In fact, 
panel data estimation is often considered to be an efficient analytical method in handling 
econometric data (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). In consequence, the advantages of panel data analytical 
methods have made the use of panel data analysis to become popular in social sciences researches, 
and particularly in corporate finance researches. According to Asteriou & Hall, (2011) the main 
advantage of the panel data is that it allows the researcher to include data for N cross-sections (i.e., 
individuals, households, firms, countries, and so on) and T time periods (i.e., yearly, quarterly, 
monthly, and so on). The combined matrix of the time series for each cross-sectional member in 
the data set, including the development over time will increase the number of observations and 
offer a wide variety of estimation methods. 
Another important reason for the increasing interests in panel data is that, the potential use 
of panel data can radically reduce the underlying serious impact of omitted variables on the 
statistical inference by allowing the researcher to control over any omitted variable, unobservable, 
and/or hard to measure firm-specific effects that may have direct or indirect effects on the selected 
variables in a research (Dougherty, 2011). For example, O’Connell, (2007: P: 372) stated that “In 
a study of the determinants of corporate failure, appropriate panel data modelling and estimation 
permits the researcher to control for unobservable firm-specific effects which can have a major 
impact on the probability that an individual firm will fail but are nevertheless difficult to measure”. 
This implies that utilizing panel data will allow to control for any unobservable individual specific 
effects, which in turns enhance the reliability of the estimator and increase the robustness and 
validity of the findings. 
Another attraction of panel data sets is that it gives more informative data, more variability, 
less collinearity among the selected variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency 
(Baltagi & Chang, 1994). Contrary to time series analysis that are usually plugged with 
multicollinearity, a panel data estimation that will allow researchers to test hypotheses using a 
large number of observations on a range of cross-sections i.e., firms, individuals, or countries 
giving more informative data that can produce more reliable parameters estimates (O’Connell, 
2007). It’s worth noting that, analysing small sample of observation through time-series analysis 
would be confounded with multiple issues like difficulties in obtaining t-ratios or f-statistics from 
regressions. Panel data sets can solve this problem by pooling the data into a ‘panel’ of time-series 
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from different cross-sectional units that will allow to include dummy variables to capture the 
systematic differences among panel observations which is known as fixed-effect model (Asteriou 
& Hall, 2011). 
In terms of classifications, a panel can be described as a ‘balanced panel’ if the panel has the 
same number of time observations for each unit of variable and every individual. On the other 
hand, if some observations are missing or there are different numbers of time observations for 
some of the variables or individuals, this can be described as an ‘unbalanced panel’ (Dougherty, 
2011; Asteriou & Hall, 2011). On the other hand, despite all of the mentioned advantages in the 
above analysis, panel data models may have confounded with different issues. One of the serious 
issues may face panel data analysis as determined in prior empirical investigations is called 
multicollinearity. 
In practice, multicollinearity refers to the high degree of correlation between the model’s 
explanatory variables. According to Wooldridge, (2010) there are two main types of 
multicollinearity; perfect and near multicollinearity. While perfect-multicollinearity occurs when 
there is a certain correlation between explanatory variables, near-multicollinearity happens when 
there is a small statistical, albeit economically significant correlation between exploratory 
variables. In fact, the latent type of multicollinearity is likely to occur in real life practice. 
Multicollinearity issue can be serious sometimes and may reduce the research’s results validity 
and reliability (Hsiao, 2007). High degree of multicollinearity can lead to large standard error and 
thus imprecise estimates of coefficients. 
In consequence, prior empirical literature suggests few methods to assess the degree of 
multicollinearity among the model’s exploratory variables. One of the most widely-used 
techniques is called Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). VIF illustrates the degree for every 
independent variable that has been explained by other independent variable to eliminate collinear 
variables. In other word, the change in one variable will change the coefficient. According to Hair 
et al., (2010)if VIF is more than 10 this indicates that the model is confounded with serious 
multicollinearity issue. Others were very simple in determining multicollinearity in empirical 
work. For example; Gujarati and Porter, (2009) suggest that if the correlation between the 
independent variables is less than 0.80, then there is no need to consider any serious 
multicollinearity issue. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is defined as: 
𝑉𝐼𝐹 (𝛽j)  =  1/ (1 – 𝑅
2
j) Eq. (1)  
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Where,𝑅2j is the coefficient of determination from a regression of the explanatory 
variable, 𝑋j, on a constant and the rest of the explanatory variables. The VIF represents the ratio 
of the actual variance of the estimated coefficient, 𝛽j, to what it would have been in the absence of 
multicollinearity, where 𝑅2j is equal to zero. Hence the higher is the VIF value, the higher the 
degree of multicollinearity. 
Despite the fact that multicollinearity can lead to unreliable and unstable estimates of 
regression coefficients, there are several situations in which multicollinearity issue can be safely 
ignored (Allison, 2012). Further, Brooks, (2014) stated that multicollinearity can be ignored if the 
model is otherwise adequate and robust, whereas the presence of multicollinearity does not affect 
the best linear unbiased estimator properties of the utilized regression. Additionally, Brooks, 
(2014) argue that in order to control multicollinearity issue in research, a one can simply remove 
highly correlated variables from the model. 
4.4 Research Framework 
As noted earlier, this research aims to investigate the relationship between country- and firm-
level governance variables and firm performance in Jordan and UAE. Accordingly, the type of 
investigation that will adopted must be able to determine the ways in which the constructs of 
governance (the independent variables) related to firm performance (the dependent variable). 
Thus, the investigation must reflect the theoretical assumptions that determine the ways of any 
potential correlations between the variables of interests. 
The extensive literature review in this thesis (Chapter 2) has identified that extant corporate 
governance research has mainly developed and grounded based on one theoretical assumptions; 
the Agency Theory. Although there are other important theories e.g., stewardship and resource 
dependency theories, they have been considered and applied in isolation rather than complements 
to the agency theoretical assumptions in governance research. Secondly, prior corporate 
governance research was found to have neglected to consider the effect of firm’s hosting country’s 
national governance system on the relationship between the internal firm-level governance 
mechanisms and firm’s financial performance, which implies to consider the institutional 
theoretical standpoints in understanding corporate governance research. 
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Thus, in order to overcome these research shortcomings, the author proposes the conceptual 
framework that encompasses and allows the simultaneous considerations of the four main 
theoretical assumptions employed in this thesis; Agency, Stewardship, Resource dependency, and 
Institutional Theory, whilst defining and providing the national governance system as a potential 
influential indicator to firm performance. 
Exploring extant corporate governance research allowed to identifying five main constructs 
of internal firm-level governance system that represents the three governance traditional theories 
(agency, stewardship, and resource dependency). The five main constructs are described as: share 
ownership concentration (relating to agency theory), share ownership identity i.e., family and 
institutional share-ownership (also relating to agency theory), board of directors’ independence 
(relating to agency theory and resource dependence theory), board of directors’ size (relating to 
agency, stewardship theory, and resource dependence theory), and finally board of directors’ 
duality (relating to agency and stewardship theory). The prior related literature has also discussed 
the extent to which the institutional theory represents a relevant and justifiable lens through which 
to observe a firm’s hosting country’s governance system impact on firm performance. 
4.5 Constructing Research Variables  
As discussed previously, this research is aiming at investigating the relationship between 
corporate governance variables (internal and external) and firm performance in Jordan and the 
UAE as form of the MENA small emerging markets context. Accordingly, there are four types of 
measures that have been identified as relevant to prior governance research, and have been 
included in the research hypotheses and the empirical model. First of all, the measures refer to 
those constructions of firm performance. Second, individual indicators of corporate governance 
(firm-level) based on the relevant extant corporate governance literature. Third, a set of national 
(country-level) governance indicators. Finally, a bundle of control variables to capture any 
unobservable individual effects on the model. Hence, this section describes and justifies an 
appropriate measurement for each element (dependent and independent/ explanatory) variables 
used in this research, and develop a set of hypotheses about the effect of these governance variables 
on firm performance. Next section describes measurements of the main dependent variable (firm 
performance) i.e., Tobin’s Q, and other alternative performance indicators that will be used for 
robustness and sensitivity checks later on. 
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4.5.1 Firm Performance 
Corporate financial performance can be measured by different methods. However, prior 
corporate finance literature has not provided a consensus way with regard to the choice of 
corporate financial performance measure. For example, prior empirical literature can be classified 
for three main streams. First, there are empirical studies that based only on accounting profitability 
measures, see for example; (Morck et al., 1988; Cao, Pan, & Tian, 2011; Hu & Zhou, 2008). 
Another strand of literature uses both accounting profitability and market based performance 
measures including (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Guest, 2009; Li et al., 2015; Wahba, 2015; García-
Meca et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2010; King & Santor, 2008;Jalbert, Rao, & Jalbert, 2011; Maury, 
2006). Other studies have relied only on market based performance measures including  
(Himmelberg et al., 1999; Berthelot et al., 2010;Nguyen et al., 2015;Jermias & Gani, 2014; Shan 
& McIver, 2011; Yang & Zhao, 2014). 
It is a worthy noting that prior literature has demonstrated advantages and disadvantages for 
all performance metrics. For example, accounting profitability measures i.e., ROA and ROE are 
backward-looking measures, and can be easily affected by accountability and managerial 
transparency (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). However, Return on Assets (ROA) can provide 
business owners and top-level management with effective tool to measure the effectiveness of their 
predetermined goals. Additionally, accounting profitability measures can provide banker, 
investors, and financial analysts with an overall picture about a firm’s financial resources 
utilization and financial strength (Corinna et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, market-based performance measures i.e., Tobin’s Q is one of the most 
frequent measure that prior empirical literature has relied on to assess a company performance. 
According to Demsetz & Villalonga, (2001) Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking performance measure, 
and it reflects the market growth and expectations, which in terms has been the most favoured 
methods for economists, who have better understanding of the market rather than accounting 
constraints to assess a firm’s financial performance. However, Tobin’s Q has been criticized 
recently by scholars arguing that it can be confounded by certain practices that may lower the 
Average Q, these practices are directly to the managerial behaviour of underinvestment.40 
                                                 
40 For example Dybvig & Warachka,(2012) claim that Tobin’s Q doesn’t measure corporate financial performance, 
and they proposed a new approach to evaluate managerial efficiency based on revenue and cost analysis.  
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Nonetheless, this research will mainly depend on Tobin’s Q ratio to capture a firm 
performance in this analysis. However, it should be noted that for robustness checks and sensitivity 
analysis of the main findings, an alternative performance (ROA & ROE) indicators will be 
employed as dependent variables instead of the main indicator (Tobin’s Q). As stated above, these 
measures are the most frequent used performance metrics in prior related empirical literature. 
According to Haniffa & Hudaib, (2006) the use of alternative performance measures can enhance 
the research results robustness. Below discussion is more analysis about the performance 
indicators used in this research and methods applied to calculate each one of them. 
4.5.1.1 Tobin’s Q Ratio 
As stated above, Tobin’s Q is one of the dominant form of evaluation methods that has been 
widely used in corporate governance literature. According to Abraham, (2013) the use of Tobin’s 
Q in literature which is motivated by the insights that firms generated rate of return greater than 
the required rate of return and will usually command market valuation premium relative to its book 
value or replacement cost. Tobin’s Q usually defined as the market value of equity divided by 
replacement cost. Contemporaneously, firms with higher Tobin’s Q can be considered to be more 
favourably viewed by the market. In some cases, market replacement costs are not provided and 
are very difficult to obtain. To overcome this problem (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) proposed a simple 
estimator that requires a basic accounting ratios to estimate Tobin’s Q for a performance 
measurement. 
Thus, due to the difficulties and lack of required information to calculate replacement costs 
in the Jordanian context, following Nguyen et al., (2015), Doidge et al., (2001) among others, this 
study will adopt the below formula to execute Tobin’s Q calculations: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + (𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
 Eq. (2)  
Where 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = Tobin’s q for the ith firm at t period of time. 𝑀𝑉𝐸 𝑖𝑡 = the market value of 
equity of the ith firm at t period of time, calculated as the firm’s year-end closing stock price times 
the firm’s number of common stock outstanding. 𝑇𝐸 𝑖𝑡 = total shareholders’ equity for the ith firm 
at t point of time. And finally, 𝑇𝐴 𝑖𝑡 = is the book value of total assets for the ith firm at t point of 
time. 
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This performance indicator (i.e., Tobin’s Q) is employed in this research to better explain 
the diverse country- and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms impact on market value of 
the firms listed in small emerging markets such as Jordan and the UAE, which may gain 
comparative insights on the effectiveness of variant corporate governance mechanisms adopted by 
nonfinancial firms listed in these two different emerging markets. 
4.5.1.2 ROA and ROE 
It’s indeed that, the researcher is fully aware of corporate financial performance that can be 
measured from different perspectives. The above method provides market expectations 
perspectives, whereas, the accounting profitability ratios provide historical perspectives. The 
Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return on Equity (ROE) are the methods that will be used in this 
research to capture the historical perspectives of the non-financial firms’ performance in Jordan. 
While the ROA shows how efficient a firm’s management is to generate earnings from its assets, 
the ROE illustrates how much profit a firm can be generated from the shareholder’s equity that has 
been invested in the firm. 
The ROA can be simply calculated by dividing a firm’s net income by the book value of its 
total assets. On the other hand, Return on Equity (ROE) is another popular way to measure 
corporate financial performance. It can be calculated by dividing a firm’s net income by its 
shareholders’ equity. Corporate finance literature has highlighted ROE as one of the best methods 
to test financial performance as long as debt levels which are rational. Accordingly, the ROE can 
be inflated by increasing the leverage level in a firm as ROE can be an output of the (ROA * 
leverage multiplier) (Corinna et al., 2013). 
It is worth noting that, each study examines financial performance that may suffers from 
issues. One common issue that is identified in prior corporate finance literature is the presence of 
outliers. Outliers can be described as an extreme values (abnormal observations) that might be 
positive or negative which may affect results robustness and may distort the research analysis 
(Black et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2013). Prior academic literature has suggested two main methods 
to deal with this issue. One way is to exclude these extreme values from the analysis41. 
                                                 
41 In statistics, this method is known as data trimming or truncating. 
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Nonetheless, removing these extreme figures may reduce the total number of the observations 
which in terms affect the research sample and hence, loss of information (Liu et al., 2012). 
Another way to eliminate the potential effect of the outliers is called winsorizing. This is an 
alternative method that would be applied in this research instead of excluding abnormal 
observations in the corporate performance data. Data winsorization means replacing the abnormal 
observations in a data set with a certain percentile value from each end. In this research, corporate 
financial performance variables (Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE) will be censored at the 1st and the 99th 
percentiles.42 Next section, sets the corporate governance and firm performance variables 
measurements.  
4.5.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
Since this research has investigated the impact of corporate governance practices on 
corporate financial performance using a sample of publicly-listed nonfinancial firms in Jordan and 
UAE, further clarification of research variables is essential. Unlike the independent (performance) 
variables used in this research, data related to corporate governance variables are hand-collected 
data from 2008 annual reports. As per the substantial shareholder disclosure requirements of 
companies Act 2004 and Act 2002, Jordanian and UAE’s public companies must comply with this 
Act and provide major shareholders ownership data available throughout annual reports 
respectively. These Acts stipulate the mandatory disclosure of substantial shareholders who own 
at least 5% of the listed firm’s common stocks. 
In addition to substantial ownership information, annual reports provide data related to the 
firm’s board of directors’ composition and leadership structure. Names of the directors and their 
direct and indirect shareholdings should be reported annually. Thus, board of directors’ size, 
independence, managerial shareholdings, and insider (non-substantial shareholder board member) 
ownership must be disclosed in annual reports. As a part of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
and Emirates Security Market (ESM) listing requirements family relationships and family 
member’s shareholdings should be disclosed clearly under the board of directors’ shareholding 
section. 
                                                 
42 The most frequently used level of winsorization in prior corporate finance literature is seems to be at the 1st and the 
99th percentiles, see for example; Liu, N.Y., Bredin, D., Wang, L.M., Yi, Z.H., 2012. Domestic and foreign 
institutional investor behaviour in China. European Journal of Finance, 1–24, among others.   
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In consequence, all of the corporate governance required data will be extracted from listed 
firms’ annual reports published by both capital markets43. This web-sources provide the annual 
reports of the publicly listed firms in the Jordanian market and UAE’s capital markets exclusively. 
Hence, the below sections provide measurement methods and definitions of the independent 
variables, and other control variables used in this research, and draw hypotheses based on 
empirical and theoretical extant work. 
4.5.2.1 Family Ownership 
As discussed in subsection 2.5.1.1.1 of chapter 2, family control in business is a prevailing 
form of ownership around the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2001; Miller et al., 
2014). This form of business has been largely seen as a superior business model to other 
counterparts in any market. Especially, when families are active rather than passive in controlling 
public firms (Maury, 2006). In the Jordanian market, most of the publicly-listed firms are owned 
by families44. However, the Jordanian corporate sector knows little about how family ownership 
may affect corporate financial performance. Despite that family ownership is a prevailing form of 
ownership around the world, prior related literature is still not clear about whether family 
ownership or ownership concentration is the key determinant of corporate financial performance 
(Singal & Singal, 2011). 
In addition, there is some empirical evidence that supports the notion that family ownership 
may exacerbate agency problem and harm firm’s financial performance. For example; Erbetta et 
al., (2013) argue that family firms have systematic lower efficiency and higher tendency to overuse 
capital and labour. This evidence supports the idea that family firms may expropriate other minor 
shareholders’ wealth which in terms may reduce corporate financial performance. Moreover, this 
                                                 
43 Companies’ annual reports in Jordan and the UAE can be accessed and downloaded by visiting the below web-
portals: 
http://www.exchange.jo/en/disclosures. 
https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/default.aspx 
http://www.dfm.ae/market-data/market-data-overview 
http://www.sca.gov.ae/english/Pages/Home.aspx 
 
44 For example; Zara investment Holding is owned and controlled by Almasri family, Arab International Hotels PLC 
dominated by Alm’sher family, Arab International Co for Education & Investment is dominated by Abu-Khadejeh 
family, Jordan Hotels and Tourism Co is dominated by Al-Salfeti family, Arab Chemical Industries is dominated by 
Al-Taher family, and etc. 
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case may get worse in emerging markets of the developing countries where the market for 
corporate control is inactive, and other external governance mechanisms are weak or absent (La 
Porta et al., 2000). 
Family business literature has grown rapidly in recent times (Zahra, 2016). Prior 
international literature on family business governance shows the advantages of such type of 
dominant shareholders in capital markets. For example; Pindado & Requejo, (2014) highlight the 
importance of family ownership and control in corporate sector, by suggesting that family 
ownership affect corporate financial performance through three main business dimensions; (i) 
ownership structure choice, (ii) corporate strategic decisions, and (iii) succession process. 
Moreover, empirical evidence over the last years shows that family business is enjoying higher 
performance on most cases around the world (Brenes, Madrigal & Requena, 2011). However, as 
noted earlier in the empirical literature review section (2.5) of chapter 2, the empirical evidence 
on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance has yielded mixed results, 
and family business research has reached adolescence status (Van Essen et al., 2014). Prior 
literature suggests explanations for this inconclusive results, which is that prior literature has used 
different family business “definitions” to examine the relationship of family ownership and firm 
performance. 
According to recent review of prior literature , associated with family ownership, governance and 
firm performance conducted by Pindado & Requejo, (2014), (57.3%) of the prior literature  relied 
on having a family in the largest shareholders as a most common feature to define family business. 
The second common definition of family business was the involvement of several family members 
in the business, and takes (22.0%) from the related literature in total. In the same vein, other 
scholars use cut-off point to define family business. For example; La Porta et al., (1999) and 
Claessens et al., (2000) use a (10%) cut-off level to define family ownership and to discriminate 
family control on business from other form of investors. La Porta et al., (1999) justify this cut-off 
point as it is provide a significant threshold of the votes, and most of firms around the world are 
mandated to disclose the investors who own at least 10% of the firm’s common stocks by law. 
However, there is another strand of literature that did not set any specific cut-off points. For 
example, Anderson & Reeb, (2003) and Villalonga & Amit, (2006) define family ownership as 
being one of the largest shareholders who own at least (5%) of a firm’s common stocks. 
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These varieties in defining a family business or family ownership was key reason adding to 
the mixed results obtained in prior literature. Other scholars i.e., Zahra, (2016) argue corporate 
governance literature associated with family business tended to use different theoretical 
assumptions from different backgrounds i.e. anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, 
organizational theory, organization behaviour, entrepreneurship, and strategic management, which 
in terms allow to have different perspectives of such implications of family ownership and 
governance on firm performance. 
As stated earlier, Jordanian and UAE’s corporate sector is mandated by law to disclose the 
names of the largest shareholders who own at least (5%) of a firm’s common stocks. Additionally, 
firms should disclose the percentage of shares held by any of the owners’ relatives. In terms of 
“definition” and measurements, this research will follow Anderson & Reeb, (2003) and Villalonga 
& Amit, (2006) among others and define family ownership as the sum of all percentage of shares 
held by founding family and their relatives who own at least (5%). 
4.5.2.2 Institutional Ownership 
Subsection Error! Reference source not found. of the literature review in chapter 2 
explores how institutional investor’s ownership may affect firm performance. In short, agency 
theory states that dominant shareholders may have better incentives to increase firm performance 
by imposing vigilant monitoring activities. However, finance theory did not distinguish between 
the types of the dominant shareholders, but empirical literature suggests that corporate value is a 
function of the equity ownership structure and shareholders’ identity. Thus, a related set of 
empirical literature has focused on the potential effect and role that large institutional investors 
can play to push the firms toward the value maximization target (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
The key point here is that, institutional investors as dominant shareholders have greater incentives 
and can perform the costly-monitoring activities on firm’s managerial behaviour efficiently, which 
in terms may eventually increase firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
There is a large theoretical literature on dominant shareholder implications on publicly-listed 
firm in general. Pound, (1988) develops a theoretical framework to analyse the potential effect of 
the institutional investors as a form of concentrated ownership on corporate financial performance. 
According to Pound’s theoretical framework, the role of institutional investors can be under three 
main hypothetical arguments. The first argument is the efficient monitoring hypothesis, which 
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indicates that institutional investors have the right credentials, capabilities, and expertise to 
monitor managerial behaviour efficiently at lower cost. This in terms may apply positive effect on 
firm’s value. The second argument is the conflict of interests’ hypothesis. This hypothesis is based 
on the traditional agency conflict between investors and management as institutional investors are 
only investors and will be reluctant to voice with managerial decisions. Therefore, negative impact 
is expected on firm’s value. On the same hand, institutional investors and management may have 
specific mutual advantage, which require the cooperation between institutional investors and 
firm’s management. This type of cooperation will eventually deprive any monitoring activities that 
may enhance corporate financial performance, thus a negative effect also is expected here. This 
proposition is the strategic alignment hypothesis. 
In terms of measurements, this research applies the 5% role of ownership measurement, by 
taking the percentage shares owned by institutional investors ‒including mutual funds, pension 
funds, insurance companies, banks and other large financial institutions‒ who own at least 5 % to 
the total number of common shares. These investors are the key institutional investors in the 
selected two capital markets of this analysis ‒Jordan and the UAE. 
4.5.2.3 Ownership Concentration 
Given that prior literature divided the impact of ownership concentration as a key internal 
governance instrument into; the type of the dominant shareholders, and the concentrated 
ownership, this research will examine the impact of the aggregate ownership concentration on firm 
performance. As noted in section Error! Reference source not found. of Chapter 2, ownership 
concentration (structure) is one of the most influential corporate governance practices in business 
life that attracted much of the debate among the different academic disciplines. In general, a firm 
ownership structure determines whether firms are closely or widely held (OECD, 2004).  Thus, 
unlike traditional Principal-Agent conflict that stems in developed countries, Principal-Principal 
conflict seems to be a major corporate governance issue in emerging markets (Young et al., 2008). 
In terms of measurements, prior corporate governance literature provides empirical scales 
for these elements of ownership structure dynamics. Following Munisi, Hermes, & Randøy, 
(2014); Ameer, (2012); Rubin, (2007); Nguyen et al., (2015, 2014) among others, ownership 
concentration is defined as the percentage of firm’s common stock held by shareholders who own 
at least 5% of the total firm’s common shares in this research. The (5%) rule has been dominant 
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in prior related literature. According to their recent meta-analysis Wang & Shailer, (2015) 
emphasize that 77% of the studies included in their analysis use ownership concentration ratio 
(5%) as a main measurement method. In addition to the ownership structure variables, this research 
employs other important governance instruments i.e., board of director’s variables ‒size, duality 
and independence‒ suggested by prior theoretical and empirical evidence as determinant of 
corporate financial performance. 
4.5.2.4 Board Size 
The optimal number of directors is an important question in corporate governance literature. 
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests that larger boards are more 
favourable when there is wider reliance on external source. However, agency theory argues that, 
the smaller is the board of the effective productivity of its function (Jensen, 1983). Subsection 
2.5.2.1 of Error! Reference source not found. reviews prior empirical evidence associated with 
the effect of board size on firm performance. Moreover, it shows implications of board of director’s 
size in terms of monitoring managerial behaviour effectively. For example; Lipton & Lorsch, 
(1992) stated that, due to the coordination difficulties and free-riding problem, larger boards could 
be less effective than smaller in supervising a firm’s management. This gives rise to hypothesis 
concerning the effect of board size on firm performance. Cheng, (2008) provide evidence that 
larger boards are negatively related to corporate performance measured by Tobin’s q and 
accounting profitability ratios. Other scholars argue that board size-performance relationship is a 
component of the firm’s complexity degree. Coles et al., (2008) stated that either small or large 
boards are optimal, providing U-shape evidence between board size and corporate financial 
performance. 
In terms of measurements, following prior literature, board of directors’ size is measured 
simply by taking the absolute total number of board member for each publicly listed-firm in both 
capital markets of Jordan and the UAE. 
4.5.2.5 CEO-Duality 
Subsection 2.5.2.2 of the literature review in Chapter 2 explores the potential effects of CEO-
duality on firm performance in general. Moreover, it shows that, the term CEO-duality has been 
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less common recently in the business life of the developed countries45. However, the critical 
analysis and the synthetic review of the data in this research, suggest that board-duality is 
frequently existing in the Jordanian capital market. This gives a rise to the hypothesis related to 
CEO-duality and firm performance. 
Agency theory assumes that board-duality may destroy firm value and defoliate its 
performance by promoting entrenchment (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Duru et al., (2016) provides 
evidence that board duality has significant a negative impact on firm performance. Baliga et al., 
(1996) stated that board duality has been blamed, in many cases, for the poor performance, and 
failure of firms to adapt to a changing environment. However, there has been differences in 
findings regarding board duality and firm performance in prior literature. For example, Yang & 
Zhao, (2014) highlight the benefits of board duality in reducing information costs and making 
decisions more faster , hence, they conclude that firms with board duality outperform other non-
duality firms. Accordingly, Krause et al., (2014) conclude that corporate governance literature 
lacks evidence of a substantive relation between the board leadership structure and firm 
performance. 
Following prior literature, in order to examine the impact of CEO-duality on firm 
performance in this context, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the board 
chairman is holding the CEO position at the same time, and otherwise zero. 
4.5.2.6 Board Independence 
As discussed in subsection Error! Reference source not found. of Chapter 2, agency theory 
supports the idea of outside directors, to increase independencies between board and management. 
Moreover, international corporate governance codes i.e., Cadbury, recommends and highlights the 
need to have independent directors. Moreover, resource dependence theory predicts that 
independent directors may have strong links with external environment resources, and hence, they 
may have positive implications on firm performance. Prior empirical studies of publicly-listed 
firms have shown a significant positive relationship between boards’ independence and corporate 
financial performance in general. Liu et al., (2015) provide significant evidence that board member 
independence is positively related to corporate financial performance. However, it should be noted 
                                                 
45For more analysis about CEO-duality trends and statistics, please refer to Byrd, J. et al., 2012. Are two heads better 
than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(4), pp.957–967. 
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that stewardship theory suggest that independent board members can add value to a firm only when 
they are minority (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
In terms of variable measurements, following prior governance literature, board 
independence is measured by taking the relative percentage of non-executive directors scaled by 
the total number of board members. 
4.5.3 Control Variables 
As stated before, the main purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of governance 
mechanisms on corporate financial performance. While corporate governance mechanisms refer 
here to ownership structure (concentration and identity), corporate financial performance is 
measured by market valuation (Tobin’s Q) and firm profitability (ROA and ROE). It’s worth noting 
that, ownership structure and board of directors’ variables are extremely treated as endogenous 
variables in this research (Wintoki et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Wang & Shailer, 2015). Thus, 
it’s important to alleviate any potential bias caused by other firm-level specific omitted variables. 
Consequently, it is necessary to account for any unobservable factors that by using other 
observables or empirical measure indicators. With these variables in mind, Bennedsen et al., (2008, 
p. 1099) stated that “Board size, in particular, is known to be correlated with observable firm 
characteristics (e.g. firm size, firm age, industry affiliation) as well as unobserved factors that are 
potentially correlated with firm performance. This makes a causal interpretation of any observed 
correlation between board size and performance highly contestable even when it is possible to 
control for observable determinants of board size”. In these perspectives, prior corporate finance 
literature has identified empirical constructs and variables that may potentially effect corporate 
governance and its financial performance. The most important and frequently used variables are 
as follows: firm size, firm age, financial leverage, and year and industry dummies. With respect 
to firm size its documented that larger firms would have better capabilities and more diversification 
opportunities thus, it’s expected to have better financial position than smaller firms (Black et al., 
2014; Al-Najjar, 2015). In this research, Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm 
transformation of the absolute book value of firm market capitalization (Caprio et al., 2011).46 
                                                 
46Log transformation was applied in this context in order to correct any potential skewness in the data distributions 
and to enhance the normality of the variables of interests. 
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Furthermore, and in order to control for market value differences among firms in the sample, 
we consider Firm age as the natural logarithm of the total number of incorporation for each firm 
since listed in the capital market. Prior literature shows that Firm age is associated with ‘life-cycle 
effect’. Black et al., (2014, p.235) assert that age could impair firm’s financial performance, 
because older firms are more likely to be slower-growing and less likely to be intangible assets-
intensive compared to younger firms. Additionally, Hansen, (1992) argues that firm size and firm 
age are both inversely related to firm’s innovative outputs. Thus, firm age is a potential 
determinant of corporate financial performance, and its governance structure (Mishra et al., 2001). 
Financial leverage usually assess the potential control that creditors may impose to reduce 
agency cost (King & Santor, 2008). It is also documented in corporate finance literature that debt 
helps firms increasing their financial performance (Morck et al., 1988). However, according to the 
peaking order theory, high level of leverage might be a bad sign, and it could indicate default or 
even bankruptcy signals. Therefore, it is also excepted that leverage may inversely impact 
corporate financial performance (Myers, 1983). In consequence, prior academic literature 
documents this relationship. For example; Grove et al., (2011) report significant negative 
relationship between financial leverage and corporate financial performance. Financial leverage 
in this research is measured by total debt scaled by total assets (Nguyen et al., 2014, 2015). 
Consistent with prior corporate finance literature, this research includes also industry 
dummies and year dummies to hold for any other potential effect on the research variables. 
Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, (2009) argue that corporate governance practices depend on different 
environmental factors including industry type. Additionally,  Millar, (2014, p.195) stated that the 
design of the efficient corporate governance mechanisms for individual enterprises may 
systematically vary by industry or firm’s size. On the other hand, corporate financial performance 
may vary by time. For example; it’s documented that boom and recession times may affect 
corporate financial performance systematically (Liu et al., 2012). Accordingly, Mitton, (2002, 
p.239) argue that, during financial crisis, we may not expect relative poor financial performance 
for enterprises, this is because investors at recession times may pay high attention to any wealth 
expropriation problem and behave more consciously. Thus, industry and time dummies will be 
added to the empirical model. 
In addition to the above-mentioned control variables, we use one-year lagged dependent 
variable (firm performance indicator i.e., Tobin’s Q) as another explanatory variable in the 
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empirical model to control for the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, and dynamic panel bias as suggested by recent advances in 
prior literature (i.e., Wintoki et al., 2012). Furthermore, including the lagged dependent variable 
in the empirical model would allow for better specifications and accounts of effect of the omitted 
and /or unobservable factors on other parameters (Wooldridge, 2010). 
4.5.4 National (Country-Level) Governance Variables 
This research mainly depends on three indicators to capture the national governance quality 
effect in this research. First, we use the World Governance Indicators WGIs (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). These macro-level indicators assess the national governance quality using a composite 
score computed by six dimensions. These dimensions include; Voice and Accountability (VA), 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory 
Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption (CC). This indicator has been 
frequently used in recent successions of the literature. 
It should be noted that, WGIs has been used in a narrowed-format by different researchers 
recently. For example; (Nguyen et al., 2015; Knudsen, 2011; Van Essen et al., 2013, among others) 
extracted only country-level governance variables that are directly related to business life and 
firm’s operations, to limit the choice to include only Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory 
Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL) as proxies of national governance quality. However, other scholars 
use the full version of this indicators, such as Seifert & Gonenc, (2016) who use the average of 
these six dimensions to define the country-level governance quality in their analysis. 
In order to capture the constitutional context of the Jordanian and UAE markets, we make 
use of three categories out of the six indicators in this research. However, due to expected high 
correlation between these three variables, using them all in a single regression would be 
problematic in terms of empirical estimation (Nguyen et al., 2015; Knudsen, 2011). Thus, these 
three individual indices are combined to form an aggregate National Governance Index (denoted 
as NGI), i.e., NGI = Rule of law + limited Government + Regulatory Efficiency + Open Markets. 
Furthermore, we follow Nguyen et al., (2015) and applied factor analysis technique to construct 
alternative national governance indicator by extracting the first principal component of the 
analysis. 
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Prior literature has also demonstrated the use of other indicators when examining the national 
governance effect. One of the most frequent indicators that has been utilized in prior literature is 
the Investor Protection Index (Schiehll & Martins, 2016). La Porta et al., (1997) and Djankov et 
al., (2008) develop a shareholder protection variable that measure legal protection afforded to 
minority shareholders against wealth expropriation. This index has been used in different empirical 
previous studies47. Other scholars have utilize another proxies for investors protection levels by 
adopting the work developed by doing business surveys (World Bank), this including (Nguyen et 
al., 2015) and (Van Essen et al., 2013). Accordingly, the Investors Protection Index provided by 
the World banks for the sampling period of this research (i.e. 2008-2014) will be used. Employing 
these three indicators in the empirical analysis will enhance the research findings robustness and 
increase the general results reliability. 
Table 4-4 below provide detailed summary about the dependent and independent variables 
definitions and acronyms used in this research. 
Table 4-4 Variables description 
Variables Acronyms Definitions 
Performance  
Tobin’s Q ratio LnQ 
The natural logarithms of (the ratio of the (market value of 
equity plus (the book value of assets - the book value of 
equity)) scaled by total assets book value). 
Ownership structure  
Family ownership %  FamOwn Cumulated percentage of shares held by individuals/families. 
Institutional ownership 
% 
InstOwn 
Cumulated percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
including mutual funds, banks, and large financial institutions. 
Concentration % OwnTotal Percentage of shares held by the largest blockholders (5% rule) 
Board of directors  
Board size lnBsize 
The natural logarithm of total number of directors in a firm’s 
board. 
Board duality  Bdual Dummy = 1 if board’s chairman is also the firm’s CEO. 
Board independence % Bind 
The number of non-executives / independent directors scaled 
by the total number of directors.  
National governance  
National governance 
index 
NGI 
NGI = (Rule of law + Government effectiveness + Regulatory 
quality). These indicators are developed by (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). 
Alternative national 
governance index 
NGI(a) 
NGI(a) is constructed by extracting the first principal 
component of Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
and Rule of Law using factor analysis technique. 
Investors protection 
index 
IPI 
IPI is developed by doing business project (world bank, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014). 
                                                 
47See for example; Seifert, B., & Gonenc, H. (2016). Creditor Rights, Country Governance, and Corporate Cash 
Holdings. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 27, 65–90. 
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Control variables  
Firm age lnFage The natural logarithm of number of year’s incorporation. 
Firm size FSize The natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. 
Financial leverage % Leverage  Total debt scaled by total assets. 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
laglnQ One-year lagged Tobin's Q ratio. 
Industry dummy 
variables   
Industry 
dummies 
A dummy variable for two main industry classifications; 
services and manufacturing.  
year dummy variables 
Year 
dummies 
Seven year dummies for each of the seven years from 2008-
2014. 
4.6 Endogeneity in Corporate Finance Research 
The purpose of this section is to bring attention to some serious problems that exist in 
econometric application of governance-performance empirical models. These problems in 
application are serious to the point of reversing even qualitative inference, which in term impeding 
the ability to make reliable inference virtually possible. Accordingly, the focus will be on the most 
frequent harmful problem called endogeneity and its sources, to include two main areas of 
econometric applications; first, the violation of the fundamental exogeneity condition for OLS 
estimators 𝐸(𝜀|𝑋)  =  0, where 𝜀 is the error term in a regression and 𝑋 is a matrix of explanatory 
variables. Secondly, the inappropriate use of models that is available for data analysis. The 
relevance of the corporate governance research depends on both theory assumptions and the 
empirical work that tests these theoretical perspectives. Thus, the rightness of model specification 
would determine this relevance. 
4.6.1 Endogeneity Defined 
Reviewing extant governance research shows that endogeneity is a common issue in this 
field. Thus, it is necessary to clarify and discuss the exact meaning of the term. Endogeneity can 
be simply defined as a correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term in a 
regression (Roberts & Whited, 2012). To understand this, it would be helpful to illustrate 
endogeneity practically in the context of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 Eq. (3)  
As an example, consider that, the important issue in this case is the corporate governance 
impact on firm’s financial performance. Let 𝑦𝑖 be the dependent variable (e.g., financial 
performance proxy measures), 𝛼and 𝛽represent the intercept and slope of this simple linear 
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relationship between 𝑦 and𝑥, they are unknown and to be estimated from the observed data,𝑥𝑖 
represent the independent variable (e.g., governance practices), and 𝜀𝑖 represent the error term. 
According to Baltagi, (2011, p. 49) This error should vary randomly, and it may exist because of 
(i) the omission of relevant factors that could influence𝑦𝑖, other than 𝑥𝑖, (ii) measurement error, 
or (iii) wrong choice of a linear relationship between y andx, when the true relationship may be 
nonlinear. 
If there is a correlation between the error term 𝜀𝑖 and any of the independent variables𝑥𝑖 in 
the regression, the OLS will be biased. Similarly, if we examining equations resembling the 
autoregressive (dynamic) form of the infinite distributed lag e.g., lagged dependent variables 𝑦i−1, 
and there was no correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the current error term 𝜀𝑖, 
e.g., 𝐸(𝑦𝑖−1𝜀𝑖)  = 0, but correlated with lagged error term 𝜀𝑖 − 1, e.g., 𝐸(𝑦𝑖−1𝜀𝑖𝑖−1)  ≠  0. In this 
case, as long as the error terms are not serially correlated, OLS will be biased, but remains 
consistent and asymptotically efficient. Alternatively, if the 𝜀𝑖’s are serially correlated, then the 
OLS is biased and inconsistent. Concurrently, this means that one of the regressors, 𝑦i−1, is 
correlated with 𝜀𝑖 and we have the problem of endogeneity (for a review see Baltagi, 2011). 
According to Roberts & Whited, (2012) endogeneity concerns in OLS regression estimators 
could rise by different issues to include; omitted variables, simultaneity bias, errors-in-variables 
(e.g., measurement error), and autoregression. In each of these scenarios, OLS regression reports 
biased coefficients. Instead of estimating the “true” relationship between the independent variable 
and the dependent variable, OLS regression mistakenly includes the correlation between the 
independent variable and the error term in the estimation of the independent variable’s coefficient 
(Semadeni et al., 2014). 
4.6.2 The Endogeneity of Corporate Governance 
Demsetz, (1983) and Demsetz & Lehn, (1985) work on the structure of the corporate 
ownership represent perhaps the most influential study highlighting endogeneity issues in 
corporate governance research. While, Demsetz, (1983) was among the first to argue that a firm’s 
ownership structure should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the 
influence of shareholders and of trading on the market for shares, Demsetz & Lehn, (1985) provide 
empirical evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure. Similarly, Gugler & 
Weigand, (2003, p.483) stated that “ownership may be determined by the characteristics of the 
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firm, e.g. its contracting environment, the inherent riskiness of its assets, or its performance, that 
is ownership may be endogenous”. This idea has caused scholars to consider the potential 
endogeneity of other corporate governance variables to include board of directors is more relevant. 
Most recently, Wintoki et al., (2012, p. 585) summarised these perspectives by stating that “board 
structure is a choice variable that arises through a process of bargaining between the various actors 
in a firm’s nexus of contracts, where the bargaining process is influenced by past performance and 
the actors’ beliefs about the costs and benefits of particular board structures”. Accordingly, almost 
all firm-level governance variables can be considered as decisions made by shareholders based on 
past performance to influence firm’s future outcomes. 
As discussed above, it has been widely acknowledged that corporate governance 
mechanisms e.g., ownership structure and board of directors are (econometrically) endogenous. 
That corporate governance mechanisms are endogenous to value seems to be a fact nowadays, but 
it is still unclear that whether the individual heterogeneity or simultaneity that exists between the 
variables are the source of this endogeneity. To answer this question, Pindado & De La Torre, 
(2004) use a panel of 135 Spanish companies’ data to examine the source of endogeneity in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm’s value. They report that ownership structure is 
endogenous because of its simultaneity with firm’s value, while they do not find evidence on 
individual heterogeneity being the cause of the endogeneity of ownership structure. 
Accordingly, the endogeneity of ownership structure has given rise to increasing controversy 
in the prior literature (Pindado & De La Torre, 2004). Statistically, endogeneity leads to biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible. 
Furthermore, endogeneity can be severe enough to reverse even qualitative inference (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). A large empirical literature has examined the impact of corporate governance on firm’s 
financial performance. However, in a recent published paper, Wintoki et al., (2012) argue that 
most of the prior empirical literature ignore one source of endogeneity in corporate finance 
research which is the possibility that current corporate governance mechanisms are function of the 
firm’s pervious value or performance. Indeed, this could be true, as corporate financial 
performance may depend on the governance mechanisms i.e., ownership structure and leadership 
structure, but these internal governance mechanisms are not exogenously given since they are 
determined in part by past corporate financial performance. 
 118 
 
According to Wintoki et al., (2012) ignoring this important fact can have serious 
consequences for inference. Most prior empirical research related to this idea has mainly depend 
on the exogeneity assumption of the governance variables, thus they rely on panel data and fixed-
effects estimates for inference. In these perspectives, employing traditional OLS and fixed- effects 
FE estimators can potentially ameliorate the bias arising from unobservable heterogeneity. 
Recently, Dang, Kim, & Shin, (2015) stated that another serious issue can face empirical corporate 
finance research is the likely presence of residual autocorrelation, which violates one of the most 
important assumptions of the IV/GMM estimators, and renders their instruments invalid. All of 
these methodological issues have raised the controversy status of the corporate governance 
research. Thus, the below section highlights recent advances in econometric literature’s 
recommendations and evaluations regarding the panel models estimating methods that most 
suitable corporate governance-performance research. 
4.6.3 Potential Endogeneity Treatment 
Corporate finance researchers rely on different methods to alleviate continuous endogenous 
independent variables effects. One of the traditional econometric techniques to correct short panel 
bias caused by endogeneity that is often used in prior literature is the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. According to Roberts & Whited, (2012) perfect instrumental variable IV must satisfy 
two main conditions; the relevance and exclusion (exogeneity). While the relevance condition is 
testable based on F-statistics, it refers to the degree to which the IV corresponds with the 
endogenous variable (e.g., strong vs. weak). The exclusion condition is untestable due to the fact 
that the regression error term is unobservable, and it refers to refer the degree to which an IV is 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage. Accordingly, one of the most challengeable 
issues in this context is to find suitable instrument that correlate strongly with the endogenous 
variable not with the error disturbance term, given that they can be used properly to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns as it is from an asymptotic efficiency perspective, more instruments is better, 
while from a finite sample perspective, more instruments is not necessarily better and can even 
exacerbate the bias inherent in 2SLS (Roberts & Whited, 2012). 
Recent advances in econometric literature suggest that the instrumental variable estimators 
are unreliable, and sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, residual serial 
correlation, and changes in control parameters, additionally, this approach suffers from the lack of 
efficiency by ignoring additional valid instruments (Dang et al., 2015). To overcome this issue, 
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scholars have turned to employ the generalized method of moments (GMM). Accordingly, three 
types of GMM estimators developed; (i) first-difference GMM estimator (FD-GMM) proposed by 
Arellano et al., (1991), (ii) the system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) developed by Blundell & 
Bond, (1998), and (iii) the long-difference estimator (LD-GMM) proposed by Hahn, Hausman, & 
Kuersteiner, (2007). However, it’s worthy of note that these estimators are statistically based on 
the assumption that there is no residual autocorrelation. 
As noted earlier, and based on recent advances in corporate finance literature (i.e., Wintoki 
et al., 2012), the following issues may explain the lack of consensus on the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance in the empirical literature: (i) an endogeneity problem, 
particularly unobservable firm characteristics that affect firm-level governance mechanisms and 
firm performance; (ii) heterogeneity in the relation between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance across different firms or industry settings; and (iii) identification of the 
specific mechanism underlying the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance. 
Accordingly, to alleviate such endogeneity concerns, we follow the recommendation by 
Wintoki et al., (2012) and examine the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance using dynamic system GMM estimator. Applying system GMM in this context 
will allow to have estimations with lower bias and higher efficiency. To examine the causal effect 
of firm-level governance mechanisms on firm performance, we examine whether the observed 
firm performance persists after controlling for firm differences other than governance. System 
GMM allow to have lagged dependent and independent variables as instruments to control the 
endogenous variables. To do this, we have first to perform the Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test 
for endogeneity, which allow to specify the endogenous variables. Thus, this research will mainly 
depend on System GMM to examine the relationship between governance and firm performance. 
However, to get the best specifications for System GMM, alternative traditional estimators i.e., 
OLS and FE/RE will be used as suggested by (Roodman, 2009b). 
4.7 Model Specification 
In order to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s value and 
profitability, the author analyses the data through many stages: 
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First of all, the descriptive statistics, the Pair-wise correlation matrix and the variance 
inflation coefficients between the research dependent and independent variables were executed 
and reported to determine if all of these variables are equally good indicators and free from any 
multicollinearity issues that may limit the research findings. This in terms reflects the preliminary 
data analysis section. 
Secondly, Multivariate Data Analysis will be applied. According to Larcker, Richardson, & 
Tuna, (2005), The methodological approach used in most prior work examining the impact of 
corporate governance on various dependent variables utilizes a multiple regression of the 
following general form: 
Dependent Variable 𝑡 = α +ΣβGovernance Factors 𝑡 + Σβcontrols + 𝜀𝑡 Eq.(4) 
However, Bebchuk & Roe, (1999, p. 127) stated that “The corporate structures that an 
economy has at any point in time depend in part on those that it had at earlier time”. This implies 
that a corporate financial performance is path-dependent, in other words, a current firm’s financial 
performance may depend in part on an earlier performance that the firm had at any previous time. 
Thus, recent advances in corporate governance literature examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm’s financial performance using first/second-order AR(1) or AR(2) 
autoregressive panel models48. Zhou, Faff, & Alpert, (2014) argue that AR(1) seems to be 
unavoidable in most empirical corporate finance studies du the time frame limitations. 
Additionally, Nguyen et al., (2015, p. 153) stated that “how many lags of dependent variable 
should be used on the right-hand side of the model is an empirical question”. Interestingly, they 
examine this issue empirically, and they report that one-year lag of firm’s financial performance 
seems to be adequate to capture all of historical influence on current financial performance. 
Accordingly, the context of Eq.(4) is applied in this case and reformulated to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance using the following 
equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 Eq. (5) 
                                                 
48 Prior corporate governance studies employed AR(1) like (Nguyen et al., 2015; Munisi & Randoy, 2013; Adams, 
Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009). For studies employed AR(2) see for example (Wintoki et al., 2012; Pham, Suchard, & 
Zein, 2011). 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is: ln (Tobin’s Q) as a proxy measure of firm’s financial performance. 𝛼𝟎 is 
constant, 𝛼1 and 𝛽 are unknown estimated coefficients;, 𝜇𝒊 represent unobserved firm fixed-effect, 
𝜂𝑡 represents time-specific effects that are time-variant and common to aggregate sample 
companies, such as the effects of GDP per capital, its growth, and inflation rates as a differing 
macroeconomic conditions, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is column vector of governance variables at the country / firm-
level, and control variables for firm 𝒊 at time 𝒕, this vector is made up of the selected corporate 
governance variables and other control specifications. Eq. (5) is rewritten as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Eq. (6) 
It should be noting that, it would be difficult to incorporate lagged independent variables in 
all specifications due to reduction effect in the sample size hence limiting the analyses. As stated 
earlier, another important objective of this research is to check whether national governance 
variables have direct influence on firm performance. Therefore, the second empirical model 
includes some explanatory variables for national governance indicators (country-level) beside the 
rest of internal governance mechanisms (firm-level) variables. A country dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for Jordan and 0 for UAE will be added, to initially account for country-
specific characteristics. Consequently, Eq. (6) is rewritten as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Eq. (7) 
4.8 Estimation Technique 
As mentioned in the previous discussions, it is widely acknowledged in prior literature that 
corporate finance empirical researches are often face different form of methodological issues. One 
of the most problematic issues in corporate governance research is the endogeneity concerns. The 
term endogeneity refers to a situation where the error term is correlated with any of the explanatory 
variables (Roberts & Whited, 2012). Additionally, recent advances in corporate governance 
research documented that ownership structure and board of directors are considered to be 
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endogenously and dynamically determined by past firm’s financial performance (e.g., Wintoki et 
al., 2012). This implies that corporate governance-performance model should  be examined in a 
dynamic framework (Nguyen et al., 2015), see Eq.(4). 
Hence, dynamic panel models plays prominent part in corporate finance research (Dang et 
al., 2015). Empirical test of corporate finance studies including corporate governance topics 
require the use of firm fixed-effects to control any unobserved time-invariant across firms in 
research sample (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). However, Nickell, (1981) observes that OLS 
estimates of lagged dependent variables (𝑌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) are biased because of the correlation between these 
lagged dependent variables and firms fixed-effects. On the other hand, estimating Eq.(4) through 
AR(1) structure and the presence of the endogenous explanatory variables may introduce serious 
estimation biases (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Furthermore, Dang, Kim, & Shin, (2015, p. 86) 
stated that “The pooled OLS (POLS) and fixed-effects (FE) estimators are not appropriate for 
estimating the dynamic model. Applying POLS to dynamic model produces biased and 
inconsistent estimates because the lagged dependent variable,Yi,t−1, is correlated with the firm 
fixed effect, η, i.e., E[Yi,t−1η] ≠ 0. It is well established that POLS tends to overestimate the 
autoregressive coefficient, Y, and underestimate the SOA”. With regards to FE, Nickell, (1981) it 
is to observe that FE estimator wipe-out𝜇𝒊, but it also produces inconsistent parameters if T is 
fixed, regardless of the size of N because it still does not deal with the endogeneity of [Yi,t−1]. 
Accordingly, estimating the corporate governance-performance model using OLS or FE 
would lead to be  biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually 
impossible (Lozano et al., 2016). It’s worth noting that, this study employs a panel dataset that has 
the following characteristics: (i) moderate length (T = 8); (ii) low variation of corporate 
governance within all firms in the sample; (iii) internal firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms i.e., ownership structure and board of directors are considered to be totally 
endogenous; (iv) external country-level governance mechanisms, firm age, and year dummies are 
considered exogenous variables49; (v) firm’s corporate governance structure is dynamically 
correlated with its past financial performance; (vi) research dependent variables i.e., Tobin’s Q 
may be driven by unobservable individual fixed-effects. According to the above-mentioned 
characteristics of the selected panel sample in this research, System GMM is the most efficient 
                                                 
49 Prior academic literature has showed that, there is a weak empirical evidence that firm characteristics would predict 
country level governance mechanisms. See for example (Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 2010; Ararat, Black, & 
Yurtoglu, 2014). 
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estimator that has the ability to produce lower-bias estimations than all the other estimators 
analysed previously, including first-differences GMM technique. 
Thus, this research will use Dynamic System GMM as primary econometric technique to 
examine the relationship between governance variables and firm performance in Jordan and UAE. 
In system GMM two-step estimation, the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, but the standard errors are downward biased. Two-step 
system GMM Use twostep robust to get the finite-sample corrected two-step covariance matrix. 
In terms of system GMM specification tests, system GMM estimations report Sargan test, AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests. The Sargan test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments as a group are 
exogenous”. Therefore, the higher the p-value of the Sargan statistic the better. In robust 
estimations system GMM reports the Hansen J statistic instead of the Sargan with the same null 
hypothesis. It should be noted that, in this research we report Hansen J statistic instead of the 
Sargan test. The Arellano – Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) process in first 
differences usually rejects the null hypothesis (the lower the p-value the better). The test for AR 
(2) in first differences is more important, because it will detect autocorrelation in levels, the higher 
the p-value the better. 
Moreover, for better specifications and diagnostics tests and comparisons basis between 
estimators, OLS and FE/RE traditional estimators will be employed in the data analysis chapters. 
Table 4-5 below provides summary of prior empirical research methodological approaches used 
to examine governance-performance relationship. 
Table 4-5 Some of the methodologies used in prior literature 
Publication  
Performance 
measure 
Independent variable(s) Estimation approach  Interface 
Li et al., (2007) ROA, ROS Managerial Ownership OLS + 
Maury (2006) ROA Family share ownership  OLS + 
Mizuno (2010) ROE 
Institutional investors 
share ownership 
OLS None   
Yabei Hu & 
Izumida, (2008) 
Q, ROA Ownership concentration  
Granger Causality 
Tests, GMM 
U-shape 
Nguyen et al., 
(2015) 
Q 
Governance variables and 
ownership concentration 
System GMM + 
Akbar et al., (2016) Q, ROA CGI GMM None  
Cui & Mak, (2002) Q Managerial ownership 2SLS W-shape 
Yifan Hu & Zhou 
(2008) 
ROA, VA Managerial ownership OLS + 
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Oxelheim & 
Randøy (2003) 
Q Board characteristics  OLS, 2SLS + 
Wintoki et al., 
(2012) 
Q, ROS Board structure  GMM None  
Note: Data in this table is self-compiled from extant governance research. 
 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
By reviewing corporate governance literature, it was found that there is a clear gap in 
studying the effect of governance variables on firm’s financial performance in developing 
countries of emerging markets, especially, in MENA region, where external institutional 
environment is weak and corporate governance codes have been released recently to organize 
business life. Therefore, this research responds to recent advances from novel scholars to examine 
the aggregate effect of national governance quality on firm financial performance i.e., Aslan & 
Kumar, (2014); Kumar & Zattoni, (2013); Van Essen et al., (2013) among others. 
This thesis identifies corporate financial performance variable (Tobin’s Q) ratio as 
dependent variable, and corporate governance variables both internal and external as independent 
variables. To examine this relationship, this empirical analysis mainly relied on some secondary 
data sources like the DataStream database, and the company’s annual reports from two capital 
markets. All financial companies and banks and any other company that has not published its 
report or has missing financial values during the study timeframe has been excluded. Additionally, 
all companies are not quoted on the ASE, ADX, or DFM, and companies with gaps and missing 
data are excluded from the research sample. 
For estimation approach, this thesis depends mainly on Two-Steps Dynamic System GMM 
technique to study the effect of governance variables (internal and external) on firm performance 
in Jordan and UAE. In addition, the pair-wise correlation matrix was applied to explore the 
correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables used in this research, 
also, this thesis uses simple and multiple regressions i.e., OLS and FE/RE estimation techniques 
for specification and comparisons basis. Having concluded the design of the research methodology 
and selected the suitable econometric estimation technique to be applied, the following part of this 
thesis presents the detailed analysis of the data and discusses the major findings. 
Thus, data analysis and research findings are presented in the next three chapters. Chapter 5 
below provide empirical examination on the relationship between firm-level governance and firm 
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performance using the Jordanian dataset. This includes the preliminary data analysis which 
describes major statistics and tests, also it was carried out on the variables of interests for 
multicollinearity. Finally, the chapter describes the multivariate regression analysis that carried 
out to test the meaningfulness and significance of the hypothesised pathways that comprise the 
governance-performance model. 
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CHAPTER 5: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE – EVIDENCE FROM JORDAN 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the structured process of empirical analysis that was applied to the 
collected data set by estimating Eq. (6) for the Jordanian market only. In particular, it provides 
data analysis and empirical findings for the set of hypotheses and conjectures presented in section 
2.5 of Chapter 2. The findings presented in this chapter adds to the academic and practical debates 
on the relationship between firm-level governance variables and firm performance in emerging 
markets in general, and in the Jordanian market in particular. It should also be noted that the 
Jordanian corporate governance framework is considered as an underdeveloped case which in 
terms provides an exceptional chance to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance within this context using a dynamic framework for the first time. This 
chapter and the following one (Chapter 6) address the first and the second questions of this thesis; 
(1). In what way (for example, likely or unlikely) will the attributes of the ownership concentration 
(ownership structure) affect firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in UAE? (2). Will the 
firm’s activities and other governance practices (i.e., board of directors’ independence, duality, 
and size) be beneficial or harmful to the firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in UAE? 
Respectively. 
Given the choice of the Dynamic System GMM as the method for analysing the collected 
data set, the author has drown upon the work of Wintoki et al., (2012) as a basis for this process. 
Zhou et al., (2014, p. 494) stated that “Dynamic panel bias, endogeneity issues, empirical model 
misspecification, and other potential corporate data issues (both separately and in combination) 
can introduce severe biases into existing baseline estimations, which cast serious doubt over the 
credibility of the inferences drawn regarding corporate decision making”. In these perspectives, 
Wintoki et al., (2012) argue that application of System GMM in a governance research context is 
relevant to three sets of methodological issues and considerations, they state “panel GMM 
estimator can be used to control for the dynamic nature of the performance– governance 
relationship suggested by theorists, while accounting for other sources of endogeneity in corporate 
finance research”. These arguments justify the use of System GMM in this research, which 
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particularly aims to examine the relationship between governance variables and firm performance. 
However, I also employed other techniques i.e., Dynamic OLS and Dynamic FE for specification 
and comparative purposes. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provide initial descriptive 
statistics of the collected data. Section 5.3 presents multivariate regression analysis to include; 
endogeneity tests executed in subsection 5.3.1, empirical results of estimating the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and firm performance using three main estimators (OLS, 
FE and System GMM in dynamic forms) are presented in subsection 5.3.3, subsection  (5.3.4) 
presents robustness checks of the main findings obtained from the Dynamic System GMM. 
Finally, section 5.4 summarises the empirical analysis and the chapter findings. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5-1 below reports the firm-year observations, the average, the median, and the 
standard deviation statistics of the series, the minimum, and the maximum of the formative are 
dependent and independent variables. Initially, the mean (median) of Tobin’s Q Ratio in the sample 
is 1.22 (1.04), indicating that firms on average in Jordan are enjoying higher market valuation and, 
hence, creating value for shareholders during the sampling period. With respect to individual firm 
governance characteristics, the average number of directors on board in Jordan is around eight, 
which is in line with the average board size of companies operating in the MENA region (IFC, 
2008). Approximately 20% of the chairpersons concurrently hold the CEO positions, indicating 
that, the role duality is quite uncommon in the Jordanian market. 
Considerably, there is a wide variation in the percentage of independent (non-executive) 
directors across the sample firms in Jordan. While the minimum is 14%, the maximum is 91%. 
With respect to ownership structure, the variables of interests, denotes that ownership 
concentration is relatively high in Jordan. The mean (median) percentage of stock held by 
shareholders who own at least 5% of the common stock (ownership concentration) is around 61% 
(64%). The mean (median) values for identities of major shareholders is as follows; the percentage 
of shares held by families is 24% (13%), the percentage of shares held by institutional investors is 
36% (33%), and finally, the average percentage of shares held by foreign investors is 3% due to 
the high variations between the maximum (99%) and the minimum (0%). This implies that family 
and institutional ownership are key and important blockholders in the Jordanian capital market. 
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Table 5-1 Descriptive statistics. 
 Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's Q Ratio 790 1.22 1.04 0.57 0.61 2.70 
Family Ownership (%) 790 0.24 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.99 
Institutional Ownership (%) 790 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.00 0.99 
Foreign Ownership (%) 790 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.99 
Ownership Concentration (%) 790 0.61 0.64 0.23 0.06 0.99 
Board Size 790 8.22 8.00 2.38 3.00 14.00 
Board Duality 790 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Board Independence (%) 790 0.56 0.57 0.16 0.14 0.91 
Firm Size [ln (Makt.Cap)] 790 16.90 16.78 1.52 13.36 22.42 
leverage % 790 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.00 2.28 
Firm Age (years) 790 21.03 17.00 15.48 1.00 77.00 
Note: This table presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the research key variables in its original 
form except where it is specified as a logarithms form. The sample comprises 113 non-financial firms 
listed in Amman Stock Exchange ASE market of Jordan. The variables are as described in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 5-2 below represents the pairwise correlation matrix and Collinearity diagnostics for 
the key variables used in the empirical analysis. First of all, most of the variables of interests have 
correlations with the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) below the 0.80 threshold. It is also noticeably 
that all regressors in the model are free from collinearity, as the variance inflation factor is less 
than 10, the threshold suggested by prior econometrics literature (see for example; Hsiao, (2014); 
Damodar, (2004); Wooldridge, (2010); and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012) among others). The initial 
analysis of the correlations between the variables reveals that, board independence is positively 
correlated with firm performance. Also, firm size (lnFsize) and firm age (lnFage) are positively 
correlated (0.42 and 0.14 respectively), and statistically significant at 1% with firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q). Furthermore, board size (lnBsize) and firm size (lnFsize) are statistically significantly 
correlated. This supports the notion that larger firms tend to have larger number of directors in 
their boards. These results are in line with (Nguyen et al., 2014; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012). 
Similar to results obtained by Wintoki et al., (2012) and Nguyen et al., (2014, 2015), the 
correlation matrix below shows that past firm performance measured by one-year lagged 
dependent variable (laglnQ) is positively correlated with current firm performance (lnQ) with 0.68 
coefficient significant at 1%, confirming the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
governance and performance. Furthermore, ownership concentration (OwnTotal) is positively 
correlated with firm performance. This initially supports the monitoring hypothesis of the agency 
theory, about the capabilities of large shareholders in imposing vigilant role in public corporations.
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Table 5-2 Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients using Jordanian database 
  lnQ FamOwn InstOwn ForOwn OwnTotal lnBsize Bdual Bind lnFsize leverage lnFage laglnQ VIFs 
lnQ 1.00             
FamOwn 0.12*** 1.00           4.49 
InstOwn 0.07** -0.64*** 1.00          4.41  
ForOwn -0.07* -0.14*** 0.31*** 1.00         4.25  
OwnTotal 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.18*** 1.00        3.81  
lnBsize 0.01 -0.34*** 0.12*** -0.14*** -0.21*** 1.00       1.70  
Bdual 0.07** 0.13*** -0.15*** -0.09** -0.04 0.02 1.00      1.05  
Bind 0.01 -0.18*** 0.07* 0.03 -0.12*** 0.44*** 0.03 1.00     1.28  
lnFsize 0.42*** -0.16*** 0.20*** 0.08** 0.17*** 0.43*** 0.04 0.15*** 1.00    1.75  
leverage 0.02 -0.16*** 0.06 -0.00 -0.11*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.14*** 0.03 1.00   1.11  
lnFage 0.14*** -0.31*** 0.20*** 0.09** -0.06 0.18*** -0.03 -0.02 0.26*** 0.23*** 1.00  1.27  
laglnQ 0.68*** 0.11*** 0.10** -0.07* 0.30*** 0.03 0.07* 0.02 0.39*** 0.01 0.16*** 1.00 1.32 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations are as defined in Table 4-4. 
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5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The previous section discusses the primarily data analysis for the bivariate associations 
between the variables of interests. These approaches initially represent the basic correlations 
between the variables. However, it is difficult to draw empirical conclusions based on the results 
revealed from these initial correlations. Therefore, this section presents the multivariate regression 
analysis by including endogeneity tests and other diagnostics tests, to properly examine the 
relationship between the corporate governance variables and firm performance. Accordingly, 
Dynamic System GMM is the main method of data analysis in this research. 
5.3.1 Endogeneity Tests 
Prior corporate governance research has been widely suffering from endogeneity issues. 
These issues can arise from three main sources; (i) simultaneity, (ii) omitted variables, (iii) and 
measurement errors (Coles et al., 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012). Therefore, recent advances in 
corporate finance research has showed that when the independent variables are endogenous, 
system GMM can obtain more efficient estimations than those of OLS and Fixed Effects (Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Therefore, it is crucial to test if endogeneity exists among the research variables. 
Accordingly, I follow Nguyen et al., (2014, 2015), and conduct Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) 
test for endogeneity of all regressors as a group based on the levels equation of firm performance 
and corporate governance variables (Schultz et al., 2010). The instrumental variables are one-year 
lagged differences of the below independent variables; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐵𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1. In addition to these lagged instrumental variables, I further include lnFage, year 
dummies and industry dummies as the only exogenous variables in the GMM specifications. 
The results of the DWH test of the endogeneity indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be 
accepted at any conventional levels of significance (Chi-sq(9) = 19.633; p = 0.002). These results 
indicate that the relationship between firm-level corporate governance variables and firm 
performance in the Jordanian context is also subject to endogeneity issues. This also implies that 
prior corporate governance research executed in Jordan using traditional OLS and / or FE/RE 
estimations techniques may have biased and inconsistent results and, therefore highlighting the 
importance of applying system GMM in this context. 
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5.3.2 System GMM Estimation Validity 
One important assumption to successfully execute efficient estimations using System GMM 
is to have valid instrumental variables. Accordingly, I mainly relied on Hansen-J test of over-
identification and the difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of instrument subsets as 
suggested by Roodman, (2009b). This section is, therefore, presents examination of the exogeneity 
of the instrumental variables used in the System GMM estimations. 
Table 5-3 below provides evidence that the null hypothesis that the subsets of instruments 
used in the System GMM modelling are econometrically exogenous and must be accepted. 
Moreover, the results, thus, implies that year dummies and lnFage are exogenous variables, while 
the endogenous variables (i.e. governance and other explanatory variables) are successfully 
instrumented by their one-year lagged independent variables i.e. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; 𝐵𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1. The estimation results are reported in the next section. 
Table 5-3 Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments subsets 
Tested instrument subsets Test statistics 
Degree of 
freedom 
P-Value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments    
All instruments for equation in levels 10.54 9 0.309 
lnQit−3 𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 lnQit−6 (for equation in differences) 6.10 4 0.192 
⧍lnQit−2 (for equation in levels) 0.24 1 0.624 
Instruments for ownership structure variables 14.38 12 0.277 
Instruments for board structure and control 
variables 
22.44 20 0.317 
    
Panel B: Standard instruments    
2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 year dummies, and 
lnFage 
8.94 6 0.177 
Note: This table represent Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instrument subsets used in this 
research. GMM instrument subset used for the equation in levels includes two-year lagged differences 
of firm performance variable; four-year lagged differences of ownership structure, board structure and 
other control variables. GMM instrument subset used for ownership structure variables includes four-
year lagged differences and lags 4 in levels of these variables. GMM instrument subset used for board 
structure and the other control variables includes four-year lagged differences and lags 4 in levels of 
these variables. The subset of standard instruments for the equation in levels includes 2009, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 year dummies, and lnFage. 2008 (constant), 2010-year dummy dropped due to collinearity. 
5.3.3 Empirical Results 
The governance-performance estimation results are reported in Table 5-4 below using three 
different econometric techniques. First of all, Eq. (6) is estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares 
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(OLS) estimator with clustered standard errors equals to the number of firms in the research sample 
reported in column (2). The estimated coefficient on the one-year lagged dependent variable 
(laglnQ) is significantly positive and still persistent using other estimation techniques i.e., FE and 
System GMM. This implies that, past firm performance has significant impact on current firm 
performance for Jordanian listed companies, which in turns confirms the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between governance and performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
With respect to ownership structure, it was found that, there is no relationship between 
ownership structure (identity and concentration) variables (FamOwn, InstOwn, and OwnTotal) 
and firm performance using OLS estimator as reported in column (2). However, once a part of 
endogeneity concerns i.e., time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across firms is controlled by 
using fixed-effects model, the relationship turns to be significant and positive. It is interesting to 
note that the significant positive relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
remain unchanged when applying the two-step System GMM estimator (reported in column (4)) 
of Table 5-4. These findings are consistent with agency theoretical assumptions and in line with 
other recent findings obtained by Nguyen et al., (2014, 2015). Similarly, Gaur et al., (2015) argues 
that ownership concentration is an important tool to minimise agency problems and hence, increase 
firm performance in emerging markets context. It should be noted that, these findings are also 
contradicting the previously-stated hypotheses −Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis3− regarding the 
effect of family ownership and ownership concentration, which is supposed to be negative on firm 
performance in such market characterised by weak legal framework and absent market for 
corporate control instruments. Accordingly, these findings support the substitute hypothesis 
regarding the notion that ownership concentration may play important role when external 
governance and other market alignment forces are absent (Wang & Shailer, 2017). 
To test the board hypothesis, each of the board variables were regressed on the Tobin’s Q 
ratio. Initially, the relationship between board size (lnBsize) and firm performance (lnQ) is 
negative, consistent with prior literature and agency theoretical expectations, and statistically 
significant at 1% level in OLS and FE estimation models. However, once system GMM applied, 
this relationship vanishes. This may suggest that the significant relationship between board size 
and firm performance reported in column (2) and (3) is driven by endogeneity issues. Taking into 
account the concerns of simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, the results reported in column (4) 
of Table 5-4 below show that board size has no impact on firm performance in Jordan. Board 
duality (Bdual) and board independence (Bind) are found to be negatively correlated with firm 
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performance (lnQ) but are not significant across the three estimators. These results are in line with 
Wintoki et al., (2012); Nguyen et al., (2015); Schultz et al., (2010). Accordingly, these results 
show consistency only with Hypothesis6, where it was expected that there is no significant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. 
With regards to control variables, firm size (lnFsize) and financial leverage (leverage) have 
a significant positive impact on firm value, while firm age (lnFage) tend to have no significant 
effect on firm value in Jordan. 
Table 5-4 The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (dynamic framework). 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Sys. GMM 
DV: Tobin’s Q Ratio [ln (Tobin’s Q)] lnQ lnQ lnQ 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) 
laglnQ 0.833*** 0.272*** 0.502*** 
 (33.312) (4.383) (4.632) 
FamOwn 0.225 8.710*** 2.388** 
 (1.523) (4.623) (2.194) 
InstOwn 0.162 8.634*** 1.899** 
 (1.083) (4.908) (2.384) 
OwnTotal -0.211 9.041*** 2.117** 
 (-1.385) (5.040) (2.249) 
lnBsize -0.118*** -0.325*** 0.143 
 (-2.961) (-3.388) (0.536) 
Bdual -0.015 -0.052 -0.018 
 (-0.660) (-1.111) (-0.082) 
Bind 0.064 0.012 0.174 
 (1.136) (0.103) (0.576) 
lnFsize 0.039*** 0.345*** 0.169** 
 (4.744) (6.799) (2.195) 
leverage  0.070* 0.483*** 0.731*** 
 (1.712) (5.845) (3.168) 
lnFage -0.011 0.030 -0.055 
 (-0.684) (0.324) (-1.003) 
Intercept -0.416*** -5.015*** -3.263*** 
 (-2.884) (-5.238) (-2.600) 
Industry dummies Yes No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 677 677 677 
R-squared 0.798 0.620  
F statistic 97.068*** 28.096***  
Wald chi2 statistic   191.530*** 
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Number of instruments   44 
Number of clusters 113 113 113 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)   0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.291 
Hansen-J test (p-value)   0.279 
Note: This table presents empirical analysis of examining Eq. (6) using three different estimation 
techniques; Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and dynamic (two-step system) GMM. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). P-values and t-statistics and z-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors and presented in brackets and parentheses. For the two-steps system GMM 
estimates reported in column (4) Iuse lag 4, lag 5, and lag 6 of the levels of Tobin’s Q, FamOwn, InstOwn, 
OwnTotal, lnBsize, Bdual, Bind, lnFsize, leverage as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced 
equation. Whereas, four lags of the first differences of these variables is used as GMM-type instruments 
for the levels equation. Year dummies are unreported. 2014-year dummy dropped in Pooled OLS and FE 
model estimations. 2010-year dummy dropped in system GMM. The notations are as defined in Table 
4-4. 
 
5.3.4 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous section provides empirical examination of the relationship between firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. The main results suggest that only 
ownership structure (concentration) and the controlling shareholder’s type matter for nonfinancial 
publicly-listed firm in Jordan. However, these results must be confirmed by robustness and 
sensitivity analysis. For this reason, I employ two methods; first, must check if the relationship 
between the suit of the governance variables and firm performance would change if we alternate 
the governance variables and reduce the number of instruments used in the System GMM 
specification. These results are reported in Table 5-5. Second, whether the main results changes if 
different performance indicators were utilised, and the number of instruments were reduced 
respectively, were initially checked. These results were reported in Table 5-6. In fact, the potential 
danger of System GMM implementation is instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009a), therefore, 
it is very important to confirm the main results obtained previously, by reducing the number of 
instruments used in the analysis. 
In System GMM (model 2) estimations reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5-5, I re-
estimate Eq. (6) by dropping board duality as a factor variable50, and adding another ownership 
structure variable; foreign ownership (ForOwn), to check the robustness of results to alternative 
proxies for corporate governance structures. The results indicate that, ownership structure still hold 
                                                 
50Roodman, (2009a) posit that dummy variable that are highly persistent across firms and time can cause bias in the 
parameter estimation and may pose problems during estimations. 
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a significant positive effect on firm performance among other governance variables. However, it 
should be noted that the coefficients on the ownership structure variables are generally reduced 
and the power of this relationship reduced from 5% significant levels in Table 5-4 to 10% 
significant levels in (Model 2) reported in Table 5-5. Thus, the main findings regarding (ownership 
structure and firm performance) are robust to alternate governance form of variables. 
Table 5-5 Robustness checks of the main results sensitivity to alternate governance variables and 
reduced number of instruments. 
 Sys.GMM (Model 1) Sys.GMM (Model 2) 
 lnQ  lnQ  
Explanatory/control variables (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 b (t) b (t) 
laglnQ 0.502*** (4.632) 0.485*** (4.287) 
FamOwn 2.388** (2.194) 2.239** (2.239) 
InstOwn 1.899** (2.384) 1.488* (1.818) 
ForOwn   1.012* (1.945) 
OwnTotal 2.117** (2.249) 1.820* (1.908) 
lnBsize 0.143 (0.536) 0.252 (0.793) 
Bdual -0.018 (-0.082)   
Bind 0.174 (0.576) 0.124 (0.480) 
lnFsize 0.169** (2.195) 0.145 (1.476) 
leverage 0.731*** (3.168) 0.668*** (2.598) 
lnFage -0.055 (-1.003) -0.034 (-0.539) 
Intercept -3.263*** (-2.600) -3.106** (-2.401) 
Number of observations  677  677 
Wald chi2 statistic  191.530***  142.345*** 
Number of instruments  44  41 
Number of clusters  113  113 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.291  0.230 
Hansen-J test of over identification (p-value) 0.279  0.368 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). P-values and t-statistics and z-
statistics are based on robust standard errors and presented in brackets and parentheses. In system GMM 
model 2 (columns 4 and 5) I use Lag 2 only of the first differences of (Tobin’s Q, FamOwn, InstOwn, 
ForOwn, OwnTotal, lnBsize, Bind, lnFsize, leverage) variables as GMM-type instruments for the levels 
equation to reduce the instruments number, rather than all lags available as used in system GMM model 
1. Year dummies are unreported. 2010-year dummy dropped in both models. The notations are as defined 
in Table 4-4. 
 
As noted earlier, the main findings may change if alternate performance indicator used, thus, 
this issue has been empirically checked. In Table 5-6, Eq. (6) was re-estimated by replacing 
Tobin’s Q ratio by ROA or ROE to check the robustness of our main results to alternative firm 
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performance proxies51. It is interesting to know that one-year lagged dependent variable (firm 
performance) is still significantly positively related to current firm performance despite any 
performance indicator used in the estimation. This implies that including lagged dependent 
variable is a must when modelling governance-performance relationship. I further follow Nguyen 
et al., (2014) and reduced the number of instruments by using only one or two lags of instrument 
variables rather than using all lags available, I also apply a collapsing instruments approach to 
reduce the instruments' count as suggested by Roodman, (2009b). Interestingly, results reported in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 5-6 indicate that the coefficients on most of the corporate governance 
variables are similar to those reported in Table 5-4 in terms of direction and magnitude. Only 
ownership structure matters for firm performance operating in Jordan. This finding is robust to 
alternative firm performance indicators, see (model 2) in columns (4) and (5) and (model 3) in 
columns (6) and (7) reported in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6 Robustness checks of the main results sensitivity to reduced form of governance variables, 
reduced number of instruments, and alternate performance metrics. 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
 lnQ   ROA   ROE   
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  b (t) b (t) b (t) 
l.Performance 0.434*** (3.676) 0.399*** (4.051) 0.436*** (5.512) 
FamOwn 3.241** (2.026) 0.460*** (3.643) 0.863*** (4.179) 
InstOwn 2.605** (2.221) 0.423*** (3.848) 0.782*** (4.489) 
OwnTotal 3.173** (1.968) 0.509*** (4.866) 0.945*** (5.364) 
lnBsize 0.079 (0.288) -0.054 (-1.421) -0.017 (-0.291) 
Bind -0.215 (-0.588) -0.056 (-0.698) -0.162 (-1.289) 
lnFsize 0.231* (1.924) 0.018*** (3.141) 0.028*** (2.974) 
leverage 0.914** (2.514) -0.013 (-0.253) -0.044 (-0.665) 
lnFage -0.065 (-1.002) 0.011 (-1.406) 0.012 (-0.965) 
Intercept -4.034** (-2.286) -0.142 (-1.567) -0.288 (-1.374) 
Number of 
observations 
 677  677  677 
Wald chi2 statistic 104.325***  353.015***  304.315*** 
Number of 
instruments 
 37  34  30 
Number of clusters                     113  113  113 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.003  0.000  0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 
0.305  0.702  0.821 
0.214  0.224  0.524 
                                                 
51 It should be noted that, I further dropped board duality (Bdual) variable from Eq .(6) as per Roodman, (2009a) 
suggestions to have better estimation results.  
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Note: In these models, Board Duality (Bdual) variable was dropped. Asterisks indicate significance at 
10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). P-values and t-statistics and z-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors and presented in brackets and parentheses. For model 1 (columns 2 and 3) I employ lag 4, lag 5, 
and lag 6 of the levels of Tobin’s Q, FamOwn, InstOwn, OwnTotal, lnBsize, Bind, lnFsize, leverage as 
GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation. I further employ, lag 3 of the first differences 
of these variables instruments for the equation in levels. For Model 2 (columns 4 and 5) lag 3 and lag 4 
of the levels of ROA, FamOwn, InstOwn, OwnTotal, lnBsize, Bind, lnFsize, leverage was employed as 
GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equations. Lag 2 of the first differences of these variables 
is used as GMM-type instruments for the levels equation. For Model 3 (columns 6 and 7) lag 3 and lag 
4 of the levels of ROE, FamOwn, InstOwn, OwnTotal, lnBsize, Bind, lnFsize, leverage was employed as 
instruments for the first-differenced equation. Further, I use Lag 2 of the first differences of these 
variables as instruments for the equation in levels. Year dummies are unreported. 2010 and 2013 year 
dummies dropped in Model 1. 2009-year dummy dropped in model 2 and 3. The notations are as defined 
in Table 4-4. 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has been a focal point 
in the mainstream academic literature, especially after the recent financial crisis. Despite this vast 
literature on the international corporate governance issues, evidence on the relation between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance is mixed due to endogeneity challenges 
and other institutional differences between countries. In this thesis, I follow recent advances in 
corporate governance literature i.e., Akbar et al., (2016), Duru et al., (2016), Wintoki et al., (2012), 
and Nguyen et al., (2014, 2015) among others, and modelled the governance-performance 
relationship in a dynamic framework, and employed System GMM that mitigates endogeneity 
concerns, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and performance in Jordan. 
Importantly, consistent with recent international evidence, specifically, those provided by Wintoki 
et al., (2012) and Nguyen et al., (2015), I find that board of directors’ characteristics (board size, 
board duality, and board independence) are not determinants of corporate performance in Jordan. 
These results provide general support for Hypothesis6, where it was argued that no relationship 
should be expected between board independence and firm performance due to endogeneity. 
On the other hand, empirical analysis executed in this chapter shows that only ownership 
structure variables –type of controlling shareholder and concentration− seem to have positive 
implications on performance of nonfinancial listed companies in Jordan. Subsequently, the three 
firm-level corporate governance indicators (FamOwn, InstOwn, and OwnTotal) appear to have 
statistically a significant positive effect on firm performance. These results indicate general 
support of Hypothesis2, where positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance was expected. Moreover, results support the view of Pound, (1988) about the 
 138 
 
efficient-monitoring hypothesis, especially of institutional investors. Similarly, Anderson & Reeb, 
(2003) provide evidence that family ownership has positive implications on firm performance. 
These results imply that; the second type agency problem i.e., Principal-Principal PP conflicts have 
no severe or any harmful implications to firm performance in Jordan. The strength of the results 
is drowned from the notion that the main findings remain robust by re-estimating different models 
of governance and performance. The next chapter presents empirical evidence on estimating the 
relationship between firm-level corporate governance variables and firm performance in the UAE 
context. 
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CHAPTER 6: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE – EVIDENCE FROM UAE 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presents robust empirical evidence on the relationship between firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, using Jordanian dataset. Results 
were consistent with recent advances provided by corporate governance literature, suggesting that 
ownership concentration in form of controlling shareholders is instrumental in reducing agency 
problems, and increasing firm performance. In this chapter, I follow recent calls and advances in 
corporate governance literature i.e., Wang and Shailer, (2015) and further provide comparative 
analysis between two countries –Jordan and UAE− that share similar firm-level corporate 
governance environments. Accordingly, this chapter presents precise analysis by estimating Eq. 
(6) of the relationship between firm-level corporate governance variables and firm performance 
using the UAE’s dataset. This chapter is, therefore, applying the similar approach presented in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 5). As noted earlier the findings of this chapter are aimed also to address 
the first (two) questions of this thesis regarding the effect of the firm-level ‒ownership and board 
structures‒ corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as the following. Initial descriptive statistics of 
the collected data is presented in section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the multivariate regression 
analysis, which includes; endogeneity test (subsection 6.3.1), empirical results of estimating the 
governance-performance model using OLS, FE and System GMM in dynamic format (subsection 
6.3.3), and robustness analysis presents in subsection 6.3.4. Finally, section 6.4 presents the 
chapter summary. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6-1 below provides primary data analysis and summary statistics of the UAE’s capital 
market dataset. The panel set used for the UAE’s capital market includes a total of 279 firm-year 
observations, these observations represents the complete set of companies that have the required 
information (financial and governance) during the sampling period of this research (from 2008 to 
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2014). In line with prior corporate finance literature, winsorization method was applied on all 
financial variables at 1% level to ensure that the findings of estimating the governance-
performance model which is not driven by the presence of outliers in this thesis. 
The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q ratio is 1.30 (0.99), indicating that nonfinancial firm listed 
in the UAE’s capital market are enjoying value creation for its shareholders, at least, during the 
sampling period, since the greater then one Tobin’s Q is favourable. However, firm performance 
analysis revealed in Table 6-1 below suggests that firm in the UAE market might be affected by 
the macroeconomic conditions i.e., the recent financial crisis, as the variation between the 
minimum (0.35) and the maximum (15.33) are relatively wide. Such effects of macroeconomic 
conditions are taken into account by introducing fixed year effects into the empirical models in the 
next stage. 
As noted for the Jordanian capital market, ownership structure of the UAE’s firms seems to 
be concentrated with the presence of multiple blockholders. The mean (median) of the percentage 
of stocks held by family investors is 0.14 (0.08), while the mean (median) of percentage of stocks 
held by institutional investors is 0.30 (0.25) respectively. The mean (median) of the aggregate 
stocks held by the multiple blockholders is 0.53 (0.58). However, this percentage is relatively 
lower when compared to other emerging markets (for example see Wang & Shailer 2015). This 
implies that family and institutional investors in the UAE’s capital market have lower levels of 
stock ownership than those reported in the previous chapter of the Jordanian capital market. It 
should be noted also that there is other form of blockholders who dominant the UAE capital market 
which is the government (sovereign) ownership, as most of this government ownership refers to 
the royal families that govern these Emirates. However, to facilitate the comparisons between 
Jordan and the UAE, only institutional and family ownerships were selected in this context. 
With respect to the board of directors’ level, the number of board members sitting on the 
boards seems to be similar and relatively identical to this reported in the previous chapter (Chapter 
5) for the Jordanian nonfinancial firms. The mean (median) of the board size is 8.12 (8.00) 
respectively. This is also identical to the average of the board members of the MENA region listed 
firms. On the other hand, board independence level seems to be relatively higher than that of the 
Jordanian listed firms. The mean (median) of the board independence is 0.70 (0.73) respectively. 
This indicates that boards in listed UAE firms appointing more independent members to ensure 
the vigilant monitoring role of the boards. 
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Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics 
  Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin’s Q Ratio 279 1.30 0.99 1.25 0.35 15.33 
Family/individual ownership (%) 279 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.70 
Institutional ownership (%) 279 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.85 
Ownership concentration (%) 279 0.53 0.58 0.20 0.06 0.88 
Board Size (members) 279 8.12 8.00 2.06 5.00 16.00 
Board independence (%) 279 0.70 0.73 0.19 0.22 1.00 
Firm size [ln (market capitalization)] 279 19.63 19.59 1.43 17.01 24.17 
Firm age (year) 279 24.19 29.00 13.20 1.00 55.00 
Financial leverage % 279 0.38 0.40 0.21 0.04 0.98 
Note: This table presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the research key variables in its original 
form except where it was specified as a logarithms form. The research sample comprises 40 non-financial 
firms listed in Emirates Securities Market (ESM) of the UAE. The variables are as described in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 6-2 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix and the collinearity diagnostics 
represented by the variance inflation coefficients. First of all, it is observed that there is a 
significant raw positive correlation between most of the internal (firm-level) governance variables 
and firm performance (lnQ). Specifically −OwnTotal, lnBsize and Bind− have significant positive 
correlations with firm performance (lnQ)at 1% and 5% respectively. It should be noted that larger 
firms seem to have larger boards. Firm size (lnFsize) is significantly positively correlated with 
board size (lnBsize) with 0.43 correlation coefficient significant at 1% level. This is in line with 
prior corporate governance literature (see for example; Nguyen et al. 2014). Similarly, board 
independence (Bind) is positively correlated with firm size (lnFsize) with 0.21 correlation 
coefficient significant at 1% level. 
On the other hand, both ownership structure indicators (FamOwn and OwnTotal) are 
significantly negatively correlated with board size (lnBsize). This implies that the higher are the 
percentage of stocks held by blockholders the lower are the board size and the less board members 
appointed. This may support the entrenchment hypothesis. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the dynamic effect exists when using the UAE’s dataset. Table 6-2 shows that the one-year lagged 
dependent variable (laglnQ) is statistically significantly positively correlated with the current 
performance indicator (lnQ). These results are in line with the recent advances in corporate 
governance research, which suggest that the dynamic effect of the pervious performance must be 
included when modelling the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
(Wintoki et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2014, 2015). 
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The multicollinearity diagnostics presented in VIFs column in Table 6-2 below suggest that 
the empirical estimations in this chapter are free from any serious collinearity issues. As reported 
below, the higher correlation coefficient is 0.65 between laglnQ and lnQ. Prior related econometric 
literature suggests that any correlation coefficient exceeds the 0.80 threshold limit that may present 
serious issues. This implies that estimating the governance-performance relationship within the 
UAE’s framework is, therefore, free from multicollinearity issues.
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Table 6-2 Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients of UAE’s sample 
  lnQ FamOwn InstOwn OwnTotal lnBsize Bind lnFsize lnFage leverage laglnq VIFs 
lnQ 1.00           
FamOwn 0.09 1.00         2.26 
InstOwn -0.06 -0.48*** 1.00        2.29 
OwnTotal 0.14** 0.28*** 0.39*** 1.00       2.06 
lnBsize 0.14** -0.32*** 0.06 -0.32*** 1.00      1.43 
Bind 0.19*** -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.11* 1.00     1.12 
lnFsize 0.18*** -0.45*** 0.20*** -0.23*** 0.43*** 0.21*** 1.00    1.50 
lnFage -0.01 0.37*** -0.12** 0.17*** -0.27*** -0.14** -0.28*** 1.00   1.31 
Leverage 0.12** -0.11* -0.06 -0.13** 0.13** 0.15** 0.21*** -0.31*** 1.00  1.18 
laglnQ 0.65*** 0.09 -0.07 0.15** 0.15** 0.18*** 0.09 -0.01 0.11* 1.00 1.17 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations are as defined in Table 4-4. 
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6.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The previous section suggests that most of the governance variables in this research have 
significant raw correlations with firm performance. Thus, taking a further step in examining the 
relationship between governance and firm performance is a matter of importance in this context. 
Accordingly, in this section, I estimate Eq. (6) is in different forms of estimation techniques52. 
First of all, the endogeneity of the governance variables used in the governance-performance 
model was initially checked. Then I examine the relationship between a suite of internal (firm-
level) governance variables and firm performance in the UAE’s market using three main four main 
econometric estimation techniques. Mainly, Dynamic OLS, Dynamic FE and Dynamic System 
GMM were applied.53 
6.3.1 Endogeneity Tests 
As noted earlier in subsection 5.3.1 of Chapter 5, all internal (firm-level) governance 
variables are endogenously treated in this thesis. This is according to the recent advances in 
corporate governance research i.e., Wintoki et al., (2012) among others. Therefore, in this section 
I empirically verify the endogeneity status of the regressors used in Eq. (6) by employing the DWH 
test for endogeneity. Accordingly, I follow Nguyen et al., (2014, 2015) , and I conduct Durbin–
Wu–Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity of all regressors as a group based on the levels equation 
of firm performance and corporate governance variables (Schultz et al., 2010). The instrumental 
variables are one-year lagged differences of the below independent variables; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1. In addition to these lagged instrumental variables, I further include lnFage, year 
dummies and industry dummies as the only exogenous variables in the GMM specifications. 
As aforementioned previously, the DWH endogeneity test is based on the null hypothesis 
that the tested regressors can be treated as exogenous variables (Baum et al., 2007). Consequently, 
the DWH test’s result indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted at any conventional 
levels of significance (Chi-sq(8) = 20.692; p = 0.009). These results indicate that the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and firm performance in the UAE context is also subject 
                                                 
52 It should be noted that board-duality variable dropped from Eq. (6) in all our regressions due to collinearity.  
53 Fixed-Effect FE estimations has been applied based on the Hausman test to choose between FE and RE. 
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to endogeneity issues. This also implies that prior corporate governance research executed in 
international context including the UAE using OLS and / or FE/RE estimations techniques may 
have biased and inconsistent results and, therefore, equivocal conclusions, which in terms 
highlight the importance of applying System GMM in this context. 
6.3.2 System GMM Estimation Validity 
As noted earlier, one important assumption to successfully execute efficient estimations 
using System GMM is to have valid instrumental variables. Accordingly, I mainly relied on 
Hansen-J test of over-identification and the difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of 
instrument subsets as suggested by Roodman, (2009b). This section is, therefore, examining the 
exogeneity of the instrumental variables used in these estimations. 
Table 6-3 below provides evidence that I must accept the null hypothesis that the subsets of 
instruments used in the System GMM modelling are econometrically exogenous. The results, thus, 
imply  that year dummies and lnFage are exogenous variables, while the endogenous variables 
(i.e. governance and other explanatory variables) are successfully instrumented by their  one-year 
lagged dependent variables i.e. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 – 1; 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1; ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 – 1. The estimation results are reported in 
the next section. 
Table 6-3 Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments subsets 
Tested instrument subsets Test statistics 
Degree of 
freedom 
P-Value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments    
All instruments for equation in levels 12.93 8 0.114 
lnQit−3 𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 lnQit−6 (for equation in differences) 8.02 4 0.091 
⧍lnQit−2 (for equation in levels) 0.20 1 0.658 
Instruments for ownership structure variables 14.13 11 0.226 
Instruments for board structure and control variables 11.45 16 0.781 
    
Panel B: Standard instruments    
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 year dummies, and 
lnFage 
5.05 6 0.537 
 146 
 
Note: This table represent Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instrument subsets used in this 
research. GMM instrument subset used for the equation in levels includes two-year lagged differences 
of firm performance variable; four-year lagged differences of ownership structure, board structure and 
other control variables. GMM instrument subset used for ownership structure variables includes four-
year lagged differences and lags 4 in levels of these variables. GMM instrument subset used for board 
structure and the other control variables includes four-year lagged differences and lags 4 in levels of 
these variables. The subset of standard instruments for the equation in levels includes 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2014 year dummies, and lnFage. 2008 (constant), 2013-year dummy dropped due to collinearity. 
6.3.3 Empirical Results 
As noted earlier, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
subject to three sources of endogeneity; (i) simultaneity, (ii) omitted variables, (iii) and 
measurement errors (Coles et al., 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012). In the presence of such endogeneity 
issues, System GMM provides more reasonable, consistent and reliable estimation results. Thus, I 
apply the dynamic panel data model to estimate the relationship between internal governance 
variables and firm performance on the full sample of the UAE’s data. Moreover, I use other 
traditional estimators i.e. OLS and FE to facilitate comparisons of those results obtained by System 
GMM and to ensure the specification diagnostics. In fact, the notation behind using different 
estimators alongside the Dynamic System GMM is based on the idea, that the correlation between 
lagged dependent variable and the time-invariant component of the error term will be upward 
biased using OLS estimations, while it is expected to be downward biased using the FE estimations 
(Nickell, 1981). Thus, in doing so, I will make sure that the empirical analysis executed by System 
GMM that is on the right scale and on the correct direction. 
Table 6-4 below reports the relationship between internal (firm-level) governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in the UAE. At the first place, the results show that one-year 
lagged dependent variable (laglnQ) is significantly related to current performance (lnQ) despite 
the estimation technique used. This also confirms the importance of including dynamics of 
previous performance when modelling governance-performance relationship. For specification 
purposes, the results of System GMM estimation below show that one-year lagged dependent 
variable (laglnQ) is positively correlated with current performance (𝛼1 = 0.553) and lies between 
those obtained by OLS (𝛼1 = 0.834) and FE (𝛼1 = 0.263). This suggests that System GMM is 
reasonable and produces more efficient results. 
Regarding the governance variables effect on firm performance in this context, the results 
reported in (column 3) of Table 6-4 shows that only ownership concentration variable (OwnTotal) 
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has a significant positive relationship with firm performance (lnQ) at the 10% level. These results 
are in line with those obtained recently by Gaur et al., (2015), Acheson et al., (2016) and Nguyen 
et al., (2015) among others. Moreover, these results are in contradictions to the ownership 
concentration-performance hypothesis −Hypothesis3− regarding the negative impact of stock-
ownership concentration assumed on firm performance. Empirical analysis reveals also that other 
ownership structure variables i.e., (FamOwn) and (InstOwn) seems to have a negative relationship 
with firm performance using FE estimator. However, once endogeneity issues controlled −by using 
System GMM approach− this relationship vanishes. 
It has been evidently noticed in prior corporate governance literature that the type of the 
large shareholders i.e., institutional and families, have the ability to enhance firm performance 
through efficient monitoring activities (Laeven & Levine, 2008). However, in this section of the 
thesis, the author failed to find any significant impact of the types of the dominant shareholders on 
firm performance in the UAE context. One explanation for the absent link between the share 
concentration type (or identity) and firm performance is the arguments presented by Brickley et 
al., (1988), which distinguish between pressure sensitive and pressure resistant owners which are 
categorized by the owner’s ability and motivation to influence firm management, and hence, its 
performance. According to this typology, pressure sensitive institutional owners may have 
business ties with their firms that impede them from monitoring firm management. Insurance 
companies, banks and non-bank trusts are said to be pressure sensitive. On the other hand, pressure 
resistant owners have no conflicts of interest and, thus, have the ability to monitor firm 
management. Pension funds, hedge funds, and investment funds are said to be pressure resistant 
and in a better position to monitor firm management. 
Supporting these arguments, Muller-Kahle, (2015) provides empirical evidence that the type 
of owner plays a large role in whether a shareholder has the inclination to engage in firm 
monitoring. It is worth noting that, the institutional investors of the UAE capital markets are 
usually found to be banks, insurance companies, and other large holdings companies. Accordingly, 
I argue that, the type of the dominant shareholders ‒of the nonfinancial firms listed in the UAE 
capital markets‒ seem to be classified as ‘pressure sensitive’ investors. Thus, it was difficult to 
observe any impact on firm performance by such types of dominant shareholders. 
Moreover, compared to the empirical analysis presented in Table 5-4 in the previous chapter 
on the Jordanian case, results obtained in Table 6-4 suggest few implications on the substitutory 
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effect between externa (country-level)l and internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms. As 
noted earlier in subsection 3.4 of Chapter 3, UAE has stronger (than Jordan) legal and national 
governance environment, which in terms suggests that the relationship between firm-level 
governance variables and firm performance if exist might be weaker in its context according to the 
substitution hypothesis (Wang & Shailer, 2017). Accordingly, when comparing these results with 
those obtained in Table 5-4 in the previous chapter for the Jordanian context, it is evidently 
showing that ownership concentration has stronger relationship with firm performance in terms of 
magnitude and significance (significant at 5 %) compared with this for the UAE context 
(significant at 10%). 
Similar to those results obtained in subsection 5.3.3 in the previous chapter for the Jordanian 
case, board of directors’ variables seem to have no significant implications on the nonfinancial 
listed firm in the UAE capital markets. Which in terms show consistency only with the stated 
hypothesis −Hypothesis6− regarding the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. 
With regards to other firm-level explanatory variables, firm size (lnFsize) seems to have 
significant positive relationship with firm performance (lnQ) despite the econometric estimation 
approach used. Unlike results reported for the Jordanian market in Table 5-4, financial leverage 
(leverage) has no significant effect on firm performance in the UAE context. This results might be 
justified by the substitution effect between leverage and corporate governance in reducing the 
agency cost (Jiraporn et al., 2012). On the other hand, firm age (lnFage) seems to have significant 
positive impact on firm performance (lnQ). These findings are consistent with the “life-cycle” 
propositions that firm performance may depend on firm age and its life cycle stages. 
Table 6-4 The relationship between corporate governance variables and performance in UAE (dynamic 
models) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lnQ lnQ lnQ 
 OLS FE SYS. GMM 
Explanatory variables b/t b/t b/t 
L.lnQ 0.834*** 0.263*** 0.553** 
 (16.662) (7.977) (2.129) 
FamOwn 0.134 -10.818*** 0.630 
 (0.869) (-3.408) (0.562) 
InstOwn -0.061 -11.036*** 1.300 
 (-0.376) (-3.274) (1.094) 
OwnTotal 0.236* 10.698*** 1.607* 
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 (1.669) (3.581) (1.857) 
lnBosize 0.059 -0.061 -0.675 
 (0.708) (-0.388) (-0.889) 
Bind -0.037 1.528 -0.390 
 (-0.413) (1.249) (-0.608) 
lnFsize 0.058*** 0.404*** 0.184** 
 (3.397) (9.642) (2.639) 
Leverage 0.202** 0.478 0.030 
 (2.048) (1.182) (0.200) 
lnFage 0.021 -0.049 0.728** 
 (0.778) (-0.548) (2.410) 
Intercept -1.338*** -9.724*** -4.191 
 (-2.909) (-6.055) (-1.412) 
Number of observations 279 279 279 
R-squared 0.814 0.686  
F statistic 42.573*** 36.589***  
Wald chi2statistic   158.274*** 
Number of instruments   39 
Number of clusters 40 40 40 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)   0.049 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.640 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value)   0.176 
Note: This table presents empirical analysis of examining Eq. (6) using three different estimation 
techniques; Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and dynamic (two-step system) GMM. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). P-values and t-statistics and z-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors and presented in brackets and parentheses. For the two-steps system GMM 
estimates reported in column (4) I use lag 4, lag 5, and lag 6 of the levels of Tobin’s Q, lnBsize, Bind, 
FamOwn, InstOwn, OwnTotal, lnFsize, leverage as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced 
equation. Whereas, four lags of the first differences of these variables is used as GMM-type instruments 
for the levels equation. Year dummies are unreported. 2011-year dummy dropped in Pooled OLS and FE 
model estimations. 2013-year dummy dropped in System GMM. The notations are as defined in Table 
4-4. 
 
6.3.4 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis 
As noted by Roodman, (2009b) the robustness and efficiency of System GMM estimations 
depend on instrument number. Thus, it is very important to check the System GMM estimations 
sensitivity to reducing the number of instruments. Accordingly, the number of instruments was 
reduced from 39 to 30. It is worth noting that the lowest possible instruments number (30) was 
basically limited to the System GMM diagnostics and specification tests. In other words, when 
trying to reduce the number further than 30, the System GMM specifications and diagnostics tests 
violated. As reported in Table 6-5 below, the main findings regarding the relationship between 
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governance variables and firm performance obtained in Table 6-4 previously are generally remain 
unchanged. Only ownership concentration (OwnTotal) has significant positive relationship with 
firm performance (lnQ) despite the alternate performance metric used i.e., ROE and ROA. It is 
worth noting also that, the one-year lagged dependent variable is still holding significant 
relationship with current performance. 
Table 6-5 Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to the instrumental variables’ reduction and 
alternative performance metrics 
 
Model (1) 
lnQ 
Model (2) 
ROE 
 
Model (3) 
ROA 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  b (z) b (z) b (z) 
l.Performance  0.727*** (4.336) 0.271** (2.486) 0.490***       (2.699) 
FamOwn -0.399 (-0.320) 0.973 (1.211) 0.160 (0.393) 
InstOwn -0.901 (-0.705) 1.179 (1.019) 0.162 (0.252) 
OwnTotal 0.879* (1.776) 0.873*         (1.763) 0.132**        (1.974) 
lnBsize -1.034 (-0.633) 0.016 (0.047) -0.000 (-0.002) 
Bind 0.016 (0.015) -0.028 (-0.063) 0.017 (0.039) 
lnFsize 0.260*** (2.693) -0.033 (-0.458) 0.004 (0.129) 
Leverage -0.197 (-0.355) 0.220 (0.739) 0.085 (0.784) 
lnFage 0.107 (0.696) -0.025 (-0.297) -0.016 (-0.528) 
Intercept -2.698 (-1.147) (-1.002) 0.182 -0.295 (-0.337) 
Observations  279  279  279 
Wald chi2 statistic  180.970***  40.374***  59.855*** 
Number of instruments  30  30  30 
Number of clusters  40  40  40 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 
0.004  0.189  0.198 
0.495  0.658  0.461 
0.427  0.513  0.236 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***). P-values and t-statistics and z-
statistics are based on robust standard errors and presented in brackets and parentheses. In system GMM 
models I use Lag 2 only of the first differences of (Tobin’s Q, FamOwn, InstOwn, ForOwn, OwnTotal, 
lnBsize, Bind, lnFsize, and leverage) variables as GMM-type instruments for the levels equation to 
reduce the instruments number, rather than all lags available as used in system GMM model reported in 
Table 5-4 . Year dummies are unreported. The notations are as defined in Table 4-4. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
To address the first two-questions of this thesis, I examine the impact of internal (firm-level) 
governance mechanisms on firm performance using separate dataset of each country i.e., Jordan 
and UAE. Thus, this chapter presents the empirical analysis of examining the relationship between 
firm-level corporate governance and firm performance in the UAE’s context, using Dynamic 
System GMM as main estimation technique. The main findings of this chapter obtained in Table 
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6-4 and the robustness analysis in Table 6-5 shows that only ownership structure matters for the 
performance of listed UAE’s firms. More specifically, it is found that ownership concentration 
(OwnTotal) has a significant positive relationship with firm performance among other variables 
i.e., FamOwn and InstOwn stock ownership identify variables. These results contradict the 
research hypothesis -Hypothesis3, where negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance was expected. However, these findings are consistent with mainstream 
academic literature on agency theory, suggesting that ownership concentration and control in the 
hand of large-shareholders can serve as efficient governance mechanism to solve the agency 
conflict, especially in the emerging markets, where the market forces and other external 
governance mechanisms are weak or even absent. 
As noticed in the previous chapter i.e., Jordanian case, board of directors’ variables ‒board 
size and independence‒ have no significant effect on firm performance in the UAE. these results 
are also in line with the recent advances in governance literature i.e., Wintoki et al., (2012) and 
Nguyen et al., (2015) among others. These results suggest that firms listed in the UAE capital 
market must pay less attention on the board composition and leadership structure, when it comes 
to its effects on firm performance. Overall, the empirical analysis indicates that, in the UAE 
context, ownership concentration is the most powerful governance tool that tends to align interests 
and bring financial benefits to shareholders. However, it should be noted that the type of 
(controlling) majority shareholders has no implications on firm performance in the UAE context. 
In the next chapter, I present empirical analysis of the effect of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance using the combined sample of both markets i.e., Jordan and 
UAE. Moreover, I test the effect of differential validity of a country’s national governance regimes 
on firm performance.
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CHAPTER 7: GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE –EVIDENCEF ROM THE COMBINED 
SAMPLE OF JORDAN AND UAE 
7.1 Introduction 
As noted earlier, the relationship between a suite of internal governance mechanisms and 
firm performance has been examined, using the separate dataset of Jordan and UAE in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 respectively. Applying a similar approach, this chapter investigates the relationship 
between governance variables ‒country- and firm-level‒ and firm performance, using the 
combined sample of Jordan and UAE as a form of the MENA region capital markets. Accordingly, 
it further examines the direct effect of the national governance quality regimes ‒in which firms 
operate in‒ on firm performance. Thus, this chapter aims also at answering the third question of 
this thesis (What will be the effect of the external country-level governance mechanisms (national 
governance quality) on firm’s financial performance in Jordan and in the UAE?). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as following; section 7.2 below discusses the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and the independent variables. Section 7.3 discusses the multiple 
regression analysis results which examines the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
firm performance using the aggregate dataset of Jordan and UAE. This analysis includes 
subsection 7.3.1 (the effect of internal governance mechanisms), subsection 7.3.1.1 (Pooled OLS, 
Dynamic OLS and Dynamic FE), subsection 7.3.1.2 (the validity of System GMM), subsection 
7.3.1.3 (empirical evidence from Dynamic System GMM), and subsection 7.3.1.4 (sensitivity and 
robustness analysis of the main findings), and subsection 7.3.2 examines mainly the effect of 
national governance quality on firm performance. Subsection 7.3.2.1 presents robustness checks 
of the main findings generated in the previous section. Finally, subsection 7.4 provides the chapter 
summary. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7-1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (firm performance) of the 
aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE, which includes 153 nonfinancial listed firms in Amman 
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Stock Exchange and Emirates Security Market, for the period from 2008 to 2014. The means of 
both accounting-base performance indicators (ROA and ROE) are the same at 0.03 level. The 
coefficient variation CV indicators for these two performance measures are greater than 1 (2.33 
and 4.33 respectively), which imply that there are large differences between firms listed in these 
two capital markets in the accounting-based performance indications. However, with respect to 
market valuation (Tobin’s Q), it has a (1.26) mean, and lower coefficient variation CV (0.67). This 
implies that firms in these two capital markets are enjoying higher equity valuation during the 
sampling period with lower major differences in Tobin’s Q as a proxy measure of performance 
between firms. This might reflect the agency theory expectations about the efficient monitoring 
role of blockholders with high level of ownership and control in corporations (Fama & Jensen, 
1983 and Burkart et al., 1997). 
To check the normality of the dependent variables data set, I calculate Skewness and 
Kurtosis values. Based on these values reported in Table 7-1 below, the dependent variables (firm 
performance indicators) data set in its original form are not normally-distributed.  
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables as a proxy measures of firm performance. 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis CV 
Tobin’s Q  1069 1.26 1.03 0.85 0.34 15.33 6.14 80.80 0.67 
ROA 1069 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.12 0.15 -0.46 3.13 2.33 
ROE 1069 0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.30 0.25 -0.78 3.77 4.33 
Note: Tobin’s Q descriptive statistics are based on the original form of the data (no log transformation 
applied), while for ROA and ROE it is based on the winsorized form of data due to the presence of high 
outliers. CV is the Coefficient of Variation, which can be calculated by the following formula (Standard 
deviation/ Mean). CV is a useful measure of the relevance of the standard deviation because it is not 
affected by the units of measurement. The higher the CV (i.e. 1 or greater), the greater the variability of 
the data, and the lower the CV (i.e. approaching to zero) the less dispersion of the data (high uniformity). 
See (Liu, Pang, & Huang, 2006). 
 
The normality assumptions of the dependent variables (performance metrics) used in this 
research has been evaluated by applying the Shapiro-Walk test of normality. This test is executed 
under the null hypothesis that the variables of interests are normally distributed. As shown in Table 
7-2 below, the assumption of normality cannot be accepted at any level of significance. However, 
having this assumption violated does not seem to be a problematic, especially in a case where the 
sample size is large enough i.e., N ≥ 30 (Berenson et al., 2012).54 
                                                 
54I executed the t-test to evaluate the sample size employed in this research is large enough to reasonably assume the 
normality across the variables of interests. The results of this test are reported in Table A1-12 in Appendix 1. 
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Moreover, the normality assumptions of the rest of numerical variables used in this research 
(i.e., board size, board independence, family ownership, institutional ownership, ownership 
concentration, firm size, firm age and financial leverage) were evaluated by employing Shapiro-
Wilk test and the t-test, and results are reported in Table 7-3 below. The reported results suggest 
that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted at any level of significance also for the independent 
variables used in this research, suggesting that all variables in the analysis have no normal 
distributions across the sample.  
Table 7-2 Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of the dependent variables before transformation 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Tobin's Q 1,069 0.627 250.179 13.712 0.000 
ROA 1,069 0.017 658.763 16.116 0.000 
ROE 1,069 0.817 122.520 11.940 0.000 
Note: This table reports the Shapiro-Walk test of normality of the dependent variables (performance 
alternative metrics) used in this research. The test is executed under the null hypothesis that these 
variables are normally distributed. ROA is the percentage ratio of the total assets scaled by the net income 
before tax. ROE is the percentage ratio of the total equity scaled by the net income before tax. 
 
Table 7-3 Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of the numerical governance indicators and other control 
variables before data transformation 
Variable Obs W V        z Prob>z 
FamOwn 1,069 0.900 67.233 10.449 0.000 
InstOwn 1,069 0.978 14.417 6.626 0.000 
OwnTotal 1,069 0.973 18.159 7.199 0.000 
Bsize 1,069 0.991 5.960 4.433 0.000 
Bind 1,069 0.988 8.093 5.192 0.000 
Fage 1,069 0.932 45.799 9.496 0.000 
Fsize 1,069 0.168 557.311 15.701 0.000 
leverage 1,069 0.924 51.155 9.771 0.000 
Note: This table reports the Shapiro-Walk test of normality of the independent variables (corporate 
governance variables and other firm explanatory variables) used in this research across the sample of the 
two-countries. The test is executed under the null hypothesis that these variables are normally distributed. 
Variables are as defined in Table 4-4. 
 
Furthermore, Levene's robust test for equality of variances was applied to evaluate the 
differences of variables’ variances between the two-country samples‒Jordan and the UAE. This 
test is executed under the null hypothesis that the variables’ variances are identical across the 
combined sample of the two countries. The results are reported in Appendix 1. 
On the other hand, Table 7-4 below shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
(corporate governance variables, and other explanatory variables) used in this research of the 
aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE. Overall, the mean (median) of shares held by shareholders 
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who own at least 5% (ownership concentration) during the sampling period is 0.59 (0.62) which 
is considered to be relatively high in line with other emerging markets (Wang & Shailer, 2015).  
Moreover, it was found that board size of companies in these two countries has a mean 
(median) value of 8.20 (8.00) which is in line with the average board size of companies operating 
in the MENA region (IFC, 2008). Other characteristics of the board of directors show that CEO-
duality is accounting for only 0.15 of the aggregate sample, while board independence is 
accounting for 0.60, suggesting that firms listed in Jordan and UAE in general, are adopting high 
independent board strategy with minimal CEO-duality in their board of directors’ structure. 
Table 7-4 Descriptive statistics of the corporate governance indicators and other control variables 
  Obs  Mean Median SD Min Max 
Family/individual ownership (%) 1069 0.21 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.99 
Institutional ownership (%) 1069 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.99 
Ownership concentration (%) 1069 0.59 0.62 0.22 0.06 0.99 
Board Size (members) 1069 8.20 8.00 2.30 3.00 16.00 
CEO duality  1069 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Board independence (%) 1069 0.60 0.60 0.18 0.14 100.00 
Firm age (year) 1069 21.85 17.38 14.97 1.00 77.00 
Firm size [ln (market capitalization)] 1069 17.61 0.32 1.91 13.36 24.17 
Financial Leverage (%) 1069 0.35 18.00 0.24 0.00 2.28 
Note: This table contains descriptive statistics based on aggregate sample of 153 firm and 1069 firm-year 
observation from Jordan and UAE for the period (2008-2014). The variables are as defined in Table 4-4. 
For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics of board size, and firm age are calculated based on 
levels instead of logarithmic form. Financial data and other firms’ characteristics for firms operating in 
Jordan and UAE capital markets downloaded from DataStream Database. Corporate governance and 
ownership structure data extracted manually from companies’ annual reports which can be downloaded 
from the Amman Stock Exchange market for Jordanian listed companies, and from Abu Dhabi Security 
Exchange market and Dubai Financial market for UAE listed firms. 
 
The mean (median) percentage of shares held by family members and individuals is around 
0.21 (0.11), while the mean (median) for percentage of shares held by institutional investors is 
about 0.34 (0.30) in these two countries. The average leverage ratio is around 35% with an average 
firm age about 21.85 years since the initial public offering. 
The significant correlation between most of the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable (lnQ) observed in Table 7-5, indicate that, governance and other control variables may 
interact with firm performance in general. This implies that these variables are subject of 
importance, and must be included in the empirical model to avoid any potential omitted variable 
bias (Nguyen et al., 2015). In addition, results obtained in Table 7-5 support two important well-
documented propositions in prior corporate governance research. Firstly, one-year lagged 
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dependent variable (laglnQ) is positively and statistically significantly related to lnQ, this implies 
that firm performance is path-dependent. On the other hand, one-year lagged dependent variable 
(laglnQ) is significantly correlated with most of the governance variables reveal the dynamic 
nature of the corporate governance–performance relationship which has an important implication 
for the choice of estimation method (Wintoki et al., 2012; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2015; Nguyen 
et al., 2015). 
The correlation analysis in Table 7-5 shows that most of the board of directors’ variables, 
ownership structure and other control variables positively and significantly are related to firm’s 
performance (lnQ). These findings are consistent with previous research that find a  positive link 
between corporate governance internal mechanisms and performance to include (Maury, 2006; 
Al-Najjar, 2015; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Bruton et al., 2010; Hutchinson et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, it’s evident from Table 7-5 below that none of the independent variables has a 
correlation coefficients higher than 0.80. Accordingly, this analysis will not suffer of any multi-
collinearity issues as correlation coefficients is far below the 0.80 threshold as suggested by 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the variables to test for 
multicollinearity was calculated. Thus, as shown in the last column of Table 7-5, there is no 
indication that there is multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. None of these variables 
have a VIF value more than 10, the threshold suggested by econometrics literature, which would 
indicate that multicollinearity issue has no threats to the empirical estimates.
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Table 7-5 Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients for the combined sample of Jordan and UAE. 
  lnQ FamOwn InstOwn OwnTotal lnBsize Bdual Bind lnFsize leverage lnFage laglnQ VIFs 
lnQ 1.00            
FamOwn 0.11*** 1.00          7.20 
InstOwn 0.04 -0.58*** 1.00         6.92 
OwnTotal 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 1.00        5.52 
lnBsize 0.04 -0.34*** 0.11*** -0.23*** 1.00       1.36 
Bdual 0.07** 0.16*** -0.11*** -0.00 0.02 1.00      1.06 
Bind 0.06* -0.19*** -0.01 -0.15*** 0.34*** -0.06** 1.00     1.23 
lnFsize 0.25*** -0.27*** 0.09*** -0.03 0.34*** -0.13*** 0.32*** 1.00    1.43 
leverage 0.05 -0.16*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.10*** 1.00   1.07 
lnFage 0.09*** -0.20*** 0.13*** -0.02 0.08*** -0.06* -0.02 0.16*** 0.12*** 1.00  1.09 
laglnQ 0.77*** 0.10*** 0.06* 0.26*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.22*** 0.03 0.10*** 1.00 1.18 
Note: This table showing pair-wise correlation coefficients and the variance inflation factors (VIFs) based on the aggregate dataset of Jordan and UAE.  The 
variables are as defined in Table 4-4. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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7.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section presents the empirical evidence on the relationship between internal (firm-level) 
governance mechanisms using the aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE. While it discusses the 
effect of the national governance quality on firm performance in subsection 7.3.2. 
7.3.1 The Effect of Internal (Firm-level) Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
on Firm Performance 
This section presents examination of the impact of internal (firm-level) governance 
mechanisms on firm performance using the aggregate dataset of the two countries. As noted earlier 
internal corporate governance mechanisms in this context refer to ownership structure variables 
(share-ownership identity and concentration), and board of directors’ variables (board size, 
duality, and independence). In line with prior corporate governance literature, this relationship 
was initially examined using OLS, Dynamic OLS and Dynamic FE estimators. In doing so, this 
will allow to get the best specifications to assign to the Dynamic System GMM later55. Second, I 
prove that the validity of the System GMM estimations by presenting the diagnostic tests. Third, 
I provide the evidence of the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and firm 
performance is based on System GMM estimations. Finally, I show the persistence of the main 
findings in the robustness and sensitivity analysis in subsection 7.3.1.4 below. 
7.3.1.1 Pooled OLS, Dynamic OLS, and Dynamic FE Empirical Evidence 
Table 7-6 below presents estimating Eq. (6) using four econometric approaches ‒Pooled 
OLS, Dynamic OLS, Dynamic FE and Dynamic System GMM‒ respectively. However, to 
facilitate comparisons between results obtained from traditional estimators and the System GMM, 
in this subsection, I discuss empirical analysis reported in the first three columns (2, 3, and 4) 
which represent the results of the Pooled OLS, Dynamic OLS and Dynamic FE regressions 
respectively. System GMM estimations and validity specifications will be reported in the nest 
subsections. 
                                                 
55 See: Roodman, D.M., 2009. How to do xtabond2: an introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata. The 
Stata Journal 9, 86–136. 
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First, column (2) in Table 7-6, presents the results of traditional Pooled OLS regression 
assessing the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance using 
the aggregate dataset of Jordan and the UAE. The results show that only board independence 
(Bind) and ownership concentration (OwnTotal) are positively related to financial performance. 
Conversely, institutional ownership (InstOwn) is negatively related to firm’s financial 
performance. These results imply that corporate governance variables and ownership structure 
matter for financial performance. These findings are widely documented in prior related literature 
(see for example; (Abdallah & Ismail, 2016; Black, Carvalho, & Gorga, 2012; Munisi & Randoy, 
2013). However, it should be noted that Pooled OLS regression technique does not consider that 
corporate governance variables are swamped with endogeneity. Thus, interpreting such results 
obtained by traditional estimators should be taken with caution (Schultz et al., 2015). 
In a second step, and in order to account for the  part of the endogeneity issues in governance-
performance relationship, I follow Nguyen et al., (2015) and applied Eq. (6) in Dynamic Pooled 
OLS estimator which includes one-year lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the 
equation in order to account for any source of dynamic endogeneity, or the potential for 
unobservable factors which influence the firm’s financial performance in previous periods to 
impact upon the contemporaneous relation of corporate governance and financial performance. 
Column (3) provides examinations of these results, which reveal that no support of the relationship 
between most of the governance variables and firm performance. These results are consistent with 
those obtained many scholars including (Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 
2011). Only family ownership variable (FamOwn) is positively related to firm performance at 10% 
significant level. However, it should be noted that Dynamic OLS does not completely account for 
all sources of endogeneity, and results obtained cannot be generalised in this context (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). 
keeping in mind that, the Dynamic OLS approach does not account for the presence of other 
sources of endogeneity in governance research such as unobservable heterogeneity and/or 
simultaneity (Schultz et al., 2015), I apply the use of other common methods of panel data 
estimations i.e. fixed-effect (FE) and random-effects (RE). According to the Hausman test, the 
null hypothesis of the test cannot be accepted at any conventional levels of significance [Chi-
sq(15) = 2785.47; p-value=.000]. Thus, I report the Fixed-Effect (FE) panel estimates in column 
(4). Interestingly, as in the Dynamic OLS model, I find corporate governance and ownership 
structure matter in the aggregate sample of these two countries. The relationship between 
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ownership structure variables and firm performance turns to be stronger. Moreover, I find that 
board size (lnBsize) is negatively related to firm’s financial performance, while both ownership 
identity (FamOwn and InstOwn) and concentration (OwnTotal) are positively related to financial 
performance. However, Wintoki et al., (2012) noted that none of the three econometric approaches 
discussed thus far account for all the three forms of endogeneity (dynamic, heterogeneity, and 
simultaneity). 
Thus, I follow Nguyen et al., (2015) and Schultz et al., (2015) and conduct the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity on the governance, ownership structure, and control 
variables. The test statistic of 27.662 has 9 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.000, leading to 
reject the null hypothesis of exogenous regressions. This implies that the Pooled OLS and Fixed-
Effects FE specifications exogeneity assumptions are violated, meaning their parameter estimates 
are biased and inconsistent (Schultz et al., 2015). As a result, only Dynamic System GMM 
approach will be able to produce consistent estimates as they are robust to the presence of the three 
endogeneity issues mentioned above in the corporate governance–performance relation (Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Accordingly, the next subsections (7.3.1.2 and 7.3.1.3) present System GMM 
specifications tests and estimation results, assessing the relationship between internal (firm-level) 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using the combined sample of both 
capital markets. 
Table 7-6 The relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm's performance: evidence 
from the aggregate sample of Jordan and UAE 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [ln(Q)] 
Explanatory variables  
Pooled 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
Pooled 
Dynamic OLS 
Fixed-effects 
Dynamic Panel 
Dynamic 
SYS. GMM 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(z) 
LaglnQ NA 0.840*** 0.264*** 0.470*** 
 NA (38.223) (6.815) (3.392) 
FamOwn -0.033 0.148* 7.274*** 3.526*** 
 (-0.215) (1.667) (2.752) (2.782) 
InstOwn -0.303* 0.081 7.258*** 2.541** 
 (-1.865) (0.864) (2.843) (2.068) 
OwnTotal 0.711*** -0.068 7.698*** 3.079** 
 (4.694) (-0.769) (2.986) (2.166) 
lnBsize 0.014 -0.056 -0.298*** 0.294 
 (-0.234) (-1.590) (-3.503) (0.851) 
Bind 0.190** -0.002 -0.002 0.075 
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 (2.234) (-0.045) (-0.020) (0.133) 
Bdual 0.034 0.009 -0.046 -0.215 
 (1.007)  (0.407)  (-0.944) (-0.613) 
lnFsize 0.041*** 0.015*** 0.370*** 0.235** 
 (4.981) (2.925) (10.438) (2.223) 
Leverage 0.148** 0.075* -0.514*** -1.073** 
 (2.322) (1.918) (-3.500) (-2.384) 
lnFage 0.068*** -0.008 0.014 -0.032 
 (4.021) (-0.651) (0.183) (-0.351) 
Intercept -1.141*** -0.144 -5.565*** -4.856*** 
 (-6.406) (-1.235) (-7.752) (-3.019) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No 
Firm-fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1069 916 916 916 
R-squared 0.255 0.778 0.626  
F statistic 18.496*** 96.401*** 40.199***  
Wald Chi-squared statistic    132.040*** 
Number of instruments    44 
Number of clusters   153 153 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)    0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.245 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-
value)    0.173 
Note: This table reports empirical results from estimating Eq. (2). Specifically, column (2) reports the 
results obtained from pooled OLS method with clustering at the firm level. Column (3) presents the 
results obtained from dynamic OLS. Column (4) represent results obtained from fixed-effects (within-
groups estimator) method. And finally, Estimations gained form two-step system GMM approach are 
reported in column (5). Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5 % (**) and 1 %(***). The 
explanatory variables are as defined in Table 4-4. t-Statistics of OLS, dynamic OLS, and FE estimators 
are reported in parentheses and based on robust standard errors corrected for potential heteroscedasticity 
and time-series autocorrelation within each firm. z-Statistics of system GMM model are reported in 
parentheses and based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Year dummies and industry dummies 
are unreported. Year 2009 dropped in SYS GMM, year 2014 dropped in dynamic OLS and FE models. 
7.3.1.2 The Validity of the System GMM Estimation 
Before moving on to economic interpretations of the results which was obtained by applying 
the Dynamic System GMM estimator examining the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance variables and firm performance, which are reported in column (5) of Table 7-6 above, 
it’s very important to make sure that the assumptions lie behind this econometric approach are 
valid. According to Roodman, (2009a) the System GMM validity is crucial to the assumption that 
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the instruments are exogenous. Consequently, following Nguyen et al., (2015), I empirically check 
the validity of the system GMM estimator through the use of the Hansen-J test of over-
identification and Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. The Hansen J-
statistics reported in the last raw of Table 7-6 shows p-value of 0.173, indicating that the 
instruments as a (group) used in the System GMM estimator are valid and the moment conditions 
are well- specified for the System GMM specifications as long as the p-value lies on the threshold 
range (0.1-0.25) specified by (Roodman, 2009a, p. 129). 
Recent advances in corporate governance research also suggests to use other tests to examine 
the endogeneity of the regressors. Therefore, I follow Nguyen et al., (2015) and applied the 
Difference-in-Hansen of exogeneity of the instruments subsets and the standard instruments to 
ensure the validity of the System GMM instruments. The null hypothesis of the Difference-in 
Hansen test is that the specified variables are proper instruments, i.e. that the set of examined 
instruments is exogenous. As it can be seen in Table 7-7 below, I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity of any GMM-instruments used, i.e. levels and differenced instruments, as well as 
the validity of standard IV instruments, indicating that both the subset and standard instruments 
used in the Dynamic Two-Step System GMM model are econometrically exogenous. 
Additionally, Arellano & Bond, (1991) stated that the GMM estimator requires that there is 
first-order serial correlation AR(1) but that there is no second-order serial correlation AR(2) in the 
residuals. As reported in the bottom rows of Table 7-6, there is enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of the AR(1) but not the AR(2) test, which supports the validity of the model 
specifications (Schultz et al., 2010). Furthermore, Roodman, (2009a) suggests additional 
deduction of the dynamic panel estimates’ specification validity by checking if the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (laglnQ) lies between the values obtained from OLS 
and FE estimators, which is confirmed in the model (i.e., the following values are obtained: 
OLS=0.840> GMM=0.470> FE=0.264). Considering together the various diagnostic tests that 
have been conducted and reported in Table 7-6 and Table 7-7, respectively, there is enough 
evidence to confirm that, the empirical model satisfies the key validity assumptions of our 
Dynamic System GMM model in general, and hence, results can be officially reported in the next 
subsection. 
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Table 7-7 Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments subsets 
Tested instrument subsets Test statistics 
Degree of 
freedom 
P-Value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments    
All instruments for equation in levels 14.19 9 0.116 
lnQit−3 𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 lnQit−6 (for equation in differences) 7.26 4 0.123 
⧍lnQit−2 (for equation in levels) 0.90 1 0.343 
Instruments for ownership structure variables 11.84 12 0.107 
Instruments for board structure and control variables 22.45 20 0.117 
Panel B: Standard instruments    
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 year dummies, and 
lnFage 
9.66 6 0.140 
Note: This table represent Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of instrument subsets used in this 
research. GMM instrument subset used for the equation in levels includes two-year lagged differences 
of firm performance variable; four-year lagged differences of board structure, ownership structure, and 
other control variables. GMM instrument subset used for board structure variables includes four-year 
lagged differences and lags 4 in levels of board structure variables. GMM instrument subset used for 
ownership structure and the other control variables includes four-year lagged differences and lags 4 in 
levels of these variables. The subset of standard instruments for the equation in levels includes 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 year dummies, and lnFage. 2008 (constant), 2009-year dummy dropped due to 
collinearity. 
7.3.1.3 Empirical Evidence from the Dynamic Two-Step System GMM Estimator 
Given that the Dynamic Panel System GMM is the best estimation technique in this case and 
it is well-specified and confirmly-fitted, I examine Eq. (6) which is assessing the relationship 
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance by implementing the 
xtabond2 ‒producing Two-Step System GMM‒ user written command in Stata 14.2 (Roodman, 
2009a). The estimated model is for the period 2008-2014 and covers the aggregate sample of 
Jordan and UAE. The results using the Dynamic Two-Step System GMM with the Windmeijer, 
(2005) finite-sample correction were reported in column (5) of Table 7-6. 
The variables of interests in this context are the internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms 
variables (i.e., ownership structure and board of directors). Interestingly, in line with recent 
findings of Pham et al., (2011); Wintoki et al., (2012); Nguyen et al., (2015); and Akbar et al., 
(2016), I find that board of directors variables have no statistical effects on firm’s financial 
performance. These results show consistency with Hypothesis6 only, where assumed that there 
will be no effect of board independence on firm performance. Only ownership structure variables 
(i.e. identity (FamOwn and InstOwn) and concentration (OwnTotal)) have significant positive 
influence on firm performance (lnQ). This is in consistent with Hypothesis2 regarding the positive 
 164 
 
effect of institutional investors’ ownership and on firm performance. Moreover, these findings 
thus, support the theory of agency assumptions that ownership concentration appears to be an 
effective internal corporate governance strategy that helps to enhance firm performance, especially 
in emerging markets. Furthermore, the empirical evidence supports the substitution effect of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. Rediker & Seth, (1995), Misangyi & Acharya, (2014), 
and Desender et al., (2013) offer support for the view that the effectiveness of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms must be considered conditional on the ownership structure of the firm. 
For example, Desender et al., (2013) argues that ownership concentration and board composition 
become substitutes in terms of monitoring management and that the strength of this substitution 
effect depends on the type of controlling shareholder as well. Intuitively speaking, the higher the 
ownership concentration and the lower the board’s monitoring role. Under these perspectives, the 
substitution effect of the ownership structure in the sampled firms might be the reason that I could 
not find any link between board of directors’ variables and firm’s performance. 
I also followed Park & Jang, (2010) and check for the possibility that ownership structure-
financial performance relationship may be non-liner, by including a quadratic term of ownership 
concentration variable in Eq. (6). However, I find that the coefficient on the quadratic term of 
ownership concentration variable is insignificant regardless of the econometric approaches 
employed (i.e., OLS, FE, and/or System GMM). This implies that ownership structure does not 
follow the U-shaped pattern with regards to firm performance in Jordan and UAE. These results 
are similar to those obtained recently by Nguyen et al., (2015) and Wang & Shailer, (2015). In the 
next subsection, several additional tests were executed to check the robustness of the main results 
reported in Table 7-6 above. 
7.3.1.4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Main Findings 
As stated above, in this subsection I conducted few additional tests to verify the robustness 
of the main findings obtained in the previous subsections. First, I reduced the number of 
instrumented variables by dropping two governance indicators ‒board-duality and institutional 
ownership‒ (Bdual and InstOwn) from the model. It is highly that board duality (Bdual) as a factor 
variable may pose problems during estimation. Roodman, (2009a) argues that dummy variables 
that are high persistent across firms and may cause bias in the estimates’ parameters. I also 
removed institutional ownership (InstOwn) from the model to check if ownership structure-
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performance relationship would differ and change. Second, robustness checks were executed using 
two alternative accounting-based performance indicators i.e., ROA and ROE. The results obtained 
from the re-estimation using the Dynamic System GMM are provided below in Table 7-8. 
Column 2 of Table 7-8 reports result nearly similar to those obtained from the initial 
Dynamic System GMM model presented previously in Table 7-6. Only ownership structure 
(FamOwn) still has a positive and significant influence on financial performance (lnQ). Moreover, 
these results are consistent when employing alternative financial performance metrics such ROE 
reported in column 3 and ROA reported in column 4 in both cases. It is also worth noting that past 
performance is still significant in explaining firm’s current performance under the alternate 
performance metrics specifications (i.e. ROE and ROA). 
Table 7-8 Internal corporate governance and financial performance: reduced form of governance and 
alternate performance measure. 
Dependent variable: 
Model (1) 
LnQ 
Model (2) 
ROE 
Model (3) 
ROA 
(2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variable b/(z) b/(z) b/(z) 
L.Performance 0.579*** 0.657*** 0.445*** 
 (5.937) (6.466) (4.448) 
FamOwn 0.997*** 1.153*** 0.131* 
 (3.145) (2.904) (1.865) 
OwnTotal 0.825 1.232** 0.086 
 (1.607) (2.231) (0.919) 
lnBsize 0.096 0.383 -0.018 
 (0.292) (1.140) (-0.299) 
Bind -0.240 -0.537 -0.160 
 (-0.486) (-0.824) (-1.583) 
lnFsize 0.190** 0.146 0.035*** 
 (2.275) (1.589) (2.589) 
Leverage 0.919** 0.642* 0.029 
 (2.564) (1.660) (0.224) 
lnFage -0.049 -0.056 -0.002 
 (-0.894) (-0.767) (-0.230) 
Number of observations 916 916 916 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 156.039*** 134.008*** 80.200*** 
Number of instruments 42 41 40 
Number of clusters 153 153 153 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.196 0.139 0.869 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.102 0.252 0.114 
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Note: This table reports empirical results from estimating Eq. (6) through the use of alternate firm 
performance metrics and reduced form of governance variables (variables Bdual and InstOwn are 
excluded from the dataset) using system GMM approach. Columns (2) and (3) present the results of 
robustness checks with alternative proxies for performance, including ROE and ROA respectively.2010-
year dummy dropped in Model (2). In Model (3) further reduction of instrumental variables were applied 
by imposing restricted limits on firm performance variable to include two-lags only. The variables are as 
defined in Table 4-4. z-Statistics are reported in parentheses. Year dummies and intercepts are 
unreported. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5 %(**) and 1 %(***) respectively. 
 
7.3.2 The Effect of National (Country-level) Governance Quality on Firm 
Performance 
One of the main interests in this chapter is on the role of national governance quality ‒
external (country-level) governance mechanisms‒ in reducing the agency cost and hence, 
improving firm performance. Therefore, in Table 7-9 below the focus was on the National 
Governance Index (NGI) variable, and to examine its effect on firm performance using the 
combined sample of Jordan and the UAE. La Porta et al., (2002, p.1147) argued that “when their 
rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay more for ﬁnancial assets 
such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognise that, with better legal protection, 
more of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being 
expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the ﬁrm. By limiting expropriation, the law raises 
the price that securities fetch in the marketplace”. As a result, Hypothesis7 was formulated arguing 
that higher quality country-level governance mechanisms would results in greater firm 
performance. It should be noted that the empirical model presented in Table 7-9 below maintains, 
in addition to country-level governance mechanisms, the rest of firm-level governance and other 
specific characteristics discussed previously in Chapter 5 and 6. 
The empirical analysis presented in Table 7-9, started by regressing the traditional (firm-
level) governance mechanisms ‒ownership and board of directors’ structures‒ on firm 
performance. It is evidently seen from this table that, the relationship between firm-level 
governance mechanisms and firm performance has not changed in its directions and magnitudes 
from what presented in the previous chapters (Chapter 5 and 6). Ownership structure variables 
load with positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that, the presence of controlling 
shareholders with high concentrated stock-ownership is instrumental in reducing agency costs in 
firms operating in such weak legal environments i.e., Jordan and UAE. Moreover, board of 
directors’ structure variables ‒size, duality and independence‒ are still showing no significant 
 167 
 
implications on firm performance, suggesting that the presence of multiple controlling 
shareholders substitute the monitoring role of the boards in this case. These results still indicate 
support for Hypothesis2  and Hypothesis6. 
Next, in order to examine the effect of national (country-level) governance quality on firm 
performance, country-dummy variable was added to initially account for country-specific 
characteristic. Unlike firm-level governance mechanisms, National Governance variables are 
assumed to be exogenous to the choices made by firms (Nguyen et al., 2015) and Aslan & Kumar, 
2014). Specifically, I run Eq. (7) in the Two-Step Dynamic System GMM estimator, and report 
the results in Table 7-9 below. First of all, it is found that the coefficient on country-dummy 
variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, results show that the coefficient of 
the national governance variable (NGI) is positive and significant at a 10% level. Accordingly, this 
suggests that not only firm-level governance mechanisms are instrumental in solving agency 
problems, but also the institutional framework and the external governance mechanisms are 
instrumental in reducing firm’s agency problems, and hence, increasing its performance (lnQ). 
This evidence is in line with the previously-stated hypothesis ‒Hypothesis7‒ regarding the 
positive impact of national governance index on firm performance, and in line with recent 
empirical evidence provided by Nguyen et al., (2015). These results can be also justified, according 
to the existing literature, that good national governance is likely to encourage low-risk investments 
which in terms result in better profitability and lower performance variability of firms (Ngobo & 
Fouda, 2012). Moreover, the effective legal institutions may also reduce the risk premium 
demanded by investors, and hence firms’ cost of capital (Hail & Leuz, 2006). 
Regarding the control variables, results reported in Table 7-9 below show that firm size (lnFsize) 
and financial leverage (leverage) have positive coefficients and significant relationship with firm 
performance (lnQ) at a 1% level. These results are similar to those obtained in Chapter 5 on the 
Jordanian market. However, it should be noted that for the UAE’s dataset, results reported 
previously in Table 6-4 show that only firm size (lnFsize) and firm age (lnFage) have significant 
positive relationship with firm performance. These results, perhaps, suggest that when the external 
governance mechanisms are active, internal governance mechanisms i.e., leverage become less 
efficient in aligning interests and reducing the agency problems. The next subsection (7.3.2.1), 
discusses the robustness checks and the sensitivity of the main findings presented earlier to 
alternative national (country-level) governance variables. 
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Table 7-9 The relationship between governance variables (internal and external) and firm performance 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnQ] 
 NGI 
 (2) (3) 
Explanatory variables   b (z) 
LaglnQ 0.438*** (3.449) 
FamOwn 3.937*** (2.723) 
InstOwn 3.628*** (2.742) 
OwnTotal 3.762** (2.449) 
lnBsize -0.096 (-0.306) 
Bind 0.249 (0.479) 
Bdual -0.252 (-0.667) 
lnFsize 0.297*** (3.379) 
Leverage 1.116*** (3.043) 
lnFage -0.022 (-0.324) 
NGI 0.066* (1.91) 
Number of observations 916 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 217.7*** 
Number of instruments 43 
Number of clusters 153 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.374 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.292 
Note: This table reports empirical results from estimating Eq. (7), testing the relationship between 
governance variables (internal and external) and firm performance using the combined sample of Jordan 
and the UAE through System GMM approach. Variables are as reported and defined in Table 4-4 
previously. Year dummies, country dummies, and the intercepts are unreported. 2009-year dummy 
dropped due to collinearity. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5 % (**) and 1 % (***). 
7.3.2.1 Robustness Analysis 
This subsection presents the robustness checks and the sensitivity of the main findings to 
alternative national (country-level) governance indicators i.e., NGI(a) and Investor Protection 
Index IPI. In particular, the national governance variable NGI, was replaced by NGI(a) and IPI 
respectively, and the Eq. (7) was empirically examined though the Dynamic System GMM. 
Accordingly, the empirical results are reported in Table 7-10 below. 
First of all, results obtained in Table 7-10 suggest that, the relationship between internal 
firm-level governance mechanisms and firm performance remain unabated. Ownership structure 
variables are still holding a significant positive relationship with firm performance, while other 
governance mechanisms i.e., board of directors’ variables still have no significant impact on firm 
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performance in general. Other control variables i.e., firm size (lnFsize) and financial leverage 
(leverage) still have significant positive relationship with firm performance across the two models 
of NGI(a) and IPI. 
Moreover, it is found that the estimated coefficients of the alternative national governance 
variables NGI(a) and IPI are qualitatively similar in both direction and magnitude to those obtained 
previously in Table 7-9. Specifically, column 2 and 3 presents significant effect of alternative 
national governance indicator (NGI(a)) which has been derived from (NGI) using factor analysis 
method. Column 4 and 5 present significant positive effect of investor protection index (IPI) is on 
firm’s financial performance (𝛽 = 1.334). Thus, provides support for the Hypothesis7. Moreover, 
these results are in line with La Porta et al., (2002) who provides evidence that firms in countries 
with stronger investor protection and more effective legal systems enjoy higher equity valuations. 
Similarly, Lskavyan & Spatareanu, (2011) argue that a country’s higher legal shareholder 
protection may reduce monitoring costs and, hence, reduce firm’s agency cost. 
Table 7-10 Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis of the main findings to alternative national 
governance indicators 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnQ] 
 NGI(a) IPI 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Explanatory variables   b (z)  b (z) 
LaglnQ 0.438*** (3.444) 0.357*** (2.694) 
FamOwn 3.922*** (2.679) 4.478*** (3.09) 
InstOwn 3.627*** (2.715) 4.119*** (3.064) 
OwnTotal 3.766** (2.416) 4.478*** (2.812) 
lnBsize -0.101 (-0.321) -0.132 (-0.412) 
Bind 0.245 (0.477) 0.067 (0.123) 
Bdual -0.253 (-0.671) -0.268 (-0.697) 
lnFsize 0.294*** (3.314) 0.357*** (3.751) 
Leverage 1.115*** (3.034) 1.145*** (2.832) 
lnFage -0.021 (-0.326) -0.024 (-0.295) 
NGI(a) 0.029* (1.907)   
IPI   1.334*** (4.246) 
Number of observations 916  916 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 222.3***  178.3*** 
Number of instruments 44  43 
Number of clusters 153  153 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.002  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.371  0.459 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.297   0.133 
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Note: This table reports empirical results from re-estimating Eq. (7) using alternative national governance 
indicators through the use of System GMM approach. Columns (2 and 3) present the results of robustness 
checks with alternative proxies for national governance quality, mainly, NGI(a). Columns (3 and 4) 
present the results of robustness checks with alternative national governance quality variable (investors 
protection index IPI). Variables are as reported in Table 4-4. Year-dummies, country dummies, and the 
intercepts are unreported. 2014-year dummy dropped in IPI model due to collinearity. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*) 5 % (**) and 1 % (***). 
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
As noted earlier, prior corporate governance literature has paid extensive attention to firm-
level governance mechanisms and ignored the importance of the country-level governance 
instruments in reducing agency problems, and increasing firm performance (Nguyen et al., 2015). 
Therefore, this chapter examines the effect of governance variables (both internal and external) on 
firm performance using the combined dataset of Jordan and UAE as a form of emerging markets 
of the MENA region. The univariate analysis executed in Table 7-5 suggests that most of the 
internal (firm-level) governance indicators have significant correlations with firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q ratio. However, once the endogeneity issues controlled via the use of the 
Dynamic System GMM, only ownership structure seems to have significant impact on firm 
performance. Specifically, it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between 
family ownership, institutional ownership, ownership concentration and firm performance, 
showing consistency with Hypothesis2 which argued that higher institutional ownership is 
associated with higher firm performance. 
These results reflect new empirical evidence in the Jordanian and UAE’s capital markets of 
the MENA region. The results imply that a firm ownership structure is the most important element 
in interpreting the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
Moreover, it is found that a firm’s financial performance is positively dependent on country’s 
national governance quality. The three national governance indicators (NGI, NGI (a), and IPI) 
seem to have significant positive impact on firm performance in both capital markets. This implies 
that, the higher the national governance quality levels, the higher the firm financial performance. 
This is consistent with prior law-and-finance work i.e., La Porta et al., (2002), Shleifer & Vishny, 
(2002) among others. Moreover, supporting these arguments, Nguyen et al., (2015) provided 
empirical evidence suggesting that national (country-level) governance quality has a positive 
impact on firm performance. Accordingly, these country- and firm-level governance factors may 
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construct the optimal governance bundle in interpreting the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in Jordan and UAE’s capital markets. 
Moreover, it is found that, the relationship between internal governance indicators i.e., 
ownership concentration variables and firm performance is significantly stronger in Jordan where 
national governance quality is poor. This implies that the relationship between internal (firm-level) 
governance mechanisms is dependent on the country’s institutional environment. Thus, it supports 
the arguments of the substitute effect between the internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) 
governance mechanisms. 
Regarding other firm-level corporate governance mechanisms i.e., board of director’s 
structure, empirical results show that, unlike the majority of prior governance literature, it is found 
that board of directors’ variables i.e., board size, board duality, and board independence do not 
have any effects on firm performance in Jordan and UAE’s capital markets, showing consistency 
with Hypothesis6. It should be noted that these results are similar to those results obtained recently 
by (Wintoki et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Pham et al., 2011). Moreover, the compliance with 
the corporate governance code recommendation regarding – the existence of independent board 
members and splitting the roles of chairman and the CEO in Jordan – has no implications in solving 
the agency problem in general, and enhancing firm performance specifically in the Jordanian 
market. These results support the substitute arguments between the internal (firm-level) 
governance mechanisms i.e., ownership structure and firm performance. 
The results reflect a new contribution which  is consistent with the recent international 
conclusions that ownership structure (concentration) in the company is more important than board 
of directors in reducing the problem of agency in emerging markets. Dyck & Zingales, (2004) note 
that controlling shareholder’s private benefits such as prestige and reputation do not always reduce 
firm value. As noted earlier, it has been also concluded that the role of ownership structure in 
enhancing firm performance is clear and more effective (stronger) in an environment characterised 
by weak legal and less national governance quality (i.e. Jordan). 
All in all, the results reflect the importance of both firm’s ownership structure and country’s 
national governance quality in mitigating the agency problem, and as a result, enhancing firm 
performance in Jordan and UAE as a form of the emerging markets of the MENA region in general. 
These results are consistent with the agency and institutional theoretical assumptions only, among 
other corporate governance theories i.e., stewardship or resource dependency. Table 7-11 below 
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provides summary of the main empirical findings on the relationship between country- and firm-
level corporate governance variables and firm performance examinations executed in this thesis 
as compared to the previously-stated hypotheses. 
Table 7-11 A summary of the empirical findings of the relationship between governance variables and 
firm performance 
Hypotheses  Tested relationship  Expected sign   Empirical sign 
Ownership Structure  
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟏 Family ownership-firm performance  - + 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟐 
Institutional ownership-firm 
performance  
+ + 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟑 
Ownership concentration-firm 
performance 
- 
 
+ 
Board of directors’ structure  
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟒 Board size-firm performance  - Ø 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟓 Board duality-firm performance  - Ø 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟔 Board independence-firm performance  Ø Ø 
National governance quality 
𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝟕 
National governance quality-firm 
performance  
+ 
 
+ 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and (Ø) represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. 
This table formulated based on results reported previously in Table 7-9. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis presents a summary of the empirical findings obtained in 
Chapter 5; Chapter 6; and Chapter 7, respectively, regarding the relationship between country- 
and firm-level governance variables and firm performance in nonfinancial listed firms in Jordan 
and UAE as form of small emerging markets. Accordingly, the first point of Chapter 8 shows 
discussions and conclusions on main findings reported in the previous part of this thesis 
(empirical analysis). The chapter then proceeds to explain the research contribution and 
implications concerning the relationship between internal (firm-level) governance and firm 
performance and the relationship between national governance (country-level) quality and firm 
performance in these two emerging markets of the MENA region. The chapter also presents 
limitations and directions for potential future research. 
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CHAPTER 8: RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The review of extant literature discussed in Chapter 3, leads to identify three major gaps in 
corporate governance research relating to the relationship between governance and firm 
performance in general. Firstly, said prior literature fails to explore how the simultaneous 
applications of the major governance theories i.e., agency, stewardship, resource dependency, and 
institutional theories combine to explain this relationship. Secondly, prior governance literature 
tended to ignore the important role of the national governance quality (country-level) in mitigating 
agency conflicts, and hence, determining firm performance. Finally, it also has failed to impose 
best endogeneity issue controls on its empirical analysis, and hence, leading to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates that question the validity and reliability of the findings. This large 
literature lacks the ability to generalise the empirical evidence, and fails to conclude whether 
governance variables have positive or negative impact on firm performance if the inference of this 
relationship exists. Therefore, in this thesis, the aim was mainly at addressing these identified gaps, 
and further advance the academic understandings and improve the corporate governance practices 
and policy recommendations. 
This chapter provides a summary of the empirical findings reported in chapter 5, 6 and 7 
respectively, regarding the relationship between a suite of corporate governance ‒internal and 
external‒ variables and firm performance of the nonfinancial firms listed in Jordan and in the 
UAE’s capital markets. The remained of this chapter is organised as following; general discussion 
and conclusions are reported in section 8.2. Relevant research contributions are reported in section 
8.3. Section 8.4 summarise relevant implications for policy makers at both i.e., country- and firm- 
level. Limitations and future research recommendations are reported in sections 8.5 and 8.6 
respectively. Finally, this chapter ended up by summary. 
8.2 Discussion and Conclusion 
One objective of this study was to determine the impact of six (firm-level) governance 
indicators ‒family ownership, institutional ownership, ownership concentration, board size, 
board-duality and board independence‒ on firm performance. Moreover, this study was motivated 
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by the recent calls for additional research on the national governance effects on firm performance, 
especially in emerging markets where internal firm-level governance activities are characterised 
by the presence of dominant majority shareholders. Using a panel dataset of (153) nonfinancial 
firms listed in two-emerging markets in the MENA region ‒Jordan and UAE, this research 
provides evidence that corporate governance in these two capital markets is characterised by the 
presence of multiple large (controlling) shareholders. Moreover, these shareholders are critical 
determinants of firm performance in both capital markets. 
On the other hand, results revealed by the Two-Steps Dynamic System GMM suggest that 
board of directors’ variables ‒size, duality and independence‒ are not efficient monitoring 
governance mechanisms when the presence of multiple blockholders is predominant. Moreover, 
consistent with prior literature i.e., La Porta et al., (2002) that weak external governance levels 
negatively affect firm performance. However, as noted earlier, the presence of strong multiple 
blockholders is likely to mitigate the weakness of the national governance environment i.e., 
Jordanian case. These results are consistent with two main governance theories, mainly; agency 
and institutions. Accordingly, this study fails to find any implications for the other utilised ‒in 
hypotheses development‒ theories i.e., stewardship and resource dependency theories on the 
Jordanian and the UAE’s capital markets. Hence, only agency and institutional theories are 
relevant in explaining corporate governance issues in small emerging markets. 
Moreover, the review of prior literature discussed in section Error! Reference source not 
found. of Chapter 3, shows that it is necessary to include the national governance quality context 
when examining the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
The effect of national governance quality is directly related to the institutional theory. Thus, this 
research accounts for these national governance indicators in the empirical model, and find that 
firm performance is positively linked to the quality of the national governance of the country that 
these firms are embedded in. 
It is worth noting that the relationship between internal governance mechanisms i.e., 
ownership concentration, and firm performance seems to be stronger in firms operating within a 
weak national governance environment i.e. Jordan. A something consistent with prior literature. 
La porta et al., (1998) provide evidence that internal corporate governance i.e., ownership 
concentration is actively developed in emerging markets to substitute for poor investors protection 
and other market instruments. 
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As illustrated in Table 5-4 and Table 6-4 in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively, the 
relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance might be different 
across countries. Specifically, the performance of the firms is less affected by the internal 
governance mechanisms in a context of strong national governance indicators i.e., UAE. 
Furthermore, it seems that only ownership structure matter across emerging markets when it comes 
to the relationship between internal governance and firm performance. Thus, any 
recommendations should be directed to the importance of such blockholders that are efficiently 
able to impose vigilant monitoring activities on firm’s agents, especially in countries characterised 
by absence of market for corporate control and weak national governance indicators in general. 
Next subsection proceeds to explain research contributions and significance. 
8.3 Research Contributions 
This research has several theoretical and practical contributions. As noted earlier in section 
1.4 of Chapter 1, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this research is among the first 
empirical researches to examine the impact of governance variables on firm performance 
(including national governance quality indicators) in Jordan and in the UAE as a form of the 
MENA region emerging market context, using dynamic framework. Moreover, this research is 
among the firsts to consider the research questions based on the simultaneous considerations posed 
by the main governance theories. Specifically, this research makes three contributions to the 
theoretical understandings of the relationship between governance variables and firm performance 
in small emerging markets’ context. 
First, prior corporate governance research has explored this contextual relationship using 
one theoretical lens, mainly and exclusively, the (agency theory). Or even using separate other 
theoretical viewpoints (i.e. stewardship, stakeholder or resource dependency). This research 
therefore, has collectively provide broader theoretical explanations of the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in general. Specifically, this research adds to the 
existing literature by providing empirical evidence showing that firm performance and the extent 
that internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms are dependent on the country’s national 
governance system quality. Thus, this research suggests that only agency theory and institutional 
theory are the most relevant in explaining governance issues in small emerging countries like 
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Jordan and the UAE, where ownership concentration and the presence of multiple large controlling 
blockholders is predominant. 
Second, recent advances in corporate governance research highlight the difficulties in testing 
governance-performance relationship due to the potential of multiple endogeneity sources which 
may leads to severe econometric issues. As stated earlier, Wintoki et al., (2012) identify three 
endogeneity problems that a one should account for when modelling the relationship between 
governance and firm performance, otherwise, the estimations can be biased. These issues are (i) 
simultaneity (where the flow of causality is not purely from the independent variables to the 
dependent variable, or corporate governance structure and its financial performance are 
simultaneously determined), (ii) dynamic endogeneity (when a firm’s governance structure is a 
results of its past financial performance), and (iii) unobservable heterogeneity (when the model is 
miss-specified and unobservable firm characteristics that may have direct impact on its 
performance are unaccounted). 
Accordingly, this thesis tended to overcome this issue by adopting a comprehensive 
empirical model using a suite of internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms which accounts for 
firm’s ownership structure and board of directors, and estimate the relation using different 
econometric estimators. More specifically, following Schultz et al., (2010); Nguyen et al., (2015); 
and Schultz et al., (2015), the empirical analysis started with a baseline estimation using a pooled 
OLS technique. Then moved to dynamic OLS which uncovers any relations, and then apply 
dynamic FE estimators and find casual relation between the variables of interests. However, it 
should be noted that OLS specifications is structured on an assumption of strict exogeneity, 
furthermore, the fixed-effect FE estimator only account for unobservable heterogeneity and unable 
to account for the other two potential source of endogeneity. Thus, drawing inference on these 
results seems to be impossible in the presence of the three endogeneity issues. 
In light of this, the empirical analysis depends on Dynamic System GMM which is robust 
estimate for the three endogeneity issues discussed previously that may affect the relation between 
firm’s internal governance and its financial performance. Consistent with recent advances in 
corporate governance research, it has been found that firm performance is path-dependent and past 
firm performance is positively correlated with current levels of performance. Thus, once 
endogeneity is controlled for, it is found that only firm’s ownership structure (identity and 
concentration) has significant positive impact on financial performance. Sensitivity analysis 
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confirm the results are not only robust to reduced form of governance variables but also to the use 
of alternate financial performance metrics. This research highlight the crucial requests for 
addressing endogeneity when modelling governance-performance relationship, indicating that 
most of prior governance research has swamped with spurious correlations. Thus, this research 
reflects a new contribution that the most important board of directors’ variable (size, duality and 
independence) that usually referred in prior literature have no significant impact on firm 
performance. 
Third, this research adds another new contribution to the literature of governance and firm 
performance, which is that a country’s national governance quality variables (i.e. NGI, NGI (a) 
and IPI) can predict firm performance. In a second stage of this analysis, the Dynamic System 
GMM was adopted to generate robust estimates of the relationship between a suite of governance 
(country- and firm-level) mechanisms and firm’s financial performance. It has been found that 
better external (country-level) governance plays a positive role in determining firm’s financial 
performance in these emerging markets (Jordan and UAE). Also, it should be noted that, the 
relationship between internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms and financial performance 
remain significant. Only ownership structure is positively associated with firm’s financial 
performance. In summary, the results suggest that the financial health of a firm in such small 
emerging markets depend on the quality of the national governance system of the hosting country 
and on the firm’s ownership structure only when it comes to governance perspectives. 
8.4 Research Implications 
The findings reported in this study have several important implications. First of all, in 
countries where institutional context is less developed i.e., Jordan, a firm-level policy may aim at 
promoting the ownership structure ‒ownership concentration‒ to improve the internal governance 
practices in publicly-traded firms and hence, increase its performance. Apart from this, publicly-
traded firms in Jordan may benefit from attracting active types of large shareholders like 
institutional (i.e., pension and mutual funds, banks and other large financial institutions) and 
family investors. These types of investors seem to have the ability in protecting minority 
shareholder interests, by maintaining a balance of power between the firm’s controller and hence, 
promoting higher firm performance indicators. However, it is found that the type of the controlling 
shareholders has no significant implications on publicly-traded firms in the UAE capital market. 
 178 
 
These results have been justified by the activity status of the controlling shareholder i.e., ‘pressure 
sensitive’ and ‘pressure resistant’ owners, as stated in subsection 6.3.3 in chapter 6 previously. 
Noticeably, it is found that board of directors’ variables ‒size, duality and independence‒ 
have no significant effects on nonfinancial publicly-traded firms in both capital markets. This is 
in line with recent findings provided by Nguyen et al., (2015), Wintoki et al., (2012) among others. 
These results are consistent with the argument that the presence of strong controlling shareholders 
‒ownership concentration‒ can substitute for other internal governance mechanisms i.e. board of 
directors’ variables. These findings are robust after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, 
simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity inherent in corporate governance 
research. Thus, a conclusion can be drawn confidently, that these results are not driven by such 
endogeneity and econometrics issues. 
In addition to the aforementioned points, there are few other important implications for 
policy formulation. All companies listed and incorporated in Jordan and UAE capital markets must 
take in their accounts the below points: 
Ownership structure–this research concludes that only ownership structure (share-identity 
and concentration) among other internal governance variables has significant positive impact on 
firm performance. When considering these outcomes in conjunctions with the conclusions reached 
in prior literature regarding “entrenchment” and “private benefits” (i.e., controlling shareholder 
may exacerbate the conflict and extract private benefits that eventually leads to deteriorate firm 
performance), the author recommend that ownership structure is an important governance element 
for firms in small emerging markets such as Jordan and the UAE. Specifically, to consider how 
different types of blockholders may create incentives rather than misalignments, and substitute the 
weak legal environment that firms are embedded in. 
Board of directors – in light of the findings of this research and the subsequent theoretical 
and empirical debate that have been generated, the author recommends that guidelines must move 
beyond board characteristics (i.e. size, duality and independence) and instead seeks more practical 
approach (i.e. ownership structure) that reduce the agency problem and align principals and agents’ 
interests towards shareholders’ wealth maximization (firm performance). 
Country’s national governance -in light of the findings of this research and the subsequent 
theoretical and empirical debate that have been generated, it is highly recommended that policy 
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makers and regulatory legislators emphasize more efforts in enhancing the national governance 
system as it seems to have direct positive impact on firm performance in general. 
Special recommendations- the Jordan Security Commission and the UAE’s Securities and 
Commodities Authority must promote confidence in corporate governance reporting, especially, 
issues related to ownership structure. The corporate governance codes issued by these two 
independent governance regulators in these two countries have not stated any minimum or 
maximum ratios of ownership. Since the results in this research shows that the higher ratios of 
ownership by families (or individuals) or institutional investors are associated with higher firm 
performance. Furthermore, the results suggest that investors must consider the differences in a 
country’s national governance systems. National governance quality indicators seem to have 
significant positive impact on firm performance in general. Finally, the best bundle of governance 
variables can be a combination of internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) indicators when 
explaining the relationship between governance and firm performance. 
8.5 Research Limitations 
Despite the considerable efforts paid in this research in order to achieve its aims, meet the 
research objectives and ensure the robustness of this study’s results, and to guarantee the 
contribution in developing the theoretical and practical debate, few limitations might be considered 
in this context. 
First, the set of corporate governance variables, for example, are exclusively related to those 
that can be practically measured but does not include those governance provisions where 
information is not observable. It’s also important to mention that I only account for board size, 
independence, and duality to capture the effect of board of directors on firm performance, while 
there are other characteristics a one may consider i.e. board committee, gender diversity, and/or 
board’s remuneration), inclusion of further information about those dimensions would certainly 
add more insights. 
Second, this research includes only nonfinancial firms in the empirical analysis, while it 
excludes the banks and other financial firms based on their different governance and individual 
characteristics. Examining the extent to which governance affect firm performance in the financial 
firms’ context may provide more new details and may add new trends in this relationship as banks 
and other financial institutions are usually excluded in governance research. 
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Third, as noted previously, this research uses only measures of corporate governance that 
are published on firm’s annual reports. Thus, any other measures of corporate governance that 
were not available on the company’s annual reports were not been used. For example, due to time 
limits, I did not use CEO tenure or other non-financial motivation of the agents that needs more in 
depth search and subsequent interview or questionnaire work. 
Fourth, this study provides evidence based on data from only two small emerging markets 
of the MENA region‒Jordan and the UAE. Despite that, to some extent, the results can be 
generalised to markets that share the same characteristics in the region, future studies dealing with 
corporate governance-performance relation should cover more areas and capital markets, 
especially, those who’s looking at the national governance quality impact on firm performance. 
Collecting firm-level governance characteristics in the emerging markets of the MENA region is 
time-consuming process, especially with the absence of databases that covers firm’s corporate 
governance and ownership structure characteristics of the MENA region. Such a research design 
may provide additional insights to the under covered governance-performance research. 
Finally, in terms of estimation method, it should be noted that system GMM may has some 
limitations. First, as noted in the data analysis chapters, the validity of system GMM depends on 
the number of instruments used in the model, therefore, the number of instruments must be reduced 
to obtain robust estimations (Roodman, 2009b). Second, system GMM report two-step standard 
error, which systematically underestimate the real standard deviation of the estimates (Blundell et 
al, 2000). Moreover, Bun & Windmeijer, (2009, p. 1) argue that “the covariance stationary panel 
data AR(1) model the expected values of the concentration parameters in the differenced and levels 
equations for the cross-section at time t are the same when the variances of the individual 
heterogeneity and idiosyncratic errors are the same, which in terms indicates a weak instrument 
problem also for the equation in levels”. However, it should be noted that these limitations have 
been considered in the empirical analysis chapters of this research. 
8.6 Future Research Recommendations 
This research is carried out to examine the impact of governance variables on firm 
performance. Thus, future research should consider the limitations discussed in section 8.5 above, 
and use the outcomes of this study as the following: 
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First of all, as noted earlier that this research use nonfinancial listed firms as population to 
examine the relationship between governance variables and firm performance. Future research 
should therefore seek to examine this relationship within the context of listed banks and other 
financial institutions, especially, after the conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
(2011) who stated that big banks and financial institutions in the US market suffered from a 
systematic breakdown of the corporate governance system that eventually lead to the financial 
crisis (2007/2008). 
Second, this thesis has identified a suit of internal corporate governance mechanisms (mainly 
six governance indicators) through which to observe the effect of governance variables on firm 
performance. Thus, future research is recommended to seek and identify further governance 
indicators that could be used to examine the relationship between governance variables and firm 
performance. In doing so, this expected to progressively increase the extent to which the corporate 
governance dynamics affect firm performance is fully understood. 
Third, the empirical analysis executed in subsection 7.3.1.4 and 6.3.3 of Chapter 7 and 6 
respectively, suggest that there might be some differences in the effect of corporate governance 
variables on firm performance between countries. In this research, I mainly depend on data 
extracted from two countries of the MENA region (Jordan and UAE) as a platform to conduct this 
analysis. Accordingly, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
examination reveals that ownership concentration and share-ownership identity are both positive 
determinants of firm performance in Jordan. While only ownership concentration has significant 
positive effect on firm performance in UAE. Future research therefore, should study the country 
effect on the relationship between governance and firm performance, or consider more markets’ 
data in their empirical analysis. 
Fourth, this research has further examine the direct impact of the national governance quality 
on firm performance, however, in light of the conclusions that the country’s regulatory framework 
and environment has significant positive impact on firm performance, it is suggested that future 
research needs to shed the light and track the important interaction between national governance 
variables (country-level) and internal corporate governance variables (firm-level) and how this 
interaction affect firm performance eventually. 
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8.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes the research with a summary of empirical findings, contributions, 
and implications. Given the limitations of this research, it provides recommendations for future 
research venues. The main interest of this research is twofold; (i) whether the relationship between 
internal (firm-level) governance mechanisms and firm performance of listed nonfinancial firms in 
Jordan and in the UAE, exists as small emerging markets of the MENA region, characterised by 
the presence of high share-ownership concentration levels; and (ii) whether the national (country-
level) governance mechanisms directly affect firm performance in these two markets. 
Accordingly, using a panel dataset of 1069 firm-year observations from the two countries, 
this thesis examines the relationship between internal and external governance mechanisms and 
firm performance, by applying the Dynamic System GMM as main econometric data analysis 
technique. The empirical analysis reveal that; (i) ownership concentration variables ‒family 
ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration‒ have significant positive impact 
on firm performance among other governance variables i.e., board of directors’ variables; and (ii) 
national governance quality indicators ‒world governance indicators and investors protection 
index‒are associated with higher firm performance. The findings of this research provide useful 
significant evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
MENA region ‒a subject matter that has not been covered by prior corporate governance literature. 
Therefore, these significant conclusions provide new dimensions on this relationship, and provide 
starting point for much of future related studies.
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Appendix 1 
Data Normality Tests 
Table A1-1 
Shapiro-Wilk test of UAE’s data normality  
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Q 279 0.833 31.644 8.056 0.000 
Bsize 279 0.951 9.293 5.199 0.000 
Bind 279 0.952 9.034 5.133 0.000 
FamOwn 279 0.905 18.008 6.741 0.000 
InstOwn 279 0.956 8.352 4.950 0.000 
OwnTotal 279 0.942 10.936 5.578 0.000 
lnFsize 279 0.970 5.714 4.064 0.000 
Fage 279 0.932 12.942 5.971 0.000 
Leverage 279 0.967 6.302 4.293 0.000 
Note: This table represent Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the UAE’s data (dependent and independent 
variables). Data in this table are raw data except where it is specified as “ln”. Data reported under “W” 
are the Shapiro-Wilk test statistics. The “V” values are indexes for to which extent data are departure 
from normality. The median values of V indexes are 1 for samples from normal populations. This implies 
that large values indicate data nonnormality. Based on this results, we cannot accept the null hypothesis 
that data is normally distributed. Variables are as defined in Table 4-4. 
 
Table A1-2 
Shapiro-Wilk test of Jordan’s data normality  
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Q 790 0.826 87.063 10.945 0.000 
Bsize 790 0.991 4.540 3.707 0.000 
Bind 790 0.981 9.671 5.560 0.000 
FamOwn 790 0.897 51.693 9.667 0.000 
InstOwn 790 0.978 11.000 5.876 0.000 
OwnTotal 790 0.969 15.700 6.747 0.000 
lnFsize 790 0.974 12.794 6.246 0.000 
leverage  790 0.904 47.933 9.482 0.000 
Fage 790 0.896 52.042 9.684 0.000 
Note: This table represent Normality test of Jordan’s data (dependent and independent variables) 
using Shapiro-Wilk test. Data in this table are raw data except where it is specified as “ln”. Data 
reported under “W” are the Shapiro-Wilk test statistics. The “V” values are indexes for to which 
extent data are departure from normality. The median values of V indexes are 1 for samples from 
normal populations. This implies that large values indicate data nonnormality. Based on this results, 
we cannot accept the null hypothesis that data is normally distributed. Variables are as defined in 
Table 4-4. 
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Table A1-3 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of Q across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 1.183 0.617 279 
Jordan 1.242 0.634 790 
Total 1.227 0.630 1069 
      
W0= 0.16872142 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F=0.681336 
W50= 0.04317418 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F=0.835439 
W10= 0.07259195 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F=0.787653 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Tobin’s Q Ratio in its raw form. Tobin’s Q ratio is as defined 
in Table 4-4. In this context, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the group (Tobin’s Q) variances 
are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is less than the critical value. 
 
Table A1-4 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of Bosize across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 8.091 2.071 279 
Jordan 8.245 2.381 790 
Total 8.207 2.307 1069 
      
W0   = 11.957 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W50 = 12.804 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W10 = 12.990 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Board Size variable in its raw form. Board size variable is as 
defined in Table 4-4. In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group (Board size) variances 
are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than the critical value. 
 
Table A1-5 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of Bind across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 0.694 0.186 279 
Jordan 0.567 0.159 790 
Total 0.599 0.175 1069 
      
W0   = 13.797 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W50 = 11.367 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W10 = 11.862 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
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Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Board Independence variable in its raw form. Board independence 
variable is as defined in Table 4-4.  In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group (Board 
Independence) variances are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than the critical 
value. 
 
Table A1-6 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of FamOwn across samples.  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 0.141 0.184 279 
Jordan 0.236 0.270 790 
Total 0.212 0.255 1069 
      
W0   = 50.206 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W50 = 22.918 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W10 = 30.011 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Family Ownership variable in its raw form. Family ownership 
is as defined in Table 4-4. In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group (Family 
Ownership) variances are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than the critical 
value. 
 
Table A1-7 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of InstOwn across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 0.306 0.211 279 
Jordan 0.355 0.267 790 
Total 0.343 0.255 1069 
      
W0   =  30.678 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W50 =  30.860 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
W10 =  28.742 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.000 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Institutional Ownership variable in its raw form. Institutional 
ownership is as defined in Table 4-4. In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group 
(Institutional Ownership) variances are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than 
the critical value. 
 
Table A1-8 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of OwnTotal across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 0.537 0.199 279 
Jordan 0.603 0.230 790 
Total 0.586 0.224 1069 
      
W0   =  4.506 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.033 
W50 =  5.575 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.018 
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W10 =  4.977 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.025 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Ownership Concentration variable in its raw form. Ownership 
concentration is as defined in Table 4-4. In this context, wereject the null hypothesis that the group 
(Ownership Concentration) variances are equal at .05 significance, since the value of the Levene test 
statistic is greater than the critical value. 
 
Table A1-9 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of Fage across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 24.419 12.978 279 
Jordan 21.171 15.546 790 
Total 21.992 14.999 1069 
      
W0   =  0.362 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.547 
W50 =  0.026 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.870 
W10 =  0.046 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.828 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Firm Age variable in its raw form. In this context, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the group (Firm Age) variances are equal, since the value of the Levene test 
statistic is greater than the critical value. Firm age is as defined in Table 4-4. 
 
Table A1-10 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of leverage 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 0.382 0.211 279 
Jordan 0.346 0.249 790 
Total 0.355 0.240 1069 
      
W0   =   2.033 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.154 
W50 =  1.231 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.267 
W10 =  1.292 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.255 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the financial leverage variable in its raw form. Financial leverage is 
as defined in Table 4-4. In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group (financial leverage) 
variances are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than the critical value. 
 
Table A1-11 
Levene's robust test for equality of variances of lnFsize across samples. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
UAE 19.634 1.438 279 
Jordan 16.902 1.524 790 
Total 17.592 1.914 1069 
      
W0   =  2.204 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.137 
W50 =  2.081 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.149 
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W10 =  2.099 df(1, 1035)   Pr>F = 0.147 
Note: This table represent testing the homogeneity of variances assumption across samples (UAE and 
Jordan) using the Levene’s test for the Firm Size variable in its transformed form (ln). Firm size is as 
defined in Table 4-4. In this context, we reject the null hypothesis that the group (Firm size) variances 
are equal, since the value of the Levene test statistic is greater than the critical value. 
 
Table A1-12 
T-test for mean values of dependent and independent variables across samples. 
  
Total 
observati
ons 
Obs. Of. 
UAE 
Obs. Of. 
Jordan 
Mean 
UAE 
Mean 
Jordan 
Mean 
difference 
t-statistics 
Q 1069 279 790 1.18 1.24 -0.06 (-1.330) 
Bsize 1069 279 790 8.09 8.25 -0.15 (-1.006) 
Bind 1069 279 790 0.69 0.57 0.13*** (9.893) 
FamOwn 1069 279 790 0.14 0.24 -0.09*** (-6.348) 
InstOwn 1069 279 790 0.31 0.36 -0.05*** (-3.059) 
OwnTotal 1069 279 790 0.54 0.60 -0.07*** (-4.452) 
LnFsize 1069 279 790 19.63 16.90 2.73*** (26.176) 
Fage 1069 279 790 24.42 21.17 3.25*** (3.324) 
Leverage 1069 279 790 0.38 0.35 0.04** (2.301) 
Note: This table presents the t tests on the equality of (dependent and independent) means across 
samples (UAE and Jordan). Variables are as defined in Table 4-4. Asterisks indicate significance at 
10% (*) 5% **, and 1% *** respectively.  
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Table A1-3 
T-test for mean values of dependent and independent variables across samples on the basis of year 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
  b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) 
Q 1.660 1.110 1.010 1.050 1.060 1.200 1.200 
 1.310 1.290 1.300 1.220 1.180 1.170 1.220 
 0.35*** -0.18* -0.29*** -0.160 -0.120 0.030 -0.020 
 -2.759 (-1.750) (-3.051) (-1.385) (-1.068) -0.207 (-0.150)    
Bsize 8.240 8.270 8.210 8.030 8.000 7.970 7.920 
 8.420 8.520 8.320 8.250 8.150 8.080 7.980 
 0.170 -0.250 -0.110 -0.230 -0.150 -0.110 -0.060 
 (-0.461) (-0.663) (-0.260) (-0.544) (-0.344) (-0.255) (-0.154)    
Bind 0.690 0.690 0.700 0.700 0.690 0.690 0.690 
 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.550 0.560 
 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 -3.415 -3.489 -3.598 -3.856 -3.507 -4.137 -3.906 
FamOwn 0.150 0.150 0.140 0.130 0.140 0.140 0.140 
 0.210 0.220 0.230 0.240 0.240 0.250 0.250 
 0.060 -0.07* -0.09** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (-1.576) (-1.729) (-2.284) (-2.802) (-2.639) (-2.778) (-2.814)    
InstOwn 0.300 0.280 0.310 0.300 0.310 0.320 0.320 
 0.360 0.350 0.360 0.350 0.350 0.360 0.360 
 0.060 -0.07* -0.050 -0.050 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 
 (-1.473) (-1.762) (-1.085) (-1.034) (-1.021) (-0.881) (-0.876)    
OwnTotal 0.520 0.530 0.540 0.530 0.540 0.550 0.550 
 0.580 0.590 0.600 0.600 0.610 0.620 0.630 
 0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.08*   
 (-1.441) (-1.532) (-1.523) (-1.793) (-1.683) (-1.785) (-1.917)    
LnFsize 20.100 19.610 19.450 19.380 19.390 19.630 19.890 
 17.050 17.030 16.950 16.790 16.790 16.830 16.870 
 3.05*** 2.58*** 2.50*** 2.59*** 2.61*** 2.80*** 3.01*** 
 -10.924 -9.525 -9.602 -9.701 -9.512 -9.746 -10.403 
Fage 21.950 22.760 23.420 24.640 25.030 26.030 27.140 
 18.060 19.160 20.130 21.140 22.270 23.290 24.130 
 3.880 3.590 3.290 3.500 2.750 2.730 3.000 
 -1.509 -1.380 -1.278 -1.375 -1.058 -1.047 -1.153 
Leverage 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.380 0.390 0.400 0.400 
 0.320 0.330 0.330 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 
 0.050 0.040 0.040 0.020 0.040 0.040 0.030 
 -1.012 -0.812 -0.864 -0.385 -1.033 -1.171 -0.830 
Observations 147 148 150 150 147 146 149 
Note: This table presents the t test for mean values of variables used in this research across samples on 
the bases. Variables are as defined and described in Table 4-4. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% 
(*) 5% **, and 1% *** respectively. 
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Table A1-14 
z-test for categorical variable (CEO-Duality) 
  
Obs. 
Total 
 Obs. 
UAE  
Obs. 
JO  
Proportion 
UAE 
Proportion 
Jordan 
Proportion 
difference 
z-
statistics 
Bdual 1069 279 790 0.00 0.20 -0.20*** -7.849 
Note: This table presents the z test for categorical variable (CEO-Duality) across samples (UAE and 
Jordan). Board-duality variable is as being defined in Table 4-4. Asterisks indicate significance at 
10% (*) 5% **, and 1% *** respectively. 
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Appendix 2 
Normal Distribution Curves 
Table A2-1 
Normal distribution curves for the dependent and independent variables of the combined sample (of 
Jordan and UAE) before and after transformation / winsorization where it was required. 
1. Untransformed Tobin's Q Ratio 2. Transferred Tobin's Q Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
3. ROA 4. Winsorized ROA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
5. ROE 6.Winsorized ROE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
7. Family Ownership  
 
 
8. Institutional Ownership  
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9. Ownership Concentration   
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
10. Untransformed Board Size  11. Transformed Board Size  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
12. CEO-Duality  13. Board Independence  
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14. Untransformed Firm Size  15. Transformed Firm Size  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
16. Untransformed Firm Age  17. Transformed Firm Age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
18. Financial Leverage  19. Winsorized Financial leverage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Note: Transformation in this context means applying the natural logarithms form. Financial variables 
are winsorized at 1%. 
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